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4th World Conference on Smoking and Health, 1979, Stockholm, Sweden
“THE SMOKING EPIDEMIC, a matter of worldwide concern”

Excerpts from Concluding address by Mike Daube (founder of ASH-UK): 4th World Conference on Smoking and Health (1979).

The other international agencies like IUEE (International Union for Health Education), and IUAT (International Union Against Tuberculosis) have firmly committed themselves to increased activity, and again you heard from Nigel Gray of the IUCC (International Union Against Cancer) smoking and lung cancer project . While I am paying compliments to international agencies, I believe it would be wrong not to pay tribute to the continuing contributions of the American Cancer Society to international smoking and health activities . They have organised two of the four world conferences so far as well as a host of other events and activities, and they have also quietly, discreetly and without publicity, helped to fund all kinds of international activities run by others; I think they deserve much credit for this . (Applause) (p.4)

The papers on cessation may not have provided us with a miracle cure but they emphasise again in Allan Erickson's words "that we have come a long way since we naively expected smokers to give up when we told them the risks" .(p.8 )

So finally, where do we go from here? I believe we go to war . We recognise quite clearly that this is a war with a determined enemy and with unsuspecting casualties . The tobacco industry has demonstrated in every continent that it has forfeited any right to be regarded as anything other than the opposition . Our enemy is not the smoker; indeed we know that most smokers want to give up smoking and get on to health . Our enemy is the manufacturer who exploits our youth and spreads this modern plague in the third world. Unless we act now there will indeed be something like a modern slaughter of the innocents ……..So let us end where we began : Prof. Hillerdal talked of smoking as the captain of the men of death . The merchants of death - and I assume that phrase was thought up by Sir George Godber because he thought up most of the good phrases we use - the merchants of death are the tobacco manufacturers and we must confront them with every battle field, whether it is health, political, social, environmental or economic or any other . The case for action is overwhelming . We ourselves cannot take the political action but we can make life so uncomfortable for the politicians that they feel compelled to act. (p.11)

I am of course delighted to see so many participants, but the warmest welcome of all I can extend on behalf of you to the representatives of the tobacco industry . I have been delighted to see tobacco representatives taking careful notes - even taking recordings of the proceedings . I hope that their masters will listen very carefully to the words of Dr . Mahler and Sir George Godber . Twelve years ago in New York Senator Robert Kennedy said that the cigarette manufacturers were peddling a deadly weapon : they are dealing in people's lives for financial gain . The peddlers of death here, so far as I can see - and my apologies ..to those I have omitted - include representatives of the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, the British Tobacco Advisory Council, British-American Tobacco, the Philip Morris Company, the U .S . Tobacco Institute and, I suspect, a few more who forgot to mention on their registration forms where they came from . (p.6)


Mahler emphasized the importance of making smoking socially unacceptable. He said that for millions of people it is now embarrassing to smoke and that the social pressure must be on the side of the nonsmoker . According to Mahler, it is now the smokers who have begun to apologize for smoking . However, he warned about the danger of the anti-smoking movement becoming an exclusive group i.e .,that the participants at the conference be viewed as fanatic anti-smokers . (p.8 )

According to Mahler, there is very little political support for fighting the tobacco industry because politicians fear the loss of revenue and upsetting the economy. Moreover, politicians smoke . He suggested that the basic reason there is such little political support for nonsmokers is that their constituents, i.e, the people, don’t care. The key to reversing this trend is to change the social norm . Nonsmoking should be regarded as normal social behavior . Only when people see smoking as socially abnormal will political pressure be felt . (p.10)

In the General Session entitled Smoking and Society, M .A .H . Russell of the U .K . presented a paper entitled Smoking as a Dependency Disorder . Attached hereto is abstract of his paper . According to Russell, smoking is a dependency disorder and, therefore, the reason many smokers can't quit is not because they are weak willed but because they are dependent. Russell claimed that 75% of smokers are motivated to quit smoking but that 25% don't wish to quit . According to Russell, the 25% who do not want to quit are not convinced of the health risks, while the 75% who want to quit can't because they are blocked by dependency. According to Russell, nicotine is the key to the smoker's dependency. He likened the problem of quitting smoking to alcoholism and heroine addiction .(p.24)

Departing from his prepared text, Califano referred to research findings in smoking control . He said that
1 . Where smoking is prohibited in the workplace, there is a decrease in the number of people who smoke and an increase in those who quit ;
and 2. Schools that have good smoking programs have fewer smokers in future years. (p.27)

(emphases added)


In another discussion group . Kurt Baumgartner, Executive Director of the Canadian Council on Smoking and Health, perhaps echoing the opening day "guerilla warfare" advice of WHO's Mahler, stressed that in trying to dissuade the smoker one should avoid upsetting him - that education and persuasion methods including emphasis on social unacceptability work best . (p.12)

The fourth and final day began with a major address by Sir George Young, the
UK's new Parliamentary Under Secretary for health matters . He identified himself as a member of a team of ministers to pursue antismoking policies . He said the big killer diseases are no longer those caused by nature, but these produced by our way of life ; they require intervention in the interest of prevention by politicians, not doctors, and there is a growing interest among parliaments everywhere to protect individuals from themselves .(p.14)

At a news conference attended by eight reporters (half from third world countries), Sir George [Young] was lectured by UPJCTAD's Clairemonta .who told him emotionally that he had no will to do anything and lacked mechanisms even to investigate the tobacco industry . Sir George replied that he believes his government is sufficiently informed about smoking and that the best way to accomplish nothing is to have another inquiry . An aide to Sir George said privately that he bad been told in the past few days that the 4th World Conference had taken on the air of a "Temperance Society meeting" and that he agreed with that sentiment . (p.14)

"And now, he [Daube] continued. "we go to war . Against a determined enemy and with unsuspecting casualties . " (p.18 )

Social (Un)acceptability of smoking will be decisive tool an the road to a smoke-free society .
Four mechanisms :
- passive smoking
- social cost
- eliminate all influences in society which could reflect favourably on smoking
- educational campaigns for children


Flamant of France addressed the topic of lung cancer . One of the more interesting aspects of his paper was his finding that in persons who smaked 30 or more cigarettes per day inhalation did not increase their risk of lung cancer . In fact, in such smokers the relative risk of the inhalers was 8 .4 compared with 14 .0 for the non-inhalers . Flamant noted the similar finding by Doll. (p.15)

Hirayama of Japan addressed the topic of smoking and other cancers .* His paper is based upon his large prospective study which included more than 265,000 adults aged 40 years and over. According to Hirayama, the data presented were all gathered between October and December of the same year . A person in the audience asked Hirayama how 265,000 people could be surveyed in a two-month period. His response that they all worked very hard drew embarrassed giggles from the audience. (p.16)

Larry Garfinkel of the American Cancer Society addressed the topic of cardiovascular disease and smoking instead of E . Cuyler Hammond who was listed in the Program. Several people made critical comments about this paper . For example, Fletcher noted that the data on smoking cessation made it appear as if smoking had nothing to do with cardiovascular disease . And, a questioner from
New Zealand, noting that the recent Surgeon General's Report had played down smoking as a cause of stroke, asked what the American Cancer Society's position was on this issue . Garfinkel conceded that in the United States the recent decrease in stroke has been greater than the decrease in smoking but would not go any farther in defining the ACS's position .

Julian Peto addressed the topic of "smoking in women ." His major theme was that there is no reliable data on women because they have only been smoking 30 to 40 years . . . Much of his talk was addressed to how and why we have such little data on women . He concluded by noting that the data do not support the theory that smoking harms the fetus . According to Peto, this is a red herring argument. (p.17)

Califano referred to WHO's claim that the international tobacco industry's irresponsible behavior and massive advertising and promotional budgets are causing millions of unnecessary deaths .(p.26)

Malmberg presented a paper entitled the Effect of Tobacco Smoke on Pulmonary Function. Malmberg noted that the majority of smokers get neither lung cancer nor emphysema . However, according to Malmberg, the lungs of "healthy smokers" are really sick, i .e ., their lung function is - in fact - impaired even though the objective tests do not disclose it because they are not sensitive enough . He stated that "healthy smokers" who don't have lung cancer or COPD are still sick . Malmberg also indicated that age is the strongest determinant of pulmonary function in healthy smokers and that differences in pulmonary function between smokers and nonsmokers disappear as they get older . He attributed this latter finding to the failure of the tests to identify the damage in smokers. (p.37, 38 )

Hirayama of Japan presented a paper entitled Risk of Dying Attributable to Cigarette Smoking in
Japan . Attached hereto is abstract of paper . According to Hirayama, smoking enhances the risk of dying from all causes of death, as well as from numerous specific conditions, including asthma, cirrhosis of the liver and cancer of the rectum. However, his data on stroke indicated that current cigarette smokers had a lower risk than either ex-smokers or nonsmokers . In fact, the nonsmokers had the highest risk of the three groups .(p.40)

An effective presentation was made by Denis Baird . National Director of the Council on Smoking and Health of
Southern Africa . He estimated the social cost of smoking in South Africa at 400 million rand, though he provided no basis for the estimate .

(emphases added)


On “second-hand smoke”:

Lindahl discussed the Swedish Government's efforts to stop people from smoking . He described tobacco as a threat to the national health, claiming that
Sweden .~ ' was one of the first countries to inform its citizens about the "health hazards" of smoking . He said that smoking was a form of human pollution which inflicts costs and economic burdens on society and that the health of nonsmokers is also affected by atmospheric smoke. According to Lindahl, the Swedish government stands for the principle that no one should be forced to submit to tobacco smoke against their will . He also referred to the government's aim of achieving a society without smoking by the end of this century. (p.5, 6)

Hillerdal claimed that smoking is the leading cause of air pollution and said that he would be surprised if environmental smoke does not contribute to the increase of lung cancer in nonsmokers . He also claimed that environmental tobacco smoke has an adverse effect on children. (p.6, 7)

He [Godber] characterizes the industry as "merchants of death ." He claimed that smoking women impair their unborn and recently born children and that workers subjected to industrial pollution increased their risk of lung cancer because of exposure to tobacco smoke . He referred to an increased risk for pilots and transport drivers who smoke or are exposed to smoke. Godber said that education doesn't work as long as people think of smoking as normal . Yet he acknowledged that smoking can't be banned. Later, he stressed the need to end smoking as a public activity and expressed the hope that by 1990 this can be accomplished . (p.12)

Godber referred to the nonsmoker issue, saying that atmospheric tobacco smoke can be harmful to those who are compromised, i .e ., asthmatics . According to Godber, only a few suffer real physical harm but no one should be allowed to do something that "inconveniences others ." Nor should people be allowed to lead children astray by smoking in their presence .(p.12)

Godber then outlined steps to be taken to control smoking . These were primarily the WHO recommendations . (p.12)

Donovan's most interesting remarks related to smoking and pregnancy . He admitted that he couldn't explain how or why smoking harmed the fetus but suggested that, instead of worrying about such fine points, women be told that all unborn children of smoking women will be hurt . Donovan urged every participant to go back to their countries and publish estimates of the lethality of smoking and pregnancy based on the number of pregnant smokers . He urged this as an effective method to get women to stop smoking .(p.14)

Julian Peto - brother of Richard Peto who collaborates with Sir Richard Doll - challenged Donovan on his smoking and pregnancy remarks . He said that Donovan couldn't establish how many pregnancies are harmed by smoking and that it is unscientific to estimate this simply estimating the number of pregnant smokers . He then showed a slide from his own study supporting his view that smoking has not been established as a cause of neonatal mortality . Donovan vigorously disagreed with Peto's view . Fletcher came to the rescue, noting there was yet room for disagreement in some areas over smoking and health .(p.14, 15)

The chairman of the session on Passive Smoking - Lindahl of Sweden - opened the meeting with a brief review of the literature . Among the papers mentioned were Coley, et al and their work with young children ;
Butler and Goldstein's study of children whose mothers smoked during pregnancy ; Pimm's recent article on the response of healthy individuals to tobacco smoke ; Sussman's work on-tobacco and allergy and Aronow's recent study of angina patients . Based on this review, Lindahl concluded that it is difficult to demonstrate harmful effects of passive smoking on healthy nonsmokers ; there is little proven in this area. He said, however, that many non- smokers - perhaps former smokers - are annoyed by cigarette smoke. He indicated that atmospheric smoke might be a problem for people who are already compromised, such as the angina patients studied by Aronow. Lindahl then noted the criticism of the Aronow study at the recent U .S . Congressional hearing, particularly the point that the study was not conducted in a blind manner.

Hugod presented data on the levels of various tobacco smoke constitutents inhaled by nonsmokers in a laboratory situation. The constituents measured were nitrogenous oxides, carbon monoxide, aldehydes, acrolein, TPM and hydrogen cyanide . Acording to Hugod, the amounts inhaled varied widely. He also presented data on the subjective discomforts registered by the subjects . He concluded that "although passive smokers may suffer considerable subjective discomfort, a lasting adverse health effect is probably not likely to result in otherwise healthy, grown-up individuals ." He further concluded that carbon monoxide is not a good marker for a passive smoker's exposure to atmospheric tobacco smoke.(p28, 29)

Miller said that he had obtained his smoking data from relatives of the decedents (including sons and daughters) ; and that he had eliminated from the study former smokers, alcoholics and overweight people . He also said that he had not included in his study any wife who died before the age of 30 because they would not have had enough smoke exposure to matter and that all of the wives in the study had at least 30 years of smoke exposure. He stated that passive smoking is one-fourth as bad as active smoking . Miller noted the tobacco industry's position that passive smoking is not harmful but rather a slight nuisance . Miller claimed that his study proved the opposite. He also claimed that for every year of heavy exposure to atmospheric tobacco smoke in the workplace, a nonsmoker shortens his life by one month. Miller's paper provoked considerable debate and comment . Miller was asked if he had correlated the deaths of the wives with smoke exposure by number of years and number of cigarettes . He said he had not . Hugod said that this was an important study in an area that needs more work, maybe a prospective study. Miller said that he did not want to do a "Hirayama-type study" because, when you get into questions of dose,it leaves you open to the type of criticism
Sterling has previously levelled at Hirayama . Miller said that Sterling was able to pull out all of the inconsistencies in the Hirayama study because of the great detail presented . Miller said he wanted to avoid this and keep it simple . Another questioner referred to the frequent observation that spouses follow spouses to the grave and asked if Miller was not seeing this phenomenon rather than the adverse impact of tobacco smoke . Miller either did not understand the question or pretended not to understand it . In any event, after having it repeated a couple of times, he refused to answer it . In response to a question of whether there was a higher percentage of lung cancer deaths among the wives of smoking husbands, he said he didn't know . There then ensued a rather lengthy exchange between Miller and Peter Lee of the TAC . Lee's position was that earlier work by Doll showed that Miller's method of analysis was invalid . Needless to say, Miller remained unconvinced. Sterling asked Miller how he could include in his study all women who died after the age of 30 and, at the same time, insure that each deceased wife had 30 years of smoke exposure from their husbands . Sterling pointed out that a women who died at the age of 35 would have to have been married at age 5 . Again, Miller either didn't understand the question or pretended not to . In any event, he gave Sterling no answer .(p.29-31)

Schmidt of Germany delivered a paper entitled The Health Damages of Forced Smoking . A copy of his two sentence abstract and paper is attached hereto . Schmidt's paper was more an anti-tobacco diatribe than a scientific paper . It included such phrases as "the cigarette industry and its stooges ." Yet he admitted that "for theoretical reason [it is] practically impossible to demonstrate induction of e .g . a bronchial carcinoma in a non-smoker by forced smoking ." (p.32)

Some of the topics covered were as follows :
- 1. Schmidt emphasized the presence of nitrosamines in tobacco smoke . He claimed that there is more than 1000 times the amount of nitrosamines in tobacco leaves than in beer and noted Brunnemann's view that sidestream smoke has 50 times more nitrosamines than mainstream smoke .
. 2 . Schmidt said that tobacco smoke is capable of inducing tumors in animals passively smoked . He referred to the work done by the German cigarette industry and Freddy Homburger .
. 3 . Schmidt noted the tobacco industry's demand for proof of harm to nonsmokers, saying that it violates all principles of preventive medicine. Even if there were no carcinogens in tobacco smoke, public smoking should be banned because of irritation .
4 . Schmidt referred to Zussman's claim of 34 million allergic persons being vulnerable to tobacco smoke .
Schmidt concluded that smoking should be banned in the workplace not only to protect the health of the nonsmokers but also to protect the health of the smokers . (p.32, 33)

(emphases added)


4th World Conference (Stockholm) 1979 - Summary

“Clenching his fist as he spoke, Mahler declared that "social pressure is now on the side of nonsmokers" .But in a sharp warning to his audience, he said they are "overwhelmingly fanatical nonsmokers, and that this is "very dangerous . Guerilla warriors must stay close to the enemy . We must not become an exclusive club" .” (p.2)

“Sir George Godber, a veteran of all four World Smoking-Health Conferences held since 1967 and a member of the WHO Expert Committee on Smoking Control, reviewed recommendations published earlier this year by his committee and called for their world-wide adoption . "We cannot ban smoking", he declared,"and therefore we must provide the irretrievable addicts with refuges" . He said he hopes to live to see a "sad, small remnant of addicted smokers" in 1990 .” (p.2)


More people must be persuaded by some means or other to stop smoking, and more people must be persuaded by some means or other not to start. The argument for and against tobacco is not all one-sided but when all advocacy has been heard and the captains and kings have departed, most doctors would agree with Sir George Godber when he said nearly twenty years ago: “it would have been infinitely better for the world if the tobacco plant had never been grown”.


Concern was expressed about the rise in female smoking by many speakers, including Mrs . Erben from
Germany, who also pointed out that "in the absence of protection for nonsmokers . . .the effectiveness of primary prevention is decisively weakened ." (p.329)

(emphases added)


Philip Morris notes on the 4th World Conference (1979)

While some of what Godber said could be called wishful thinking or merely encouragement for less inspired colleagues, it is important to keep in mind that he is typical of many of those leading the anti-smoking campaign. After briefly reviewing the major trends that developed at the first three World Conferences on Smoking and Health, Godber noted~: "Now we are talking about Smoking Control." He went on : "I haven't really tried to make the case against smoking., I am really only arguing about speed and outcome. I don't believe we have to wait for decades., Years ago I worked with a Minister who actually said in public that "of course" we weren’t talking about the end of smoking. But why not ? I think we ARE talking about the end of smoking as a public social activity and I believe we can get to that end much faster than we have ever realized." (p.21)

(emphases added)


3rd World Conference on Smoking and Health, June 2-5, 1975 (New York, USA)
“The Worldwide Campaign Against Smoking”

Sir George E. Godber
Chairman, Expert Committee on Smoking and Health
World Health Organization

(Excerpts from Godber’s opening address)

“In 1969, the World Health Organization Regional Committee for Europe and the Americas had passed resolutions calling attention to the dangers of smoking and deciding that smoking would not be allowed during their meetings.”

“None of us can be really satisfied with what we find anywhere. Yet there has been progress sufficient to make one feel that THIS world conference will have an even clearer message for the world and will be able to endorse and amplify the views expressed at the World Health Assembly in Geneva last month.”

“I imagine that most of us here know full well that our target must be, in the long-term, the elimination of cigarette smoking…… We may not have eliminated cigarette smoking completely by the end of this century, but we ought to have reached a position where a relatively few addicts still use cigarettes, but only in private at most in the company of consenting adults.”

“First, I think we must ask ourselves whether our society is one in which the major influences exercised on public opinion are such as would convey the impression that smoking is a dirty, anti-social practice, spoiling the enjoyment of youth and accelerating the onset of the deterioration of age.”

“Need there really be any difficulty about prohibiting smoking in more public places? The nicotine addicts would be petulant for a while, but why should we accord them any right to make the innocent suffer?”

“…..described the way in which education against smoking was to be incorporated into the general programme of health education which is so well presented in the

Every smoker is a promoter of other smokers. The practice ought to be an enclosed one, not to be endured by the non-smoker in ordinary social intercourse; and no one should be allowed to use advertisement or any indirect means to suggest otherwise.”

If we start with the view that we can begin to get rid of cigarette smoking from many communal occasions and that we can and should make it more and more difficult for the individual to smoke cigarettes in public, and if we can eliminate the false message of the advertisers, I believe we could have a rapidly cumulative effect…..There are plenty of weapons of persuasion, of restriction, of financial penalty by price and tax increases with which we could seriously hope to reduce the consumption of cigarettes by a substantial portion within 5 years.”

A longer-term target would make cigarette smoking an undesirable and private activity within ten years after that.”

(emphases added)


A sampling from the “Conclusions” section of the 3rd World Conference

More effort must be devoted to the identification of those groups of pregnant women whose babies are especially vulnerable due to their mother smoking during pregnancy.

Our society must provide a more fertile atmosphere, economically, intellectually and legislatively, in order for preventive medicine to prosper . Its influence must be improved in medical schools, in hospitals and in our health insurance structures if available preventive procedures, including those involving tobacco usage, can be expected to succeed . At the present time, preventive service programs in most countries are inadequate .

The scope of adult anti-smoking education .programs should be increased to include the non-smoker.

Business, industry, and employee organizations should accept responsibility for their employees health by providing health education programs regarding mortality and disability related to cigarette smoking. Smoking cessation and non-smoker's rights activities should be included in this program .

International airlines corporate leadership should be approached by the
Third World Conference in regard to creating and enforcing nonsmoking seating sections in their aircraft .

Programs aimed at creating a social environment in which smoking is unacceptable .

An educational emphasis on the exemplar role of female adults (especially) as it relates to children).

The utilization of the women's liberation movement to encourage rebellion against the old social systems by the act of not smoking .

The utilization of tobacco tax revenues for smoking education programs .

All organizations and associations concerned with matters of smoking and health should set an example for the societies they serve by taking and enforcing all necessary and appropriate measures for the protection of non-smokers including the prohibition of smoking in their offices, or their conferences and workshops and on the part of any persons representing them professionally or officially at any function or activities .

All organizations and associations concerned with matters of smoking and health should utilize their resources for, and provide their whole-hearted vigorous and unequivocal support to, legislative, administrative and other measures or initiatives for the protection of the health of non-smokers.

The professional medical practitioners concerned with the health of children (i.e., pediatricians, family practitioners and pediatric nurses) be made aware by the sponsors of this conference that the rights of the non-smoking patients are being ignored daily . We, therefore, further recommended that a vigorous education campaign be launched and conducted by professional pediatric associations to provide scientific information about the chemical toxins to which their patients are being exposed and the resultant adult toll.

That professional obstetric associations make their members aware of the scientific evidence that the non-smokers rights of the unborn children are being violated and their health impaired by the involved smoking mothers .

That the educational and legislative efforts of the voluntary non-smokers associations be supported by all of the sponsors of this Conference .

That more time be allocated to the rights of the non-smoker at the Fourth World Conference on Smoking and Health .

That there be no areas for smoking for teachers or students in schools .

A coordinated world-wide campaign against cigarette smoking would dramatize and emphasize this health problem . Therefore, to the extent possible, we recommend that a common theme be adopted internationally . Such a theme should be based on the positive aspects of enjoying freedom from cigarettes . . . that it's fashionable to be free from smoking . The Committee suggests that emphasis be given to special needs of women and children.

We recommend that efforts be made to have tobacco manufacturers and smokers support an educational anti -smoking campaign . In the U .S ., enactment of an additional 10 tax on cigarettes is suggested to support such an educational program . Tax proceeds would be used principally for the purchase of mass media -- time and space .

It is suggested that in the
United States, major health agencies join forces to create and produce anti-smoking material for mass media .

In order to start a new generation of health professionals who will provide a medical environment free of smoking, present health professionals must adopt good health practices themselves specifically not smoking .

No cigarette smoking in the course of professional duties should be a condition of employment in health facilities .

As a condition of acceptance, those seeking admission to health career training facilities should agree not to smoke in the course of professional duties .

When patients visit hospitals, health clinics, neighborhood health centers and similar facilities, health professionals should take the opportunity to conduct education about the hazards of smoking and show smoking patients their personal responsibility in taking a major step toward better health; namely, quitting cigarettes .

Health professionals as exemplars should use their influence to establish a "no smoking" policy at all professional health meetings .

This sub-section believes that the combined efforts of health professionals can help make the use of tobacco socially unacceptable.

The positive health benefits of stopping smoking, even after years of heavy smoking, have been extensively documented . For this reason, and because it is patently unfair for non-smokers to subsidize high insurance rates already generated by self-cause smoking related diseases, and which would be further generated by any coverage of treatment programs, and because reduction in insurance premiums may serve as an incentive to stop smoking and remain free of cigarettes, it is recommended that all forms of health (including prepaid health plans), accident, life and fire insurance be granted to non-smokers at rates appropriately adjusted to reflect their reduced risk status .

Much public education is needed to help create the ideal of a non-smoking oriented society . Such educational activities are required not only for the prevention of smoking but also for the stopping of smoking . Education is needed first and foremost to build smokers' motivation to stop and then to support them to prevent relapse .

It is further recommended that all schools which train physicians nurses and other health professionals develop course materials on smoking and health the benefits of cessation, and methods for helping people stop smoking. Students who smoke should be strongly encouraged by faculty members to stop and programs to help students, faculty and staff should be made available by the school . Finally, it is recommended that hospitals ban smoking in all semi-private rooms, wards, clinics waiting rooms cafeterias and other public places within the hospital and prohibit the sale of cigarettes on hospital property . Smoking in hospital should be restricted to limited designated areas out of view of patients and the general public .

Exposure to tobacco smoke is aggravating and sometimes harmful to non-smokers and adds to the problems of those who have recently stopped smoking . Restricting areas where smoking is permitted in public places will provide important incentives to those who are trying to stop smoking and to others who have stopped and require support to remain free of tobacco . Therefore, it is recommended that as a part of national health policy the use of tobacco should be viewed as behavior that is destructive to self and to others and to implement this aspect of policy by appropriate legislation, regulation, and voluntary action, there should be a deliberate and systematic enlargement and guarantee of non-smoking areas in all public places including places of employment . Non-smokers should always have the right to work in smoke free areas . Furthermore, the sale of cigarettes in vending machines drugstores, public transport and supermarkets, and other commercial outlets should be banned and restricted to government licensed tobacco shops .

That Governments be urged to develop comprehensive programs directed against the smoking of cigarettes and based on the recommendations of this conference and those of the WHO expert Committee on Smoking and its Effects on Health.

That Governments be urged to introduce legislation to require the production of cigarettes of low tar and nicotine content .

That there be progressive and regular increases in the tax on cigarette tobacco .

That it be recognized that unrestricted tobacco smoking in closed areas create a health hazard for millions of persons with a wide variety of medical susceptibilities and conditions and causes physical irritation and discomfort to the majority of nonsmokers and therefore, THAT legislation be introduced and that existing legislation be enforced to protect the right of the nonsmokers and to shield them from the hazards and irritations of passive smoking and THAT such legislation include the banning of smoking in public places such as cinemas, libraries, shops, trains, buses, and conference rooms .

That legislation be introduced by governments
a) To prohibit smoking in all educational institutions .
b) To prohibit the sale of tobacco to minors under the age of 16 .
c) To prohibit smoking in public by minors under the age of 16 .
d) To make education in the hazards of smoking compulsory in all
educational institutions .

That senior government officials be urged to refrain from smoking in the exercise of their duties .

That all organizations and associations concerned with the matter of smoking and health set an example by taking and enforcing all necessary and appropriate measures for the protection of the health and comfort of the non-smokers, including the prohibition of smoking in their offices, at their conferences and workshops, and on the part of any person representing them .

That general or family physicians be encouraged to take the initiative in anti-smoking activities in their role as exemplars in their communities .

That it be recommended to members of the teaching profession that they accept their role as exemplars in the campaign against smoking .

That in hospitals smoking by members of the medical and nursing staff be prohibited and that other members of the staff who smoke do so in segregated areas and that smoking by visitors to non-smoking patients be prohibited .

That it be recognized by all organizations and associations concerned with smoking and health that the campaign against smoking is political and economic in character and requires decisions based on political and economic factors . As a consequence each government should appoint a special committee whose members have expertise in these areas .

(emphases added)


From The Tobacco Institute Newsletter (Re: 3rd World Conference)

Nesbitt was applauded out of politeness after telling the conference there’s little if any evidence of tobacco smoke danger for non-smokers; that everybody better watch out for ‘quacks and charlatans’ in the quit-smoking clinic field; and that a ‘more pragmatic, as opposed to an emotional approach’ might be preferable in the anti-smoking field.

Said Nesbitt: “We must all be ware that reports in both the scientific and popular media regarding other suspected causes (of lung cancer)………It is incumbent upon all of us concerned with this subject to exercise total objectivity and in so doing, avoid being trapped by over-simplification of issues beyond which the audience will hear but not heed”.

Some of John Banzhaf’s activity was also noted:

Banzhaf of Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) helped himself to the newsroom to denounce ACS and other voluntary health organizations for not prohibiting smoking among their own staffs.

Banzhaf disclosed he’s filed a six-point petition for rule-making at Federal Trade Commission: 1. Prohibit attractive people in cigarette ads; 2. Require relative ‘tar’-nicotine disclosure in brand ads; 3. Prohibit cigarette coupons and premiums; 4. Ban cigarette billboards; 5. Require ads to state the ‘difficulties of smoking cessation’; 6. Require ads to state a warning about danger to nonsmokers.

Sir George [Godber] surrounded himself with an all-North American group of section chairmen who huddled with him until the wee hours of adjournment morning to prepare conference recommendations. Something went awry, however, because the ‘recommendations’ turned out to be ‘conclusions’…….Sir George guessed between 150 and 200 [conclusions]. He declared them acceptable without debate, and forecast their appearance in the proceedings he thought might become available ‘likely sometime early next year’.

Among the conclusions:
- Research to find out if smoke harms nonsmokers;
- “Elimination of smoking cigarettes”;
- Include quit-smoking assistance in health insurance;
- Create ‘a social environment in which smoking is unacceptable’;
- Ban all smoking in all schools;
- Classify tobacco as addictive and smokers as drug-dependent;
- Preempt 5% of tobacco sales revenues for antismoking ‘education’;
- Raise tobacco prices enough to discourage sales;
- Ban all forms of tobacco advertising and promotion;
- Set up committees of sophisticated politicians and economists in every country to help pursue stated goals.

Overall, observers saw heightened dedication and clearly visible anti-tobacco progress throughout the world. Though publicity levels were clearly so low as to disappoint the conference organizers, the world’s antismoking activists went home with sharply focused notes on both the useful and useless ways to progress toward Sir George Godber’s stated goal.

(emphases added)








Rampant Antismoking Signifies Grave
Danger: Materialism Out of Control

Vincent-Riccardo Di Pierri, PhD


May, 2003
Paperback, 578 pages.

     Rampant Antismoking Signifies Grave Danger presents an examination of the antismoking mentality in greater, multidimensional context. The book's discussion covers biological (epidemiologic), psychological, social/relational, moral, legal, and metaphysical considerations in indicating that rampant antismoking is not coincidental but symptomatic of dangerous, fully-fledged materialism (rule by superficiality): The unchecked rise of antismoking, globally, is a telling, disturbing sign of the times.

       The book is strongly researched, packed with a wealth of information and discussion. In addition to over 350 formal references, there are numerous newspaper citations and a number of case studies. Rampant Antismoking Signifies Grave Danger is a scholarly work highly critical of lifestyle epidemiology and the "health" promotion industry. It is a most engaging, stimulating, and enlightening work. It goes far in filling a glaring void concerning assessments of the antismoking and materialist mentality, and proffers insights into critical signs of the times.

The Author studied undergraduate Psychology & Philosophy at the University of Melbourne, Australia, and was awarded a PhD in Psychology at the same university in 1991.

The Author has, and has had, no affiliation with either the tobacco industry (or affiliated organizations) or the medical establishment (or affiliated organizations).

Last updated: 15 Dec, 2009



1967 - World Conference on Smoking & Health, New York, NY, USA
1971 - 2nd World Conference on Smoking & Health, London, UK
1975 - 3rd World Conference on Smoking & Health, New York, NY, USA
1979 - 4th World Conference on Smoking & Health, Stockholm, Sweden
1983 - 5th World Conference on Smoking & Health, Winnipeg, MB, Canada
1987 - 6th World Conference on Smoking & Health, Tokyo, Japan
1990 - 7th World Conference on Tobacco & Health, Perth, WA, Australia
1992 - 8th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, Buenos Aires, Argentina
1994 - 9th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, Paris, France
1997 - 10th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, Beijing, China
2000 - 11th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, Chicago, Ill, USA
2003 - 12th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, Helsinki, Finland
2006 - 13th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, Washington D.C., USA
2009 - 14th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, Mumbai, India
2012 - 15th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, Singapore

The contemporary antismoking crusade has manipulated/altered psychology and social/economic/cultural/political structures the world over. One of the manipulations instrumental in its ‘success’ is avoiding scrutiny by smearing anyone that dares question antismoking policies and methods. By its beliefs and tactics, antismoking conducts itself like a cult. The antismoking industry is now so large and mainstream that questionable, inflammatory claims are produced with high regularity. There are so many such claims working to an agenda that it is impossible to keep up with scrutiny.

The current antismoking crusade has a clear beginning and framework. Rather than try to keep abreast of a myriad of questionable claims, it is wiser to consider what the antismoking framework has been from the outset, and to consider it by antismokers’ own words. Provided below are excerpts from antismoking conferences and manuals. By this information, the public can then properly judge the basis and nature of the contemporary antismoking ‘movement’.

In the 1970’s, the idea of disease attributed to smoking was questionable. The ‘death toll’, a statistical exercise, attributed to smoking was questionable. The idea of ‘nicotine addiction’ was questionable. A glaring absence in the literature and official reports was/is coherent causal argument. There was/is only the constant assumption of cause, made to substitute for explanation. All that was required in epidemiological circles is that a small group concluded that a relationship was causal for that relationship to be promoted so, i.e., ‘causation’ by consensus. (see also RASGD)

Many claims/conclusions made at the 3rd World Conference were anything but scientifically ‘settled’. A pertinent question, then, is who authorized denormalization/abnormalization/stigmatization of smokers? Who decided that it was ‘the way to go’? Who decided that ‘elimination of cigarette smoking’ was a coherent goal? It seems that it was this antismoking group at the 3rd World Conference that manufactured all the conclusions. Under the auspices of the World Health Organization, and under the banner of “Worldwide Campaign Against Smoking”, this small group led by Godber (a WHO representative) decided that it had a definitive view of the world and smoking - the issues were “settled” - establishing a ‘blueprint’ for action. The overriding goal of the ‘blueprint’ was to eradicate smoking from public (indoor and outdoor) places through denormalization of smoking/smokers.

but why should WE accord them any right”
“WE may not have eliminated cigarette smoking completely”
“but WE ought to have reached a position”
“and no one should be allowed to use advertisement or any indirect means to suggest otherwise”

Who do these ‘WE’ think they are? The ‘WE’ are obviously haters of smoke/smoking/smokers, i.e., acute, pathological fixation. The ‘WE’ speak as though they are absolute rulers, a typical symptom of those suffering a god complex or tyrannical tendencies. Likewise with the final statement indicating that no one is permitted to disagree with ‘WE’.

Interestingly, many of the antismoking claims made (e.g., smoking and disease, smoking and pregnancy, ‘passive’ smoking, and nicotine ‘addicts’), and that had no/little underlying evidence, are a continuation of the obsessions of the Nazi medical establishment - essentially idea-for-idea, preoccupation-for-preoccupation: They align with deranged materialist ideology - the cult of the body. And, the tyrannical stance is essentially the same, although not as extreme: To promote a deranged goal, eliminate (through vilification and enforced exclusion) all opposition. This deluded group of misfits decided that they had a definitive view of the world and would go about fixing the ‘smoker problem’ - a sort of ‘final solution’ to be accomplished in orchestrated steps through ‘weapons of persuasion, restriction, etc.’ Even with the advantage of hindsight, of only recent history, the global medical organization (WHO) was venturing again into dangerous territory.

There are a number of important observations that can be made here. Firstly, the conduct of this antismoking group demonstrates some typical symptoms of cultism - delusion of grandiosity, delusion of omniscience/infallibility, delusion of benevolence. This group perfectly ‘understood’ disease, the solution, and how society should function. They made it clear that it doesn’t matter what anyone else thinks. Only their thinking is important. Given the deranged belief that they have a ‘definitive’ view of the world, they concluded that any ‘reasonable’ person would fully share their view. The idea of coherent information conveyed to the autonomous individual for decision-making was comprehensively steam-rolled. This group even believed that it stood over the public, society being an experimental quantity entirely at its disposal. The notes of the 3rd World Conference, statement after statement, seethe with contrived hatred of smoking and smokers. This group demonstrated no more than shallowness of thought, bigotry, obsession with control, and dictatorial tendencies - amongst other psychological and relational dysfunction. These antismokers demonstrated a severely exaggerated view of their competence, understanding, benevolence, and self-importance.

Secondly, it must be emphasized that the many claims pre-date ‘evidence’. For example, there is a call for research to explore whether environmental tobacco smoke poses a danger to nonsmokers. Yet, Godber already refers to such “harm” and Banzhaf wanted a warning of such on cigarette packs. The ‘Conclusions’ section indicates “[a]ll organizations and associations concerned with matters of smoking and health should utilize their resources for, and provide their whole-hearted vigorous and unequivocal support to, legislative, administrative and other measures or initiatives for the protection of the health of non-smokers.”

Thirdly, consider the imperative “set up committees of sophisticated politicians and economists in every country to help pursue stated goals” (i.e., elimination of cigarette smoking). No-one voted the WHO or its antismoking fanatics as overseers of the world. Nor did any specific society ask for their guidance. Societies around the world that would have the Godber Blueprint inflicted upon them had no say in the infliction. This is a global organization by-passing/bulldozing due process and ultimately undermining national sovereignty. The WHO (an agency of the UN), and its 'sanctioned helpers', is accountable to no-one.

Fourthly, the idea of nonsmokers rights is a misnomer. The Godber Blueprint is an antismoking, not nonsmoking, view. Godber’s views on smoking are not too far removed from Hitler’s (see RASGD) There is a number of Godber’s statements that indicate that for him antismoking was a moralist crusade - e.g., “smoking is a dirty, anti-social practice”, “but why should we accord them [nicotine addicts] any right to make the innocent suffer?”. Yet, Godber provides no coherent moral argument, just a series of questionable beliefs.

Fifthly, of those presenting papers, by invitation only, at the conference, there is not one on tobacco-plant science or on psychology - either concerning psychological aspects of smoking or on the psychology of fanaticism. The view presented at the conference represents a very narrow, flawed view of smoking and a very flawed and dangerous view of Public Health. And, it would appear that this absence of expertise was not coincidental: The intent was/is to promote antismoking globally. While there has been ample opportunity over the ensuing three-plus decades to correct wayward claims, this has not occurred. Rather, an entire bureaucracy has been built to protect the original Blueprint and its fulfillment.


Demonize the tobacco industry. Eradicate all industry advertising. The tobacco industry will be portrayed as always evil, public health as always good. Public health is always right - anyone questioning public health will be smeared (argument ad hominem) as a tobacco industry shill or sympathizer/apologist, i.e., wrong by association.

Smoking will be punished through taxation and the removal of smoking-permitted areas. Any reference to smoking/smokers will always be negative and never positive. Smoking will always be referred to as abnormal behavior. Smoking will be depicted as a non-normal or abnormal behavior. Smokers would be depicted, in a wholly derogatory sense, as ‘nicotine addicts’: Smoking would be ‘reduced’ to no more than nicotine addiction. In short, nonsmokers are ‘superior’, smokers are ‘inferior’.

Those in education and public health will be the first to be brainwashed into antismoking, and should be ‘exemplars’ of ‘normal’, nonsmoking behavior. Those choosing to smoke should have their employment terminated in these ‘exemplar’ industries, to begin with.

Most interesting is that in the ensuing three-plus decades since the Godber Blueprint, the research themes, ‘findings’, ‘interpretations’, re-definitions, and policy demands ALL magically align, one by one, with the Blueprint.

The 4th World Conference was a reinforcement of the Godber Blueprint. There was much deluded, cultic belief indicated and occasional references to flawed research. Godber gave further insights into the ‘moralism’ of his ‘crusade’ - “Nor should people be allowed to lead children astray by smoking in their presence”; “it would have been infinitely better for the world if the tobacco plant had never been grown”.

Donovan’s suggestions would reflect the modus operandus of future tobacco control: When there is no evidence to support deluded antismoking beliefs, just make up the ‘evidence’.

Daube also indicated the driving force behind international antismoking - the WHO and the American Cancer Society. Again, these organizations are accountable to no-one.

5th World Conference on Smoking and Health, 1983, Winnipeg, Canada


A Dilemma
This list, which is by no means complete and whose arrangement may be questioned, presents an arsenal of powerful weapons . A signal of their importance is the fact that, with few exceptions, these measures have been fought vigorously by the tobacco industry

On the other hand, it is also clear that the list of restrictions may cause irritation in the general population, and a feeling of being under the guardianship of the authorities . Boomerang effects may occur if restrictions are not introduced with caution . Therefore, it is important not to implement restrictions which will not be understood and respected .
This situation demonstrates our dilemma : if restrictions are not utilized, we may lose opportunities to influence a major health problem. If utilized too fast, and without intelligence, they may turn out to be useless and even counter-productive .

To find a point of balance, it is necessary to observe public opinion in this field closely . Surprisingly, however, when public opinion is measured, it may reveal that people agree to restrictions more often than anticipated . (p.32)

This new development in the smoking epidemic is still not enough . It is time to call a spade a spade, and announce our final goal: the eradication of the problem .

In 1981, the Norwegian Medical Association passed the following resolution-
"The Representative Body of the Norwegian Medical Association urges the Government to work towards making
Norway a smokefree society by the year 2000 . . . Phasing out the consumption of tobacco is an important step towards improving the health of the nation ."

This resolution has received extensive publicity . The doctors ask the Government not only to turn its attention to this avoidable health problem, but to rid the country of it within a reasonable time .

Some will find this goal utopian and unrealistic, and think that more time is needed . This may very well be so . The main point, however, is that eradication has been set up as an attainable goal, and that this goal should be reached within the forseeable future . This ought to be possible . With few exceptions, cigarettes started to invade the industrialized countries at the beginning of this century . It should be possible to get them out before we have gone too far into the next . (p.41)

What, then, are the prospects? The simple answer is that our goal will not be obtained unless politicians and the general public all over the world are mobilized on our side.
Mike Daube has a favourite sentence : "If you wish to do something about the smoking and health problem, you are in politics" . We have to realize that this is the fact . Our task is to confront the politicians with the enormous magnitude of the problem, to make them see that it is the greatest epidemic of modern times . They must pass from a stage of only pretending serious concern, into a stage of active involvement and determination . Let us ask them the pertinent question : Do you really want to do something about the problem? Or is your involvement only a question of lip-service?

Some of us may think that our job is merely to account for the scientific evidence, and that the medical journals are the only media acceptable as a communication channel . Involvement in political pressure is below one's dignity for many professional people . In my opinion, such an attitude is out of touch with real life . We should be aware that our opponents, the tobacco industry, are experts in lobby activities and creation of political pressure . Who is going to create a counter-pressure, and tell the decision-makers the other side of the story, if not us?

This does not mean that we have to become politicians . But we should realize that we all are political human beings, and utilize all possible channels to make the politicians stand up and take responsibility . One thing is certain, without active political involvement, we shall never reach the final goal . Therefore, let us act, and let us act now . (p.43)

(emphases added)



The rapid growth of medical care expenditure over the last few decades has made medical care a major policy issue . Life-style factors, particularly smoking, have been blamed frequently as an important cause for the high and rising expenditure .

This study demonstrates that the problem is far more complex . Reducing smoking not only decreases age-specific annual medical care utilization rates but simultaneously increases longevity . The cost relevance of the latter effect is strengthened by the fact that health care expenditure increases dramatically with age . Modelling these counterbalancing effects appropriately, this study implies that the impact of smoking on medical care expenditure is marginal .

A few caveats are called for, however . First, at the present stage of research, the quantitative impact of smoking on mortality and, even more so, on medical care use has to be approximated using relatively crude methods . However, the conclusion that smoking is not likely to increase medical care expenditure seems to hold over a wide range of assumptions . Using alternative assumptions about the quantitative role of smoking even implies that reducing or eradicating smoking, in the long run, would increase rather than decrease medical care expenditure . Second, treatment costs in terms of real resource use are not known by disease and, therefore, average costs per consultation and hospital day had to be used . It is conceivable that treatment of smoking related diseases causes different costs in terms of real resource use than treatment of other diseases . However, no such evidence exists . (p.493)

(emphases added)


Report on 5th World Conference on Smoking and Health,
Winnipeg, Canada, 1983


The overall impression gained at the Conference was that the anti-smoking movement had come of age. It has consolidated itself in many Western countries in durable, well-organised pressure groups. It has established beachheads in various government agencies and international organizations. In several Western countries, it can point to legislative and political successes. The movement has recently gained a much clearer sense of purpose and adopted a carefully mapped-out strategy which was repeated continuously throughout the conference so that even the least bright activist could understand it. While there are still battles ahead, with the tobacco industry as a putatively powerful adversary, the mood at
Winnipeg was up-beat and optimistic.
There did not appear to be much interest in scientific findings and in fact, little new emerged on the scientific research front. As was repeatedly stated by several speakers, the position is that all relevant data are in now and there are no more important open questions; the agenda now is one of action, not of research. It follows that anyone who still has doubts about the scientific evidence concerning the pathogenic effects of smoking is willfully ignorant. In other words, the case has been proved and one should now get on with the practical implications. Consequently, the conference was primarily devoted to strategy, tactics and techniques of anti-smoking programs. (p.1)

A small cadre of people, under the umbrella of an "International Liaison Committee on Smoking and Health", is now coordinating the global campaign against tobacco (see later section of report for greater detail). This Committee was instrumental in drawing up a list of 15 "Top priority recommendations to be carried out internationally as swiftly as possible". These cover virtually the full range of anti-smoking activities and show where the attack will be carried forward.
These recommendations are enclosed with this report and it is of interest that delegates were not given an opportunity to vote on them or express an opinion. They do, however, now comprise the "official" determination of the Conference and will be considered as such when their substance is transmitted to government leaders, health ministers and other authorities in all countries and international agencies. (p.2)

The first
US city-wide law regulating smoking in the workplace was recently adopted in San Francisco. Canada's Health and Welfare Ministry has begun a long-term program, possibly 15 years, to create a "generation of Non-smokers". Programs with similar goals have been initiated in many places. (p.3)

A recommendation from the "Health Consequences" rapporteur called for more research in this [passive smoking] area, noting there was conflicting evidence in regard to lung cancer. Nevertheless, "passive" smoking will continue to be stressed, not only in connection with lung cancer, heart disease, effects on children, etc., but also as a major source of annoyance and irritation for nonsmokers. The "passive" smoking theme will be used even more strongly, particularly in the political-legislative arena. It is something that people generally find easy to believe. (p.4)

…..US activist Dr. Stanton Glantz, attacking the US tobacco industry's recent "free choice" advertising campaign, said "passive" smoking "probably holds the key to controlling and reducing primary smoking". (p.4)

There will be no diminution of efforts in this [economic costs] area. The charges will continue to relate smoking to increased costs to society because of its alleged effects on health. This theme was not ignored at
Winnipeg where it was addressed by several speakers. One, however, strayed from the party line. Robert Leu of Basel, Switzerland, reported a study whose results, he said, "imply that smoking does not increase medical care expenditure and, therefore, reducing smoking decrease it". (p.5)

Australia's BUGA-UP extremists, whose session was the only one to be repeated by popular demand, will no doubt continue their billboard-defacing activities and their enthusiasm may catch on elsewhere. Non-cigarette items, such as clothing and equipment of various kinds that carry cigarette brand names, will also be a likely target.
An effort is being made on an international basis to persuade well-known personalities in sports, entertainment, the arts, etc., not to participate in any form of tobacco advertising or promotion. Author of this idea is Simon Chapman of
Australia who was at Winnipeg selling copies of, and giving a paper on, his recently published 53-page "The Lung Goodbye -- A manual of tactics for counteracting the tobacco industry in the 1980's". His manual had a ready sale at Can. $4 a piece and its contents are considered so "enlightning" that it is enclosed with this package. (p.7)

One of the "top priority" recommendations said that world religious leaders and groups would be asked to support actively the international anti-smoking program. An approach was to be made to the World Council of Churches which meets in
Vancouver, Canada, July 24 - August 10. It can be presumed that the Confereence chairman communicated with officials there. The Council holds an Assembly every six to eight years; its previous Assembly was in 1975.
A session on smoking and religion was held during the Conference. Speakers included a Canadian Rabbi, a
US Seventh-day Adventist, a UK Archbishop and a US Mormon. The chairman was an Egyptian Moslem, Dr. Omar Sherif. All inveighed againsst tobacco with varying degrees of clarity. Only 14 persons attended what had been promoted as a major new field.
For the benefit of readers in Islamic countries, the section on smoking and Islam is reported here in more detail.
Dr. Omar Sherif gave a short resume of the introduction of tobacco into Moslim areas and the teachings of Islam regarding its use. Reference was made to studies and tradition within Islam as a basis for serious questions about tobacco use with a consensus that it should be prohibited because of the following reasons : harmful habit, no nutritional or medical value, wasteful habit, offensive and irritating to others (especially in Islamic worship environs) , classed as an intoxicant or narcotic and as a behavioral modifier and change agent, i.e., "making a pleasant person unpleasant". Having identified these reasons for prohibition, Dr. Sherif concluded that Islamic law does not specifically prohibit tobacco use and usage depends on interpretation of the law. He further explained, however, that, current Islamic thought affirms the dangers of experimentation with both tobacco and alcohol, and the requirement for older Moslems to teach discipline and model sobriety for new Islamic generations.
Dr. Sherif ended his presentation by reporting on two recent events that support a more aggressive strategy for a policy of prohibition. The first was a March 1983 International Islamic conference in Saudi Arabia at the holy city of Mecca that recommended prohibition because tobacco usage was not beneficial but harmful to human health, wasteful (time, energy, creative accomplishment for Allah), and causes lassitude in users. The second event described televising anti-smoking sermons by imams from
Cairo mosques and the positive response from the Moslem community, thus promoting more extensive media use by religious leaders in anti-smoking campaigns. (p.9-10)

The primary session on "Taxation and Social Intervention" was held on Tuesday afternoon in a side room with an audience of around 45 people and contrary to the agenda, chaired by Dr. W.F. Forbes,
Canada. The session ranged far beyond taxation and addressed itself to strategies and tactics on the "economic war" against tobacco. It should be noted that increasing taxation as a successful tool for reducing consumption was mentioned by several speakers at various other sessions.
...Last but not least : Kjell Bjartveit of
Norway, a leading anti-smoker campaigner, said the EEC should be drawn into the fray. (p.11)
Four years ago at the Stockholm Conference, it was observed that there were two quite distinctive institutional interests represented within the anti-smoking complex . Bureaucratic interests (W.H.O., Western government agencies,
Third World government agencies) and movement interests (the various non-governmental anti-smoking groups). These two interests were anything but identical, with the bureaucratic interests being more reasonable, less absolutist, and therefore capable of compromises with the industry.
Although the distinction between these two interests is still apparent, there appears to have taken place a certain interpenetration. A number of bureaucrats seem strongly committed to the anti-smoking cause. More important, the non-governmental anti-smoking groups have clearly become more bureaucratised and professionalised since
Stockholm. There has been a displacement of missionaries by technicians, i.e. by people with a great deal of political and organising competence. They may be less fanatical in their adherence to the cause, but they are much more formidable in getting things done both on the level of influencing political processes (including legislation) and on the level of shaping public opinion ("education"). One might now speak of an anti-smoking conglomerate, a network of interlocking governmental and non-governmental organisations. (p.12)

WHO's commitment to the anti-smoking cause is absolute and considerable. One need only read these comments from a speech made at
Winnipeg by Dr. Roberto Masironi, Coordinator of the WHO program on Smoking and Health :
"WHO's position is ... that measures like legislation to control advertising, taxation, health education and public information systems have already proved effective to some extent in developed countries. These activities should be more vigorously pursued. An intensive educational campaign should be directed at young school children... THE AIM SHOULD BE TO HAVE A NON-SMOKING GENERATION AND NO SMOKING BY THE YEAR 2000" (Emphasis added).
And further : "If steady pressure is maintained and is further spread, it is reasonable to expect that the habit of tobacco smoking, which is a major threat to health and a social nuisance, could progressively be phased out of the social mainstream". (p.14)

The WHO originates national and international seminars on lung cancer, cardiovascular diseases and respiratory ailments at which smoking control often is a priority item. Another purpose of these seminars, according to Masironi, is "to sensitize governments to implement national smoking control programs". (p.15)
The UICC has a busier, more structured anti-smoking program than any other major international organization. The medium for this is its Smoking Control Program which, under the leadership of Nigel Gray, conducts Smoking Control Workshops around the world. The program reportedly is financed by annual grants ct $55,000 from UICC and $50,000 from NORAD, the latter earmarked for developing countries. Obviously, host countries contribute. Twenty-four Workshops have been held since 1976 and it is hoped that there will be at least 10 annually from 1983 on. (p.15)

For the first time, a representative of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was at Winnipeg to make a formal presentation at a World Conference on Smoking and Health. He said UNESCO considers tobacco and alcohol are drugs. The agency occasionally issues publications dealing with drugs that include mention of tobacco. Another first at
Winnipeg was the appearance of a representative of the League of Red Cross Societies. He briefly expressed the League's support for the Conference and said it was the League's hope to have a new generation of non-smokers. (p.19)

The 1987 World Conference on Smoking and Health will be held in
Kitakyushu, Japan, a city seven hours by train from Tokyo. For this to have happened means that somebody has already guaranteed the availability of a substantial amount of money. Dr. Hirayama will be the Conference President.
The Winnipeg Conference attracted 1,086 delegates from 79 countries (11 more than
Stockholm) and cost $700,000, according to its organizers. Expecting a deficit, they were seeking more funds. They also needed money for a number of third world delegates who had been given one-way tickets to Winnipeg. Some funds for the Conference had been provided by the government- sponsored Swedish International Developmental Authority, which has been involved in previous Conferences. (p.20)

Michael Daube proposed that tobacco industry representatives be barred from future Conferences. Delegates were asked to respond to this point on a questionaire and, while results were not disclosed, it is possible a majority would be in favour. Daube also suggested that anti-smoking activists single out tobacco company officers and directors by name. In other words, personalize the attack.
The BUGA-UP presentation attracted such a crowd that it was repeated - to much applause. An Australian doctor (Chesterfield-Evans) who is a member of the group said it was started by "three fringe lunatics" and now involves hundreds of people.
A representative from the Consumer's Association of Penang, Malaysia, said there were 500,000 heroin addicts in his country and that tobacco smoking leads to heroin addiction. Martin Khor Kok Peng indicated he would try to establish some sort of international network to provide politicians with anti-tobacco information. His association has just begun publication of an anti-smoking newspaper called “Liberation”.
The walls of the Conference centre's corridors and meeting rooms were covered with anti-smoking posters done by children in various countries. It was reported that many of these posters will be used for a book. (p.22)

The most popular exhibit was one that played the British television film "Death in the West", every day, all day. Members of Californians for Nonsmokers' Rights [Stanton Glantz], the exhibitors, took orders for tape copies at $50 each. It was said nearly 500 copies had been paid for or ordered. (p.23)

Free apples, bananas, oranges and bran muffins were available at breaks during the Conference. Young athletes, clad in gymnasium attire, conducted brief exercise rituals for delegates at many sessions. Health for all. (p.23)

US Federal Trade Commissioner Michael Pertschuk said a universal prescription for the "cure of smoking" would be 10 percent medical and 90 percent political. (p.24)

The anti-smoking forces see the industry as a wealthy and powerful entity, but one that is vulnerable and can be defeated by carefully planned and patiently executed campaigns. (p.25)

(emphases added)


A manual of tactics for
counteracting the tobacco industry
in the 1980s
as a contribution to


“Some remarkable things have been happening to the tobacco industry in Australia in the past four years . Consumers and health workers, appalled by the 16,000 annual tobacco related deaths, by the industry's galloping promotional activities and especially by the inertia of a conservative government in acting with any force grew tired of 'working through the correct channels' . Radical critiques of the futility of traditional individual-directed forms of smoking control in seriously effecting community health quickly spawned radical actions. Suddenly, the industry was forced to contend with a whole new arsenal of tactics and their responses on many occasions have proved woefully inept .” (Foreword)

One of the main aims of this monograph is to describe aspects of the 'so much more' that are involved . It should be read as a fine cook book - a smoking control activists' manual that considers ways of both frustrating the Industry's marketing efforts and shaping public and political opinion favourably towards smoking control goals . It is not so much concerned with what changes and actions need to be taken to check the Industry as with how these might take place . The Union Internationale Contre le Cancer (U .I .C .C .) manual, Guidelines for Smoking Control [2] and the World Health Organisation report Controlling the Smoking Epidemic [3] contain the most complete and concise statements of the goals of a total smoking control program.

Many governments by now have been handed policy documents, reports and recommendations by their hopeful expert advisors urging adoption of the standard set of legislative smoking control measures . Often these are backed up by the most reasoned and researched arguments, yet in spite of lofty government declarations about commitment to reducing smoking , they are seldom enacted. The reasons are nearly always political and this monograph will consider arguments and suggestions as to how smoking control may be more forcefully politicized, thereby giving politicians an imperative to act .

The task ahead is to assess and act on ways of turning this armchair, do-nothing acceptance into a virtual obligation to act . Briefly, this will probably best be done by engineering public antipathy to the tobacco industry to such a point that it would become embarrassing for a government not to act . While such a point is being reached, there is much that can be done . Goals like bans on advertising and promotion and forcing disclosure of chemical additives in the manufacturing process are as important as processes as they are as goals because of the way their difficult attainment can inspire massive press coverage that often takes in the wider aspects of the smoking issue . (p.3)

All the tactics and strategies that are to be discussed, especially in Chapter 4, are totally within the law, although in nations with repressive and openly corrupt political regimes, the power of the tobacco industry may conceivably result in harsh treatment for anyone who seeks to disrupt the progress of such a 'favoured' industry in some of the ways suggested . Many of the suggestions to be made could be described as radical, confrontational and ‘uncivilised’. No apology is made for this or for the lack of any deliberately reformist/gradualist orientation to dealing with the tobacco industry . (p.4)

Civil Disobedience .
To some, the assurance above about the tactics to be discussed being within the law, may seem a surprising statement . However, recently in
Australia, a widespread national campaign of civil disobedience involving graffiti spray painting of tobacco billboard advertisements (BUGA UP or Billboard Utilising Graffitists Against Unhealthy Promotions) has emerged as perhaps the most visible form of anti-smoking activity in the country . Several doctors, teachers and health workers have been among those fined by the courts for this form of pro-social vandalism which has attracted overwhelming public financial and moral support - a modern day Robin Hood phenomenon . History reveals some groups who break laws as champions of causes judged eventually as being more just or of higher principle than the status quo the law being broken sanctifies . One thinks of the suffragette movement, the campaign for nuclear disarmament and environmentalist groups who regularly break the law in confronting corporate polluters and destroyers . The work of BUGA UP may be considered parallel to other social reforming groups who have broken the law for what they, and much of society, have regarded as a higher concern . Readers interested in the BUGA UP movement can contact them at Box 78, Wentworth Building, University of Sydney 2006 Australia . They have several pamphlets and posters available describing the rationale and techniques of their campaign . (p.5)

The litmus test of whether a smoking control intervention is worthwhile is the Industry response to it . If they try to oppose an action, you're on the right track . If there is a deafening silence, you need hardly bother . The industry makes very loud noises indeed when legislation is being proposed but seldom rustles when education is being discussed . Indeed the industry has often advocated health education as the 'proper' sort of government response in the heat of its protests about impending legislative controls . (p.6)

Perhaps the greatest challenge for health and consumer activists in the 1980s' is to 'determine how the smoking and health issue can be best positioned in ways that will make it more personally and politically important to those for whom it is not at present .
This is especially true for opinion leaders and shapers: politicians, celebrities, journalists and editors . A corollary of this will be when taking active objection to the tobacco industry's activities is seen less as a form of extremism, and more as a sane and decent response to the legally sanctioned mass promotion of a carcinogenic agent . After a brief consideration of the 'state of the art' of community attitudes toward smoking, this section will examine some ways that the smoking issue might continue to gain momentum as a highly engaging news area . (p.9)

It is worthwhile reflecting on how such attitudes have arisen; on how it is that the social climate about smoking appears to be changing in many (usually developing) countries with such encouraging rapidity . The only reasonable answer is to point to some key milestones and to broad, quite intangible influences - the major smoking and health reports and their surrounding publicity; the aggregated number of people with personal experience of a relative or friend who died of a smoking induced disease; the cumulative effect of over twenty years of health education in schools ; some outstanding TV reports like Britain's Panorama series produced by Peter Taylor on the tobacco industry which were seen, by millions of people in many countries ; the spin-off from the growing concern in the affluent classes about 'lifestyle' and environmental pollution .

Such a list could be added to considerably, but most entries would be characterized by being somehow cast in a mythological good versus evil battle in an arena observed by mass numbers of people. The good (health/clean air/children) versus evil (cancer/uncaring, callous industry) dimension is the ineluctable bottom line in the whole issue and a rich reservoir for spawning a great deal of useful social drama, metaphor [2] and symbolic politics [3] that is the stuff of 'news value' and almost always to the detriment of the Industry. (p.11)

Remember that people are presented daily with a mass of news items, all potentially pressing for attention . It is largely up to you to develop a 'sense' for angles or emphases that are headline-grabbing, and to exploit these angles in your news releases and appearances on the media. (p.12)

The Industry actively encourages this view and emphasises that smoking control advocates are enemies of freedom and pleasure-haters (see Chapter 3) . To diffuse this widespread preconception, it is crucial to select emphases and spokespeople who belie such images . People who carry implicit repudiation of a puritan image by their reputation (eg : celebrities renowned for some wild, risque, or widely admired lifestyle), by their appearance or manner and by their arguments should be pushed to the front of your efforts whenever the goal is to widen community support. (p.13)

It is vital to reflect on the vastness of information; social issues and news to which people are exposed and over which they are often urged to take up a position . The smoking debate is just one issue pressing for attention amongst thousands, and like almost any other issue, tends to attract media attention when its issues can be subsumed under some more fundamental mythological context [6]

Fo1lowing, are some examples, by no means exhaustive, of angles

* the mouse that roared, or David and Goliath - when little public interest groups or individuals go into battle with the tobacco industry.

* child abuse - when the industry directing advertising and promotions at children. Also shopkeepers who sell cigarettes from broken packets to children, without doubt, an unfailing standby that brings out all the usual child abuse metaphors .

* the emperor with no clothes - when some public industry extravaganza  is deflated by a ‘rude’ and 'uncivilised' smoking health group who have the gall to point out that all the colour and pageantry- should-be seen as 'part of the process that' keeps cancer wards full . (p.13)

* the private lives of celebrities - the popular culture of interest in celebrities' lives is a profound and seemingly endless source of fascination to the media . Celebrities who quit smoking or who curse it from their sick beds can be pushed into the limelight to great advantage . (p.14)

When you hold press conferences, advantage should be taken of any venues that will be a poignant reminder of the more dramatic aspects of the smoking issue . Rooms adjacent to cancer wards, forensic medicine or autopsy lecture theatres (which are often located near morgues) or general hospital locations are ideal. Someone active in smoking control will probably be connected with such a venue, and so holding a meeting there will not appear contrived or melodramatic. (p.14)

A glance through any copy of the Smoking and Health Bulletin of the U S  Department of Health and Human Services shows an entire indexed, section on ‘Tobacco Product Additives’ . Citations are included from patent office registrations of new chemical applications to tobacco processing and from the specialist chemical literature. Both these sources are virtually unintelligible, let alone normally accessible to the average person but are rich in potential for anyone willing to translate them into news items with popular interest . Polysyllabic chemical names should be checked through a reference book that lists common usages and toxicological data for chemicals . Look for usages that will connote revulsion or concern . For example, well known chemicals found in tobacco include cadmium (as in car batteries), ammonia (as in toilet cleaners), cyanides, formaldehyde and so on ……” (p.15)

The industry is a past master of the quick n' dirty public opinion survey - the sort that asks leading questions . The surveys are calculated efforts to ask questions in ways that will produce favourable results for use in the industry's special pleading . A favourite technique, for example, has been to ask a survey sample to rank a forced-choice list of pubic issues on degree of importance or personal concern . Tobacco advertising is one item thrown in with a list that includes major social problems like unemployment, nuclear disarmament, violent crime and inflation . Lo and behold, tobacco advertising is ranked last by most respondants and the industry jubilantly announces to an often uncritical press, headlines like "public are unconcerned about tobacco advertising - industry says government has no mandate to ban tobacco ads ." All survey results reported by the industry should be thoroughly analysed for biased and beside-the point questions and for conclusions not warranted from the data . Two can play this game . Just as the industry casually slip in the odd emotive word into their surveys to produce favourable results, so too can smoking control interests ask questions their way - and publish the results . In seeking public opinion on an advertising ban, the industry might ask "Do you believe that in a free country a legally sold product should be allowed to be advertised, thereby allowing consumer 'freedom of choice?" whereas you might care to word it "Do you believe that government ought to act to protect children from being exposed to cigarette
advertising?' (p.17)

This chapter gives detailed critiques of the most common sophistry and rhetoric used in attack and defence by the industry . They fall into three categories : denials of the health arguments against smoking ; defences of advertising ; and attacks on the supposed wider motives of their anti-smoking antagonists. (p.19)

* Refer to your group as a 'movement', thereby allowing a more liberal answer to questions about your group's size.

* Maintain constant communication with all other groups involved. In smoking control they may find your independence an asset that assists with aspects of campaigning where their own organization is somehow compromised .(p.36)

Keep an eye out for advertisements in the press seeking applications for junior executive positions in the [tobacco]industry . It may be that you know someone who is in a situation to apply for such a job and who is sympathetic to the smoking control effort . If this person succeeds in being employed in the Industry, they will be in a good position to divulge a great deal of invaluable information before their cover is blown. Properly handled, there is nothing illegal about doing this. (p.51)

(emphases added)


Toward a Global Strategy to Combat Smoking:
The 5th World Conference on
Smoking and Health

The Conference's main themes were not the only ones to receive substantial attention. Other subjects generating considerable interest included the health effects of passive smoking, the nonsmokers' rights movement, civil disobedience in promoting nonsmoking, other legal and economic strategies to combat smoking, the fire-safe cigarette, benefits and hazards of the "less-hazardous cigarette," and the use of nicotine chewing gum to assist in smoking cessation . (p.33)

Regardless of the ultimate validity of the [passive smoking] findings, which remains to be established; studies such as these have brought the issue of passive smoking to the public's attention. In addition to publicity blitzes in response, the tobacco industry has attempted to refute the damaging findings with its own review of the scientific evidence (22) . The health effects of passive smoking; certainly will remain a focal point of scientific interest within the smoking-and-health community. (p.34)

The passive smoking issue resides at the heart of the nonsmokers' rights movement, the effort to legislate restrictions on smoking in public places . The principal argument for "clean indoor air" laws is that smokers' pollution of the air prevents nonsmokers from enjoying clean air . In the U .S. and several other countries, the movement has experienced considerable growth and success . Currently, the vast majority of U .S. states have smoking-restriction laws on the books compared with only a handful little more than a decade ago (23) . Many local jurisdictions have adopted smoking-restriction laws of their own - San Francisco's new ordinance, supported by voters over strong industry opposition, is a prominent recent example - and the right to clean air is diffusing to the unregulated business community as well. The call for nonsmokers' rights is not predicated on the idea that passive smoking is a health hazard - rather, simply that the nonsmoker's right to clean air should dominate the smoker's right to pollute it-but certainly nonsmokers' rights activists are keeping a keen eye on developments on the scientific frontier . (p.35)

Interest at the Conference in civil disobedience in combatting smoking centered almost entirely on the activities and experience of
Australia's BUGA UP (Billboard-Utilising Graffitists Against Unhealthy Promotions) . The objective of BUGA UP is to use ridicule and sarcasm to draw the public's attention to the inconsistencies of industry promotion of smoking and other unhealthy behaviors . The principal method of the organization (or
certainly the most notorious) is the defacing of cigarette billboards with spray paint to convert a cigarette promotion into a de facto health warning. The Conference did not choose to advocate widespread adoption of BUGA UP's strategy, but the enthusiasm for the BUGA UP presentations was undisguised .

The boldness of many of the action recommendations initiated by individual Conference
participants reflected what seemed to this observer to be a new-found confidence and aggressiveness in the smoking-and-health movement. The political action requirements of several recommendations, again particularly those originating with individual delegates, demonstrated an increasing realization of the need for and commitment to political activism on the smoking-and-health front. The theme of calculated political activism reverberated throughout the Conference, from the opening gavel to the closing of the meeting five days later . There was a maturation of political sensitivity here, the appearance of wisdom along with enthusiasm (24) . (p.36)

(emphases added)


By the 1983 Conference, at least a number of critical shifts had occurred in the ‘antismoker movement’.

Firstly, pushing the idea of nonsmokers’ rights was proving unproductive. Remember that antismokers are not just nonsmokers. They are anti smoking. The antismokers found that the vast majority of nonsmokers were not antismokers; they did not hate smoke/smokers. The vast majority of nonsmokers were not bothered by smell and were not irritated or annoyed by ETS. Many typically would not have even noticed ambient tobacco smoke: ETS was essentially a background phenomenon. The prospect of nonsmokers’ rights being the basis for at least promoting the ‘blueprint’ banning of smoking indoors was proving very difficult. So, the emphasis shifted to ETS being a health danger to nonsmokers, and therefore warranting ‘protection’ for nonsmokers. There are quite a number of statements indicating that ETS ‘harm’ was the way to proceed. To this point, the only major, though severely flawed, study on ‘passive smoking’ was that of Hirayama (1981), himself an antismoking fanatic. Remember, too, that antismokers were speaking of ‘harm’ to nonsmokers back at the 3rd World Conference. To advance the Godber Blueprint, promoting the idea of passive smoke danger was the only available avenue. Throughout the 1980’s this idea would be highly exploited. In doing so, the nonsmoking population was being hijacked with a view to brainwashing them into cultic antismoking. As will be noted later, antismokers have been careful not to use the terms ‘antismoking/antismoker’. They constantly refer to nonsmoking/nonsmokers and ‘protection’ thereof. This is a manipulative lie. It removes from nonsmokers the distinction between antismoking and nonsmoking, leading them to believe that there is only nonsmoking, and that the Godberites only represent nonsmoking. It would take propaganda/brainwashing through the 1980’s and beyond to move a considerable subgroup of nonsmokers from nonsmoking to antismoking, while convincing them that they were still only nonsmokers, not antismokers. The antismoking ‘movement’ would then use passive smoking danger as the basis for demanding indoor smoking bans. Again, this is a lie. The goal from the outset was to banish public (indoor and outdoor) smoking - Godber Blueprint. The idea of passive smoke ‘danger’ was only a means to that end.

Secondly, the political activism and media manipulation themes came very much to the fore at the 5th World Conference. *Chapman’s ‘contribution’ was taken on board. For those familiar with the antismoking campaigns of the last few decades, they will see Chapman’s recommendations very much in play. Keep promoting the idea of the tobacco industry being the bad, corrupter of the public and antismoking representing the benevolent redeemer of the public. Keep promoting it in mythological terms of the great battle between good and evil. From Chapman’s recommendations comes the fully-fledged idea of inflammatory propaganda. In referring to smoking, always use inflammatory terms such as ‘kill’, ‘death’, ‘poison’, ‘toxic’, ‘danger’, ‘threat’, ‘disease’, ‘dirty’, ‘filthy’, ‘smelly’, ‘abuse’. Antismokers are encouraged to create attention-grabbing slogans, whether accurate or not. Consider Chapman’s ‘playing with chemical names’. Cyanide, in [acceptable] trace levels, is found in drinking water (e.g.,
http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/chemicals/cyanide.pdf ) - together with many other potentially toxic (above a particular dose) chemicals. Trace levels of metals/metalloids are also typical encounters and some essential to life. For example, fruit seeds contain levels of cadmium; so do many plants. Apricot kernels contain levels of cyanide. Arsenic, cadmium, and zinc are found naturally at low concentrations in the earth’s crust. Yet, the role/goal of the antismoker is to remove smoke from any meaningful context, and associate particular chemicals with some unnatural, industrial, ‘dirty’, ‘poisonous’ use. Chapman’s example is not inaccurate. But, it is highly misleading, intentionally so, and intentionally inflammatory. From this point, antismoking would typically involve progressively more exaggerated (catastrophized) claims working to a fixed (Blueprint) conclusion. Other terms that would come to be used mantra-like are ‘saving lives’ and ‘for the children’.

Consider also a recent antismoking advert in
Australia with the slogan “Cigarettes are eating you and your kids alive”. The slogan has no meaningfulness in fact. The wording is carefully chosen to elicit a negative emotional reaction, i.e., inflammatory propaganda, and particularly in nonsmokers.

The Godber Blueprint already reflected a dysfunctional, manipulative, dishonest goal. The political activism and media manipulation openly advocated at the 5th World Conference added another layer of deceptiveness, manipulation and dishonesty. The defacing of tobacco-advertising billboards is one thing; inflammatory propaganda that goes far beyond the implication of fact is another. The mixing of political activism, media advocacy, and science creates a dangerous ‘hybrid’ - a cultic framework producing propaganda. This new-found ‘freedom’ of not being shackled remotely by facts, and when applied to ETS ‘danger’, would indeed propel, by orders of magnitude, the antismoking movement in the 1980’s and beyond. The typical ‘tools’ of antismoking are fear-, guilt-, shame-, and hate-mongering. This time they would be leveled at not only smokers, but nonsmokers, too. This conduct, in terms of actual multi-dimensional health, reflects an assault on psychological, social, and moral health. As such, it is delinquent.

*Chapman was a Member, Expert Advisory Panel on Tobacco and Health (1985-2000) for the World Health Organization -

Chapman praised by ex New South Wales Premier Carr - “Carr praised Chapman's bravery in raising public awareness of the dangers of smoking, and for his work in 'denormalising' smoking itself.”

Chapman’s paper on the ‘markers of denormalization’ and how they can further be exploited -

6th World Conference on Smoking & Health, 1987, Tokyo, Japan

Dr. Halfdan Mahler
Director General - World Health Organisation
November 9, 1987

(Speech excerpts)

In 1979, the World Health Day theme was "Smoking or Health, the Choice is Yours" . But so much has changed since then, that WHO today, as guardian of the worlds' health must now firmly advocate "Smoking or Health, Choose Health" . Of course in any democratic society, the existential (?) choice ultimately rests with the individual, but responsible individuals have to take into account a society as a whole, for only then can society remain viable and be able to support individual well being .

Now, WHO has a responsibility to both individuals and society as a whole, so we are duty bound to point out what are the established facts that link smoking inexorably with ill health and to have our way at those facts until nobody, and certainly nobody who smokes, can claim not to know these facts . So what have been the major developments in the last decade or so?

Certainly there is a great deal of accumulated information that smokers, in addition to damaging their own health are now damaging the health of others, and this phenomenon, the danger caused by smoking to non smokers, referred to, euphemistically as "passive smoking", this danger of "passive smoking" has added its very considerable weight to the growing awareness that smoking is indeed an abnormal social behaviour, which then in turn is resulting in an increasing demand for smoke free workplaces and public space . (p.24-25)

And lastly, about two months ago, one cigarette manufacturer announced the creation of what was described as a"clean cigarette", this is being promoted as smokeless, ashless, odourless, but it is not tobacco-less, and experience so far has shown, that all new tobacco products have been a threat to health . So, in response to society's growing concern, WHO's duty is today to exhort both individual and society :"Tobacco or Health: Choose Health" .

As for the bad and the good news : the good news is that in many countries they have already chosen health . Let me give just a few examples : in the
United States, there is a growing commitment to the goal of a smoke free society by the year 2000, and Canada is urging its young citizens to break free from the addiction of tobacco, its goal is a new generation of non smokers .

In the countries that belong to WHO's European region, they are also striving for smoke free societies within a five year plan . We take
Belgium as an example which has prohibited smoking in public places recently . The Soviet Union's anti-smoking programme has recently received new emphasis by a decision to make the health establishments smoke free environments .

And so there is momentum on this side of the
Atlantic and certainly this movement is being felt in this part of the world too . Hong Kong and Singapore are seeking liberation from tobacco, and in my opinion there is little doubt that they will succeed . The first no smoking day was observed in China in May last year in Shanghai . And in India, the second most populous country in the world, most state governments have passed laws banning smoking in closed areas, such as cinemas, buses, educational institutions and hospitals . And all these countries and many, many others, show us that the counter attack against tobacco is accelerating . (p.26-27)

The developing world can serve notice that it will reject tobacco and instead choose health . Smoking is now no more a topical (4) issue, it has very much become a social issue . Spitting in public places, first in sawdust, then in spittoons was once common place, but now it just isn’t done, and similarly tobacco today is being seen as a public nuisance, a practice that is less and less socially acceptable, and public toleration of this habit is indeed very thin . Passive smoking is now known to be of sufficient risk to non smokers to justify methods to protect the non smokers .

A study in this country,
Japan, pointed the way by showing that non smoking wives of husbands who smoke have a higher rate of lung cancer than women married to non smokers . It has also been estimated that passive smoking may account for between 4000 and 5000 deaths annually in the United States and about 1000 in the United Kingdom . Smoking in the workplace or in public spaces is no longer a matter of individual choice, it is a societal decision, and societies are choosing health .

And now to the tobacco addicts . Until fairly recently smoking was considered to be very little different from compulsive peanut or potato chip eating, and that was clearly a very innocent view, because tobacco has been shown to be as addictive and as dependence producing as hard drugs . It is psycho-active, it is affecting the chemistry of the brain and the nervous system, and like hard drugs, tobacco is abused and misused . But since it is neither food nor drink nor medication, it escapes controls under national food and drug laws . If tobacco were to be introduced today as a new product it would certainly not meet the standards of safety of any country and it would frankly be outlawed .

Indeed, the argument that smoking is a question of personal choice is a hollow one . The smoker who finds it most difficult to quit, is generally hooked at the age of 10 to 11 years, at an age where there is no adult rational judgement, no real choice is ('-) . There
is rather induced addiction as a consequence of lavish advertising and peer pressure. And that peer pressure in turn is influenced by advertising and by the unhealthy role models that smoking adults represent to youngsters .

But because of a growing awareness that a grown-up society doesn't smoke, great numbers are putting aside such infantile practices and are quitting . To take but 3 examples ; in
Canada, some 5.5 million people have broken the habit, in the United Kingdom, some 10 million, and in the United States, some 40 million . So, it seems as if
industrialised countries which unknowingly at first helped to sell a very bad habit to the world, are now making amends .

In this day of rapid communication of ideas and images from one country to another, industrialized countries are spreading the word, that a smoke-fouled society is yesterday's fashion ; out of date, a smoke free society is the trend . The new fashion, the latest, the smartest, worthy of emulation, to be with it today is to choose health, and growing numbers in the industrialized countries are doing just that .

I highly commend the effort to reverse this trend that are embodied in the White Paper on Smoking and Health just published by the Japanese Government . But the fact is that all around the world, the non smoker's counter attack is under way, and I believe
Japan will not be slow to take whatever actions are needed .

Now, let me give you a few examples of what is happening in many countries . The health warnings required by law on cigarette packets and advertisements are much more precise, much more far ranging than ever before, the warnings by health officials that passive smoking is dangerous are being now directed at nonsmokers, so non smokers themselves are ceasing to be the passive recipients of other people's smoke . And individual citizens are challenging tobacco companies through law suits seeking to prove product liability for sickness and death . And smoking is being curbed in public places, particularly in government buildings, but also in private and public enterprises where cigarette smoking is banned from the workplace . And more and more vehicles of public transport, buses, trains and airlines are becoming smoke free .

At WHO headquarters in
Geneva, we smashed symbolically the ashtrays this year on 7th April, World Health Day, just to mark the start of a ban on smoking throughout the building . Our regional office in Manila had done so earlier than WHO's headquarters in Geneva, and I think that it is very likely that agencies in United Nations gradually will feel the moral pressure and will have to follow suit .

A few months ago, the World Health Assembly declared 7th April next year, the 40th anniversary of WHO, as the World's First No Smoking Day, and I'm sure that all assembled here will join in this observance, for only through your concerted action, backed by your weight, knowledge and prestige, will this first global effort make its mark upon world opinion . So let us together ask smokers throughout the world for the sake of health in their society as responsible citizens to desist from using tobacco in all forms on that one day, as a first step to cutting down or to quitting .

Let us together appeal to vendors to refrain from selling all forms of tobacco and to the press to refuse tobacco advertisements for that one day as an act for the common good, and let us work to turn this day into a week, a month, a year, until it is permanent . Let us work for health, for everyone, everywhere, to choose health . And from this forum, let me appeal to the leaders of all countries to carry out programmes of information and education that progressively will create a smoke free society .

The challenges, I think are straightforward : to nonsmokers, don't start, to smokers, quit . Just as societies fight alcoholism, let us fight tobaccoism, let us try to wean tobacco addicts away from this mortal addiction . And to planners and economists of industrialized and developing countries alike develop your genius to finding economic alternatives to tobacco growing, so that farmers and their governments do not have to sell their health or their soul to the tobacco devil .

To parliamentarians : assume your social responsibilities by passing legislation aimed at ensuring the right of people to live free of tobacco hazards, and by devising programmes to phase out tobacco with a minimum of harm to your economy, in other words vote for health . And to trade union leaders, do not forget the battle to protect the workers from that toxic substance, tobacco, in short, join the fight for health .

To doctors, my own profession, and nurses everywhere, set an example of non tobacco use, many of your colleagues have already done so, and to entertainers, athletes, and public personalities, you are role models for young people, please help them to choose health through avoiding tobacco . And to directors of plays and films : try to find some way of filling a pregnant pause, other than with the tired old cliche of a character lighting up a cigarette . (applause)

So dear friends, let me end . one prominent citizen of this country, Mr . Riochi Satakava has chosen health . For years, his generosity has helped finance WHO's tobacco health programme, in developing countries and in particular to make moves towards banning of smoking in all commercial aircraft .

So follow the example of your compatriot~ mobilize your energy and your expertise to choose health . This is the message that we all must spread before, during and after the World Health's First No Tobacco Day next April 7th .

Friends, together we can achieve tobacco free societies . Together we can make sure that the 21st century will become free of all tobacco related diseases . Together we can lead a popular movement to choose health . So again, domo arigato, thank you very much. (p.32-36)

(emphases added)

Mr. Michael Daube

(Speech excerpts)

Ladies and Gentlemen, it's a great privilege to have been asked to speak here today, and I would like to commence by paying tribute to the organisers of this conference, which I think is a very worthy successor to the series of World Conferences that have been running now since the idea . . . . . . . . . The American Cancer Society who have contributed so much in this area invented the idea of World Conferences which have proved to be so worthwhile . (p.38)

Some of us are sometimes criticised for speaking too strongly, too passionately about the need for action, but this is a criticism that I believe that we should be more than willing to risk . There is a grave danger that because the smoking problem has been well recognised for 25 years, since the publication of the first Royal College of Physicians report on smoking and health, people have become tired of the problem, or even bored with it, but the magnitude of the problem is as great as ever . If more than 2 million preventable deaths worldwide each year do not justify passion and urgency, we're in a sorry state indeed . (p.39)

We have indeed a pandemic, and the scale of the problem is complemented further by the recent conclusive evidence an the consequences of passive smoking, second, by increasing recognition of the consequences of smokeless tobacco and betel chewing in developing countries, and also by increased sale and promotion of smokeless tobacco in developed countries . (p.40)

There have of course been some changes in emphasis, particularly with reference to passive smoking and smokeless tobacco, but otherwise there's no great need to "re-invent the wheel" . Indeed, one of the most important developments of recent years has been the general acceptance of this programme by health interests . We no longer need to waste time arguing about the action needed, we all agree . well, 90% of us, on the case for a comprehensive programme, there's broad agreement as to its composition and the debate is simply about how to implement it . (p.42)

So my third question is who should be implementing smoking control programmes? Clearly the major responsibility rests with governments, and governments are traditionally reluctant to place public health interests ahead of short term economic considerations . But responsibility for implementation rests also with two other broad groups; first the campaigners, the kind of people who attend a conference such as this, or again 90% of us . It's our job to press for action and we are, I believe, getting better at it, but there is still a vast untapped group in-between, those who are not against us but who should be actively on our side, they range from regulatory agencies, to the doctors and health professionals who are still reluctant to recognise that smoking is as much a political problem as a health problem .

We must persuade them to move off the fence, we must get them to move off the sidelines, or in my favourite quote from Dante, which some of you may have seen before "We must remind them that the hottest fires in hell are reserved for those who in times of great moral crisis maintain their neutrality" . One of our tasks must be to mobilize these groups who themselves can influence a vast range of further constituencies, for once you mobilise their constituencies, the politicians will follow .

So my fourth question is, given we know the magnitude of the problem and we know the action necessary to bring it under control, why isn't it happening? The answers are well known to you so I will spend little time on them . Above all, of course, we face what Joseph Califano described at the
Stockholm world conference as the formidable, economic and political power of the tobacco industry . Now, at a conference like this, we are long past the stage where we need to compete as to who's rhetoric best villifies the tobacco industry and its adherence, they are the opposition, they'll fight us every inch of the way, they will put up all kinds of phony debates and arguments, and it's their existence and power which prevents governments from implementing measures which they know to be in the public interest . (p.43-44)

This slide which was put together by some people from our host country, Japan, just puts together some of the smoking and health stamps that have been produced around the world . But the kind of achievements I have in mind also range from the early Scandinavian and Nordic legislation on advertising and health warnings, to price increases in the U .K . It ranges from rights of the non smoker legislation in the
United States or Belgium, to establishment of the Latin American co-ordinating group . From education programmes in countries such as Australia, to bans on smokeless tobacco, which many of us have now introduced or are introducing, or it ranges to the planned Canadian legislation on cigarette advertising . (p.46)

My third theme is that we've recently seen the development of a new professionalism, even a new sophistication in many aspects of smoking control, and this slide I owe to Kjeli Bjartveit one of our Norwegian colleagues, it identifies the kind of area where we do have to be much more professional, and I believe that the professionalism that we've developed applies particularly to the political process, where Michael Pertschuck has been inspirational, he's not only applied all the necessary skills and more himself, but he has taken the time and trouble to show others how it can be done . Allied to this is the recognition, by many once staid and respectable groups, such as medical associations, that smoking control does indeed require political campaigning, that's a crucial step . (p.47)

My sixth and seventh points also relate directly to the industry . As Stan Glantz and others have pointed out, one of the most intriguing developments of recent years has been the way in which the industry is gradually changing its tactics . This is an area in which we must constantly be alert . We've got to look at the way they approach their campaigning, and sometimes change our tactics to suit . (p.48)

The eighth development is one to which I have already alluded, namely, the dramatic changes we've seen in public opinion in many countries, especially on the rights of the non smoker . The work of Takeshi Hirayama and others in demonstrating that passive smoking is harmful as well as inconvenient, is in my view, the single most important change to have overtaken the smoking and health issue since the early 1960's . Suddenly, the rights of the non smoker is no longer a Cinderella issue . It provides a very legitimate justification for action, it involves a new range of participants, and has, in a sense, re-energised the smoking and health campaign . (p.50)

The tenth development I wish to note is the involvement in the smoking and health issue of new campaigners and new approaches . Since the last world conference, we've seen a much more active engagement of groups ranging from consumer organisations to dental associations . We've seen national medical associations in countries such as the U .K. moving from lip service to active campaigning . And we've seen substantial and prestigious bodies, such as the US National Cancer Institute attacking the smoking problem with a commitment and a professionalism and with the kind of resources that are in my experience unrivalled, and I believe that this brings us perhaps better ground for optimism than we've ever had before . (p.51)

There are special sessions on passive smoking and non smokers rights . which I will take together. As I've already noted . this is the area which I believe there to have been more progress in recent years than in any other aspect of our campaign . It's now, even in isolation, a more than legitimate public health issue, which has caught the imagination of both public and legislators, and as you see here, the ardent opposition of the tobacco industry .

I sometimes wonder why it is that passive smoking has caught the imagination of the public, in a way that active smoking at times hasn't done . It sometimes seems to me that our visual and olfactory senses have something to do with this . You can't actually see or smell the smoke that a smoker inhales so it is difficult to envisage the damage it causes, but you can sure as hell see and smell environmental tobacco smoke .

We've seen the publication of evidence now accepted as conclusive about the dangers of passive smoking, and we've seen attempts by the industry to rebuff these, as you see here, but their attempts are so ham-fisted that they serve only to publicise the evidence yet further .

We've seen public opinion moving fast, and with it those who respond to public opinion, legislators and also those responsible for a variety of public places . We've seen the further development of public concern about the effect of passive smoking on children, but also an increasing acceptance by groups such as employers, that they not only have a responsibility in this area, but that they may face expensive litigation if they fail to meet their responsibility . We've also seen the achievements of some superb campaigners in this issue, and I think it's a very real tribute to their success that only yesterday, Stanton Glantz, who has done so much to promote the rights of the non smoker in the United States, only yesterday Stan was complaining to me that he is no longer seen as a radical, terrible fate! Indeed . I've always seen Stan as a very conservative figure but I'm glad he confirmed that . (Laughter) .

What are the prospects in this area? I believe that over the next few years, we will see yet more rapid progress, we will see both organized and spontaneous pressure for action . And I would warn the industry representatives here not to underestimate the spontaneous public concern on this matter . I see the letters coming in on a day to day basis, to governments, to ministers, to health departments, letters coming in spontaneously on this issue, and I am very conscious that there is a tremendous groundswell of support for further measures to protect the non smoker.

We'll certainly see the publication of further evidence on the dangers of passive smoking, but above all, we'll see more and more individuals, organisations, and even countries moving to create smoke free areas, and this in turn will serve better than anything else we can do to create an atmosphere in which smoking is indeed seen as anti social behaviour, behaviour that's not socially acceptable . (p.54-56)

The special session on smoking control media strategies is one in which I had the privilege of speaking as well as chairing, so I’ll spare you much duplication and make simply a few observations . Again, this is an area in which there is signal change which has occurred in the last few years and will occur in yet more . We're moving out of the horse and cart era, we're not yet in the jet age of media strategies, but we're getting there, we're getting more professional . Health promotion has moved a long way since the days when a poster or a leaflet were considered almost extravagant, and it's moved a long way further since the doctors, then at the helm, thought of a media campaign as meaning a letter in The Lancet .(laughter)

Like smoking control programmes as a whole, media strategies must be comprehensive . Obviously, the approach varies from culture to culture, but it's important to make sure the fullest possible spread including advertising, including promotional activities and this is an example of sports sponsorship, and including public relations activities . (p.58)

….We must compare ourselves with commercial advertisers because we are in the same marketplace . (p.59)

Now, we are of course imaginative in our use of public relations and we have the kind of access to editorial pages and other news media that is open to no commercial organisation, but even so, we must get across the message that media campaigns cost money . If you want to change behaviour through the media, you can do it, but it costs money . Prospects? I suspect that this area, like the rights of the non smoker, is set to take off, or more precisely to explode .

We learned from the
United States in 1968 to '70 that constant exposure to our message brings results . Although, I should stress that this is not an argument for permitting cigarette advertising, it's an argument for funding substantially more anti smoking advertising . We are all getting better at all aspects of working with the media, from public relations to advertising and promotion, and interestingly, our experience in Western Australia is also that the more politicians are willing to commit themselves to supporting this kind of activity the more popular it becomes.

And it becomes popular amongst politicians too, here are the slides of some politicians that very few of you will recognise, they're the four members of the Western Australian Cabinet running in the celebrity relay, at a major athletics event that we sponsored, I believe that they're the world record holders for the 4 X 100 metres Cabinet squad . And the point I want to make here is that if you can involve politicians, and here are some of them again with a figure you should recognise, Ben Johnson, the fastest man in the world from
Canada . if you put them together with a figure such as that . of course they enjoy it, and of course it makes our campaigns more popular . Again, our surveys show that after several years of high profile campaigning, we have only 9% opposition . even amongst smokers . So media campaigns can be effective, they can work, they can be popular, but they must be well funded. (p.60-61)

We've seen some excellent legislative developments since the last World Conference, we've seen a lot on the rights of the non smoker, the best examples perhaps being in some of the United States and in Belgium, Canada, we've noted, will shortly ban all tobacco advertising, making it by my recognition, the thirtieth country to have done so . Several countries have strong new health warnings, the ones we have include "Smoking causes lung cancer" and "Smoking causes heart disease" - now let me make two points about these, first, that they were fully researched and tested, and second, that we made sure that when they were introduced, we publicized and promoted them with a hard hitting advertising campaign .

Several countries have also taken action to ban smokeless tobacco, some countries have used fiscal legislation to good effect, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and if I may be parochial, the state of Victoria in Australia is this week passing through parliament, with support from both government and opposition, a very creative package which entails banning all tobacco advertising and promotion, except in print media, and putting on an extra few cents to tobacco tax which will go directly to a health promotions trust raising 23 million dollars a year, a very encouraging development .

So the prospects in the area of legislation? Well, probably still slow progress, but speeding up, and the speeding up I think will be yet another spin off from the rights of the non smoker campaign . I think we're seeing more and more, as I said, a decline in the power of the tobacco industry and that also means that governments are less reluctant than they were to offend the tobacco interests . (p.62-63)

But here too, the prospects are encouraging . much excellent research is being done around the world and much of it will have genuine applicability elsewhere. We're seeing the development of health education in schools, not of the occasional one-off lesson, but as an integral part of the curriculum, we're seeing increasing emphasis on the role of exemplars, sporting heroes, parents, teachers, and in the kind of complementary activity that can make education programmes work, we need that complementary activity, we need media campaigns, we need advertising bans, we need tax increases . (p.65)

But second, we have a responsibility to get our own houses in order . to provide an exemplar role, for how convincing are we when we go as visiting experts to advise a health minister on the policy he should adopt, and yet we're conscious, as he or she is, that this policy has not yet been adopted in our own countries . So, we must get our own houses in order if we are to be convincing . (p.67)

And so where do we go from here? Well, as I've said at every previous World Conference, so I']I say it here, I believe that we go to war . The challenge is clear and we must not shirk it, we know that we face formidable opposition and we know that the prospect ahead of us is no different from the industry's traditional approach . In the words of the Royal College of Physicians of
London, "the international tobacco industry can be expected to oppose and hinder efforts to reduce smoking. In doing so, it will be directly responsible for fostering the deaths of thousands in the twentieth century's most avoidable epidemic ." The industry will not go away, but nor will we . We know the extent of the problem and we know what needs to be done about it . We've set it out in reports, we know what needs to be done .

We'd be foolish to believe that the smoking problem will somehow miraculously resolve itself over the next few years, but the last few years have seen some particularly encouraging developments, and at long last the work of so many pioneers and activists in this area is starting to bear fruit .

The prospects for smoking control in my view, therefore, are better than they have been for sometime . They are better than they have been at previous World Conferences . But the prospects of smoking control are only good if we maintain our impetus, and if we encourage and inspire new generations of campaigners, new generations of educators, new generations of scientists, new generations of activists . That, I believe is our major responsibility here, not just to carry out the work ourselves, but to ensure that other people come into this area, and if we can do more of that by the time of the next world conference and by the time of the conference thereafter, I believe that the prospects of smoking control are better than they have ever been before .

Thank you (p.69-70)

(emphases added)


Arthur Chesterfield-Evans, Non-Smokers' Movement of Australia



The Tobacco Industry is the source of the tobacco problem. Without its media, marketing and political campaigning the smoking epidemic would have ended years ago . Smokers, most of whom have been recruited since the harmful effects of smoking were known, are merely the Industry's victims .

Non-smoking groups have not been effective against the Industry . They must develop an information exchange network and a political strategy which aims to destroy the tobacco industry and which spans groups, states and nations . The strategy must be practical and it must be acted upon .
Elements of the strategy are-
To recognise the Tobacco Industry is the source of the problem :
2  To seek a political solution ;
3  To define a strategy composed of campaigns so that groups can adapt their tactics :
4. To create a formal network for coordination .
A matrix is suggested which lists groups on one axis and campaigns on another so
each group can define its part in the overall strategy. (p.72)

The Present Situation

The belief that the industry is being beaten is not true enough . Tobacco consumption continues to grow in the developing world, and though sales drop a few percent in the developed world, the Industry's profits keep climbing . The idea that the industry is the source of the problem is not new - it was enunciated by Mike Daube and others (1, 2, 3, 4) at the end of the 4th World Conference, but nonsmoking activity has remained dominated by research meetings and the medical model - a focus on the victims . The non-smoking movement as a whole has been strategically flabby, without clear goals, without cooperation within itself and without actions to back its rhetoric .

Protest groups such as BUGA UP (5) and non-smokers' rights groups have urged a more industry-oriented approach and lobbyists such as Califano, Pertschuk and Sir George Young have fought it as a political war (6) .

The bulk of non-smoking industry has had too much research and too many presentations which lead only to eminence for the researcher . We must look at our ‘faite-etre’ - to save lives . That means reducing smoking dramatically and that means a coordinated anti-industry strategy - now!

The function of this Conference is of great importance . It is an opportunity which happens only once every 4 years . A meeting of this magnitude must not merely be individuals giving their results or ideas . This is fine when the outcome required is for individual practitioners to act alone, such as in discussing medical treatments or engineering designs . But when what is needed is a political action plan, a Conference must become a workshop to produce sufficient consensus for coordinated, directed and sustained action. This paper attempts to present a concept that will form the basis for such action .

The Basic Requirement

What each individual needs to contribute is the desire to help the world's health by reducing smoking and a willingness to be part of a coordinated network . The individual
must pursue his or her own efforts but also contribute information, time and action to the network. In turn the individual would gain information and support from it .

We must recognise that other individuals and groups will not necessarily approach the smoking issue from the same perspective, nor have the same priorities or methods. If what they are doing is likely to help our cause they are allies who must be respected and encouraged . We cannot produce a recipe and expect everyone to follow it but we can produce a general direction and strategy and encourage everyone to look for their own place in it and contribute as they can.


Priorities will vary among non-smoking workers according to their culture, perspective or job. But having struggled unsuccessfully with a victim-oriented model for years the new strategic directions suggested are :-
1. To identify the Tobacco industry as the source of the tobacco problem.
2 . To recognise that smoking is a political problem that needs a political solution .
3. To develop and implement strategies with elements such that each group can see and discuss its function within the action framework.
4. To set up a worldwide network to coordinate the necessary exchange of ideas and

The Industry as Renegade Corporations

The Identification of the Industry as the source of the problem involves both the conceptual step but also to convince governments that the Industry is a legacy of the unacceptable face of nineteenth century capitalism or 'Social Darwinism' where the achievement of a profit justified all unscrupulous actions. The political corollary of this is that the industry must be isolated as renegade corporations - out of step with modern ideas of social responsibility, product liability and advertising honesty .

Two important Canadian initiatives must be mentioned here . Firstly the 'Equal
Treatment Campaign' which identified tobacco and nicotine as poisons which were
inappropriately not on the Poisons Register. They should be given 'equal treatment' with other poisons with proscribed advertising and labelling [ 7]. Secondly the RODDS group (Relatives and Friends of Dead and Dying Smokers) (6) which attempts to turn the anguish of relatives into political action against the Industry and shifts the onus from the inadequacy of the individual who couldn't quit to the Industry that had spent millions to encourage initiation of the habit and retain its social acceptability.

A Political Imperative

The financial might of the Industry has denied all attempts to beat them in the publicity war, outspending all Australian Quit campaigns by approximately 100 to 1 . The
flaw in the Western legal system is that money is so important in victory that Tort law has not been able to sheet home the liability of deaths and the Industry which resisted health warnings but has now escaped liability because of them . Given the financial and legal situation only governments have sufficient power to defeat the industry and they will only do so if the Public Relations battle against the Industry has been won . Despite skepticism about governments, respect for the law ensures that what is enshrined in legislation becomes the benchmark for 'normal' behaviour. This is why non-smokers' rights legislation is so important .

The Need for Strategies

The concept of an industry-oriented strategy is not new but in practice smoking campaigns have centred on individual smokers because the public still see diseases from an individual rather than an epidemiological perspective and because individual-oriented
campaigns are politically easier. Government campaigns have been run to gain votes rather than seriously to affect sales . Health charities such as Cancer Councils and Heart
Foundations have also been conservative, partly because of the nature of their illness- oriented academic management and partly because of fear of offending conservative corporate sponsors . Activist groups tend to choose their campaign priorities based on what seems the biggest problem or the most achievable object at a point of time . Rarely is this organised into an overall strategy and rarely do any of these groups cooperate in a strategic or even tactical sense .

Protest groups and non-smokers' rights groups have trouble with funding and
information access but have great freedom to act without being shackled by need for governmental approval . They can thus have a catalytic function and serve to define the most radical pole of the political spectrum. If they are both vociferous and radical it allows groups such as Health Charities or Medical Associations to take more aggressive stances without being perceived as radical . These more conservative bodies should not directly criticise activists but should if pressed say things like “We don’t always agree with their methods but we can understand their frustration at the seriousness of the problem and the government's lack of action”.Thus the two groups reinforce each other and then the Health Department can take a more radical stand within the government . The principle is that the government will not move far from the centre of the perceived political spectrum so by shifting a pole one redefines the position of the centre .

Groups must develop networks in a number of ways . They must develop them geographically even if this means breaking out of an academic, bureaucratic or activist subculture . A first step is to exchange addresses and newsletters with all interested parties and then to have informal contact with all groups that would be interested in or could contribute to a local initiative . There is no substitute for personal contact .

Contacts with groups further away should be with groups who have the same outlook
or functions so that work is not done which merely duplicates that already done elsewhere . Political or media ideas can also be adapted to local circumstances .

Groups not directly involved in the smoking issue but which are likely to be sympathetic can be targeted as a subculture and recruited as allies . Feminist groups are concerned about women and smoking, boy scouts or parent and citizens' groups will be interested in child smoking or cinema advertising . Environmental groups will be interested in deforestation, pesticides or air pollution . Service clubs are usually looking for interesting speakers and take a pride in overall community welfare . The important thing is to tailor each presentation to the concerns of that group, so that the aspect of smoking that most concerns them is emphasised .

The cultivation of journalists, the writing and timing of press releases, the methods of keeping statements short and quotable so that they will be included in news bulletins are all part of the general topic of ‘media management’ which must be addressed by any group seriously interested in smoking control .

Ultimately the object is to influence legislators and the non-smoking cause must achieve this. Clearly the protest groups whose shrill criticism of government inactivity is so useful to attract media attention may not then be the best ones to meet the politicians face to face . But there must be a network with a sensitivity for timing so that other citizens or groups can make the approach . Too often, if an activist criticises a politician’s inactivity the only person to approach the politician is an industry lobbyist who reassures him that the activist is just a disorderly minority and no action is needed . Coordination is as vital as political and media action .

The Strategic Matrix

The last concept to discuss is the division of the action strategy into distinct campaigns. A matrix is suggested that lists non-smokers and allied groups on one axis and campaign priorities on the other, The resulting chequerboard allows individual to consider their campaigns as part of a wider concept and to ask themselves if they could cooperate with other groups or in other areas without overtaxing their resources . This matrix is only an initial one - the concept can be refined and new campaigns, tactics or allies added .

The important idea is that we must all think beyond our own local efforts and recognise we can be part of a movement working in different ways but cooperating for better effectiveness and support to beat the greatest killer of all time .

(emphases added)


From list of Abstracts

A. Judson Wells
American Lung Association, 1740 Broadway,
New York, NY 10019, U .S .A .

The purpose of this paper is to review the development of smoking policies and smoking cessation programs that have come about because of the interest and backing of business and industrial leadership in the United Stares . On the basis of information gathered at a international meeting in
Washington, D .C . in 1985 it was inferred that relatively little activity of this type was going on in countries other than the U . S . Therefore, a review such as this might be helpful in getting similar activities started in other countries .

Forty percent of the larger companies in the U.S . now have some kind of smoking policy to protect nonsmokers from tobacco smoke compared to only ten percent five years ago . Many of these larger companies sponsor smoking cessation programs paid for entirely or in part by the companies. Examples of such activities in specific well known companies will be given. The effects of group interaction and peer pressure on smoking reduction will be discussed . Legislation passed in many states and smaller subdivisions has aided in this Effort, but substantial activity has taken place even where no legislation is yet in place . It is concluded that the enlistment of business leadership is an important component of a successful national smoking reduction program . (p.36)

A . Judson Wells
National Council for Clean Indoor Air,
316 Pennsylvania Ave ., S .E .,
Suite 400, Washington D .C . 20003, U. S. A
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the number of adult deaths per year in the
U. S. from passive smoking . The epidemiological literature on passive smoking and adult mortality and cancer and heart morbidity is reviewed. Combined relative risks for lung cancer, cancers other than lung and heart disease are calculated for each sex and disease category. These data along with estimates of nonsmoker death rates and populations exposed allow , calculation of annual deaths in each category . The results are updated from a similar analysis that was presented at the June, 1986 meeting of he Air Pollution Control Association (U. S.) by (1) including data from the epidemiological studies published since December, 1985 (particularly the new heart studies), (2) using a more refined analysis that takes into account reduced relative risk and reduced exposure at older ages, (3) using heart nonsmoker death rates that reflect the dramatic reductions of the last 20 years, and (4) expanding the age range from 45-79 to 35-84 . Altogether, 47,400 deaths per year were calculated consisting of lung cancer, 2500, other cancer,
22, 700, and heart disease, 22,200 . Reasons why such high estimates for other cancer and heart disease may be possible are explored. It is concluded that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke can have adverse long term health effects that are more serious than previously thought. (p.42)

* J. R(?)ead
Department of Community Health Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, The University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada

The First-ever Smoke-Free-Olympic Program developed for the Calgary Winter Olympics and supported by the Canadian Council on Smoking and Health and Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada will be presented . Critical incidents in gaining approval for the program include 60 letters of support from athletes, health organizations, non-smokers rights groups and government officials .

The objectives of the program are - (1) primacy for the athlete by providing smoke-free Olympic spaces, (2) protection of the non-smoker from second-hand smoke ; (3) enhancement of the healthful image and the dignity of the Olympic games . The Smoke-Free spaces will include the athletes’ villages, Olympic vehicles and public transportation, all competition sites, medal presentations and banquets . Each of 7 venues will have designated smoking areas.
Sale of tobacco products will be limited and no sponsorship of tobacco products will be allowed.

The program will consist of (1) signage; (2) providing information packages for all winter Olympic countries and all Sports Federations; (3) assigning venue managers to oversee the provision of smoke-free spaces. A method of evaluating the effectiveness of the program will be described. Delegates to the 6th World Conference will be asked to spread the word! (p.43)

* A. Stuart Hanson, M.D .
Department of Pulmonary Medicine, Park Nicollet(?)
Medical Center, 5000 West 39th
, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55416
. U.S.A .

Park Nicollet Medical Center, a multi-specialty group practice with 19 offices, 280 physicians and 2,000 employees in Minneapolis and St . Paul, Minnesota, followed a seven step process to become a totally smoke-free organization and environment. It used management methods to develop staff attitudes and acceptance of a smoke-free buildings and grounds policy for patients, visitors and employees . The methods included the following steps: (1) Governing body commitment; (2) an identified person in charge (called the prime mover); (3) a representative implementation task force, including smokers and nonsmokers; (4) employee surveys; (5) a formal communications plan; (6) a written policy implementation plan; and (7) a follow-up evaluation .

Over a two year period, a comprehensive smoke-free policy was implemented prohibiting smoking in all buildings and grounds and preferentially hiring nonsmokers.

Smoking rates in employees fell dramatically and documented support for a total ban grew during the two year process. When the final smoking areas were removed
January 1, 1986, there was no significant resistance. This model process of organizational culture change prohibiting smoking has been used successfully by hospitals, schools, businesses and public agencies in Minnesota to create more smoke-free organizations . (p.44)

Regina Carlson
New Jersey GASP (Group Against Smoking Pollution),
105 Mountain Avenue,
Summit, New Jersey 07901, U.S.A.

Unlike traditional health-promotion organizations, nonsmokers’ groups are small, independent, local, flexible, single-issue organizations, primarily comprised of individuals motivated by their reactions to secondhand smoke.

In 1974 citizens created New Jersey GASP (Group Against Smoking Pollution). Strategies have included news releases, conferences, public hearings, guest editorials, art exhibits, confronting tobacco promotions, advertisements, legal actions, press conferences, providing unique information, public demonstrations, documenting sales to children, supporting legislation, and radio and TV interviews . Using volunteers and spending little,
New Jersey GASP has encouraged New Jersey to become a leader in creating a smoke-free society .

Coinciding with GASP’s activities are several measures of impact: GASP has been interviewed for hundreds of reports in local, state, national and international media . Numerous polls show increased social support for control of smoking in
New Jersey . Nine state laws limiting smoking have been passed . Hundreds of employers, restaurants and others in the private sector have created nonsmoking areas .

Throughout the
United States the greatest social, legislative and private sector changes on smoking are correlated with the existence of local citizen nonsmokers’ groups. (p.46)

Y . Isayama
Attorney-at-Law, Yotsuya Law Office, Ito Bldg . 2, Yotsuya 1-chore,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160 Japan

This study evaluates the efficacy of a lawsuit to promote nonsmokers’ rights as a means to advance a citizens' movement advocating the same, and takes the kenenken lawsuit as an example.

In 1978 Japanese citizens commenced various actions to promote nonsmokers’ rights . At that time, smoking was allowed in every car of every Japanese National Railway ("JNR") train except for urban trains and certain Tokaido bullet trains, in which one non-smoking car was provided……………….

Conclusion: The very pursuit of a lawsuit, regardless of the judgment, has proved to be an effective means to attain the particular goal of the citizens’ movement to promote non-smokers’ rights. (p.46)

Jean Tostain
Ligue Contre la Fume du Tabac en Public . 14 . reu du Petit Ballon
Colmar. France .

Summary: 1) Our militant action is based on the assumption that in places used collectively, the air should be clean and more particularly free [from] tobacco smoke; the non-smokers should be aware of their rights and have them acknowledged by smokers.

2) The militant does everything on his behalf to make the existing regulations work and possibly to improve them . He calls out for well isolated smokers’ rooms, smokers being in far smaller numbers than nonsmokers .

To this effect he takes initiatives with :
- local authorities, M .P .s (Members of Parliament), representatives or any elected bodies,
- professional and medical authorities,
- newsmen in the press, the radio an TV .

3) The French Non-smoker association will make available as soon as possible a practical guide for non-smoker militants to help them ensure that existing regulations are put into practice .

4) our Non-Smoker association asks the French government and National Health Services for a substantial grant for prevention purposes: its action helps prevent the whole population from being intoxicated by unhealthy air. (p.47)

Gregory N . Connolly DND MPH
Director, Office for Non-Smoking and Health, Massachusetts Department of
Public Health, United States of America

Honorable Wendy Nelder
Member, San Francisco Board of Supervisors, San Francisco , California, U .S .A .

In order to assure to every San Franciscan the right to choose whether to run the health risks associated with inhaling tobacco smoke, in 1982 Supervisor Wendy Nelder authored the toughest American smoking ordinance ever considered at that time……….

Prior to the passage of the San Francisco ordinance, talk of the dangers of second-hand smoke was dismissed as fanatical and, scientifically unsound …………(p.62)


SS- 9- 08




A disturbing comment is that WHO, an unelected globalist entity, sees itself as “guardians of the world’s health”.

WHO undertook an antismoking cultic ritual - “we smashed symbolically the ashtrays this year on 7th April, World Health Day, just to mark the start of a ban on smoking throughout the building”, and instituted an ongoing “day of observance”, the first commemorating WHO’s 40th anniversary - “the World Health Assembly declared 7th April next year, the 40th anniversary of WHO, as the World's First No Smoking Day.”

Mahler indicated many times over the goal of smoke-free societies.

Both Mahler and Daube invoked symbolism of the war between good and evil - “so that farmers and their governments do not have to sell their health or their soul to the tobacco devil;” "[w]e must remind them that the hottest fires in hell are reserved for those who in times of great moral crisis maintain their neutrality"[quoted from Dante]. Obviously, WHO and the Godberites represented the ‘eternal good’.

ETS (passive smoking) was the centerpiece, as it needed to be, of the 6th World Conference. This contrived issue propelled the antismoking movement since the last Conference. Without it, antismoking would have stalled. ETS, for the purposes of the Godber blueprint needed to be dangerous.

Both Mahler and Daube were very upbeat about the prospects of the ETS ‘danger’ issue. Most interestingly, both speakers spoke of the issue as if ‘settled’ - ‘conclusive’ evidence. It must be remembered that the first formal, albeit corrupt, attempt at a meta-analysis of available data - EPA (1992/3) - was still five years away. Daube goes so far as to say “We'll certainly see the publication of further evidence on the dangers of passive smoking”. How did he know that further ‘evidence’ would indicate ‘danger’? Why could it not indicate ‘no danger’?

Wendy Nelder (San Francisco Board of Supervidors) authored a bill in 1982 to ‘protect’ nonsmokers from the ‘hazards’ of ETS. This was a decade before EPA (1992/3). By Conference time, 1987, Nelder was speaking of ETS ‘danger’ as a ‘settled’ matter.

Furthermore, in 1986 the
US Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop - also a vehement antismoker, intimated, beyond the implications of available data, a passive smoke ‘danger’.

A number of critical shifts occurred between the 5th and 6th Conferences. Members of the core group had made inroads (infiltration) with the government health departments of there respective countries. This would not have been all too difficult given that government health departments are dominated by medico-materialism. Government officials were promised ‘saving lives’ and ‘saving costs’. This attracted considerable tax-payer funding for ‘tobacco control’ organizations. Antismokers had access to material wealth and a recently-acquired ‘professionalism’ for ‘media advocacy’ (i.e., self-serving, inflammatory propaganda). Consider Nigel Gray of
Australia, an early member of the Godberites, and his antismoking success with the Victorian State Government.

Other core members such as Stanton Glantz and James Repace were busy spreading the gospel of passive smoke ‘danger’ - (p.7-15)

James Repace background http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/oxy59d00
Repace was claiming in the early 1980’s - in general, testified Mr. Repace, non-smokers who are chronically exposed to tobacco combustion products in work place related exposures may inhale as much as 27 low tar cigarettes per day, depending upon the duration of the exposure, and the ventilation  http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/quz09a00
By the mid-1980’s, Repace had ‘established’ a lung cancer ‘death toll’ in nonsmokers ‘attributable’ to ETS exposure

Repace: “
In 1979, I went to work for the US Environmental Protection Agency in Washington, in the national Air Policy Office as a science policy analyst. I quickly made indoor air pollution an EPA policy issue, became an EPA media spokesman for indoor air, and was soon invited all over the country to speak on this emerging issue, and later testified before the US congress. In 1985, Al and I published the world's first risk assessement of passive smoking and lung cancer, estimating 5000 US nonsmokers' deaths per year. When the national news media learned of the study, it had a major impact: news of the study appeared on major TV news programs and in the major newspapers.”
“ETS became a big issue at the EPA because when I raised it as an issue in 1983 when I was in the Air Policy Office, I had the support of the Agency's Air Program Chief, who was appointed by the President of the
U.S., and had sufficient influence to allow the program to flourish. In general, however, the lower level managers who ran the air programs were only interested in what they were required to do by law, and the U.S. Clean Air Act covers only "ambient," i.e., outdoor air.”

From the Abstracts of the 6th World Conference, Judson Wells, representing both the American Lung Association and the National Council for Clean Indoor Air, arrived at another ETS ‘death toll’ altogether. Judson Wells background http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/zxe42d00

Background on Hirayama’s antismoking stance

Also from the Abstracts section is the disturbing conduct of the Park Nicollet Medical Center which had instituted a ban on employment to smokers in the mid-1980’s - in keeping with the Godber Blueprint. At that time, before smoker discrimination became sanctioned by government, this conduct may have indeed been illegal.

One of the most disturbing, perverse, presentations was that of Arthur Chesterfield-Evans of the Non-Smokers' Movement of Australia. Chesterfield-Evans presentation adds further layers to the politicizing of antismoking and a workable tactical route. He indicates “[r]arely is this organised into an overall strategy and rarely do any of these groups cooperate in a strategic or even tactical sense.” He suggests how various groups within antismoking can strategically and tactically work together towards the common antismoking goal, i.e., orchestrated propaganda. Repugnant are the tactics to manipulate/deceive decision-makers. For example, more radical groups can put initial pressure on decision-makers. Other groups, seemingly less radical, can then be the ones to pursue discussions with decision-makers. Furthermore, “[t]hese more conservative bodies should not directly criticise activists.” These groups are working in concert. In this fashion, government health departments could be manipulated towards a radical view without realizing it. Chesterfield-Evans also reinforced the idea of ‘media management’.

Media Strategy for Smoking Control, January, 1988
US Department of Health
and Human Services
Public Health Service
National Institutes of Health


The Surgeon General's recent report on nicotine addiction underscores the importance of mobilizing all segments of society toward the elimination of tobacco use from our culture.

…. These guidelines offer expert advice useful in the continuing effort to assist smoking control advocates to influence the media and bring about changes in the public's knowledge, attitudes, and behavior related to tobacco use.

…. We believe that the media would better serve the public to reduce the prevalence of tobacco use.

The NCI wishes to thank Mr. Michael Pertschuk, Co­Director of the Advocacy Institute, and his staff, particularly Dr. Anne Marie O'Keefe and Mr. Phillip Wilbur, for taking the lead and developing these guidelines. Their vision, together with the insight of the workshop participants, has produced a valuable handbook. We hope that those who read and use it will add to the momentum toward a tobacco-free society by the year 2000.


…. But we have also learned that the promise of that open­ness will only be realized if we develop strategies, the skills, and the confidence to bring our story forcefully to the media.

…. The priority task for the smoking control advocate is to master and implement the full complement of strategies for gaining access to the mass media in ways that contribute to the adoption of smoking control policies.

….Indeed, even in the midst of the smoking control movement's current media "blitz" and policy success, there are danger signals:
• Too often, tobacco industry spokespeople succeed in framing the smoking issue as "zealous anti-smokers versus unoffending smokers" an issue, not of public health, but of public civility.
•Even without tobacco industry "spin," some journalists are beginning to react negatively to what they perceive as the excessive zeal and puritanical fervor of smoking control advocates.

….Media advocacy requires art, imagination, and creativity; and, effort to reduce it to a series of rigid and prescribed steps is doomed to mediocrity or failure. But practitioners tend to agree on the soundness of certain basic operating principles or prac­tices. This section outlines and examines those basic principles.

Be Flexible, Spontaneous, Opportunistic, and Creative
A sound media advocacy campaign requires careful plan­ning, but ample room must be left for flexibility and spontaneity. Media advocacy requires the ability to react quickly and crea­tively to the evolving news environment. Opportunism is not ordinarily viewed as a virtue in our society. But the ability to seize an opportunity is the es­sence of media advocacy. The media advocate is constantly on the hunt for breaking news stories which can provide a "peg" for a press comment on smok­ing. So, an advocate might issue a press release contrasting a spontaneous national mobilization to prevent a handful of poi­sonings from contaminated soup, for example, with the community's relative lethargy in confronting the hazards of smoking. The death from smoking-caused lung cancer of a popu­lar figure, however painful, is another such opportunity. (Good taste and sensitivity to the tragedy, must, of course, guide the advocate.) Smoke Signals contains many illustrations of creative opportunism.

…. As a smoking control advocate, you are inherently cred­ible, whether scientist or citizen, because you are seen to be moti­vated by concern for the public health, not by profit seeking (see Chapter 3). You need not be totally at ease, or fluent and flaw­less, to be persuasive and convincing. If you do not present yourself as shrill, moralistic, or self-righteous, you will ordinarily meet with a sympathetic response from journalists, who have become increasingly angered by the distortions of the tobacco industry spokespeople.

…. Keep in mind that a full-length story on the evening news averages about 90 seconds. (Three minutes, says a network producer, "is the equivalent of War and Peace".)
Because of these time limitations, your message must be conveyed in a 10 to 15 second "bite," or a handful of quotable sentences. That "bite" is your prime opportunity to help frame the issue - not to debate the issue as it has been framed by an in­dustry adversary. Smoke Signals contains many illustrative "bites" which have proven to be effective media stoppers.
If you believe that a question from an interviewer or tobacco spokesperson is diversionary or misinformed, you don't have to answer it. One option in such a situation is to answer the question you believe should have been asked! Or, you can even take it a step further and ask the question that should have been asked - ask the interviewer or the pro-tobacco spokesperson.

….There can be no media advocacy without access to the media. And access to the media is limited to, those stories which the media gatekeepers deem newsworthy, i.e. significant, inter­esting, and new. Therefore, the media advocate must continu­ously search for new "pegs," "angles," and "hooks." This section of the guidelines develops some of the most promising tech­niques for keeping stories on smoking and disease continuously newsworthy.

….But soft path approaches alone are not sufficient. Contro­versial "hard path" stories create news. Of course, not all smok­ing controversies are equally effective in framing smoking control issues. In particular, a debate or confrontation which frames the controversy in terms of smokers vs. nonsmokers is plainly counterproductive. But controversy created by the exposure of tobacco industry marketing or political strategies can gain public attention and properly frame the issue as the tobacco industry vs. the community (smoker and nonsmoker alike).
Controversy can also be created. For example, when thirteen-year-olds are videotaped purchasing cigarettes from vending machines, the resulting controversy is highly newswor­thy, and strongly supportive of bans vending machine sales or enforcement of existing laws against the sale of cigarettes to minors. Of course, thirteen-year-olds buy cigarettes from vend­ing machines every day, so "creating" this controversy merely means exposing something that is commonplace.

Creative Epidemiology
One felicitous discovery of smoking control advocates is that readers and viewers and, therefore, media, have an almost insatiable appetite for stories relating to their health. The "news" about smoking's hazards is hardly new, yet stories about those hazards still command media attention.
Of course, there is a continuous stream of new scientific findings about smoking, including new epidemiological studies, behavioral studies, and studies of the chemistry and effects of cigarette smoke. When presented in a form designed to heighten reader or viewer interest, these studies remain newsworthy, even if largely confirmatory of earlier findings.
A second wave of newsworthy scientific reports has come from various consensus reports, most notably the media-potent annual reports of the Surgeon General. With the release of these reports, the evaluation of previous studies and the conclusions of an authoritative body become news. Public scientific pronounce­ments, coupled with calls for action by leading medical and scientific authorities such as the President of a medical society or the Dean of a school of public health, can command media atten­tion. And such pronouncements serve as an important vehicle for shifting public focus from the health impact of smoking to the need for public policy solutions.
The newsworthy life of smoking-related disease stories can be constantly extended and renewed by the practice of "crea­tive epidemiology."
Michael Daube, who coined the term, defines creative epidemiology as "the ability of the good epidemiologist to re­work data so that what is essentially the same information can be presented in a new and interesting form." Thus, creative epidemi­ology marries the science of the researcher with the art and crea­tivity of the media advocate.
….As a tool for smoking control media advocacy, creative epidemiology can demonstrate several key objectives.

Relative Harms of Smoking. By establishing the relative enormity of smoking's toll, as compared to hazards which the public perceives as more severe or threatening, creative epidemi­ology serves to elevate the priority of smoking as a public health issue. For example, smoking's 350,000 deaths a year are placed in a good perspective by noting that this total is more than cocaine, heroin, AIDS, accidents, fire, alcohol, homicide and suicide coni­bined. The relative addictive power of smoking can also be dramatized by noting
that the 80% of smokers who try to quit relapse within one year. This is the same relapse rate asfor heroin addicts who try to free themselves from their addiction.
Local--big Statistics. By breaking global data down into local data, creative epidemiology can make the threat of smoking more tangible and heighten its importance as a community prob­lem. The nationwide or worldwide statistics on smoking can be numbing, but calculating the death toll in your own state or community is a new and engaging angle on an old and remote story. The story can be continually renewed by such devices as a state or community death clock, prominently displayed, which records the estimated cumulative deaths from smoking in your community, one by one.
Public Policy Implications. Creative epidemiology can be an effective tool for dramatizing the public policy implications of smoking. It is possible, for example, to calculate the numbers of teenagers in a state who will take up smoking as the result of a proposed increase in the cigarette excise tax. Or, in arguing for
funds for public education on smoking's hazards, it is possible to calculate the dollars paid by smoking teenagers themselves in cigarette taxes.
Appendix C contains a list of prime illustrations of effec­tive creative epidemiology.

Timely Reaction to the General News Environment
News creates new opportunities. The smoking control advocate must stay constantly alert to developing national or local news stories that furnish opportunities at the local level for reactive "piggybacking." These opportunities will include:
• national smoking control studies that lend themselves to
local "spins" or angles;
• legislative or public policy actions taken by adjoining or
"model" jurisdictions that provide an opportunity for
appealing to community pride and competitiveness (no
community likes to see itself as lagging behind its neigh­bors, or the times);
• investigative reports of tobacco industry advertising, pro­
motions, political campaign contributions, or other strate­gies that create opportunities for focusing on local ex­amples; and
• national or local epidemics, disasters, or tragedies whose
toll, while serious, is dwarfed by smoking's.

Creating News With Created Events
Smoking control advocates can generate news by creating newsworthy events, such as the American Cancer Society's Great American Smokeout and local satellite events. Care must be taken, however, to not appear as if you're trying to get publicity. The artful media advocate can get media attention while making it look like they're simply doing their job. In other words, the more you look like you're trying to get publicity, the more reluc­tant some journalists will be to give it to you.
Nonetheless, it is often necessary for the smoking control advocate to be creative in enticing journalists to cover what, to many, seems an old or uninteresting story.

….These hurdles can be overcome by the prestige of the sponsoring organizations, and their skill and experience in con­vincing media gatekeepers to run them in prime time. But the most effective way to insure significant airing of PSA's is to organize local volunteers to visit and persuade local station managers to accept and run the PSA's in prime time.

….Paid ads are especially effective when they create news and serve to frame the public debate. For example, smoking control advocate Tony Schwartz placed a paid ad on a single
New York radio station challenging New York Mayor Koch to take the lead in seeking a Clean Indoor Air ordinance for the city. The ad used an excerpt from one of Koch's press conferences in which the mayor castigated the proprietors of gay bath houses for "selling death." The ad, which applied Koch's "selling death" quote to cigarette promotion, itself became a news story in all the New York media and helped convince the Mayor to lead the fight for the Clean Indoor Air ordinance.
In another tobacco control fight, the Canadian group, Non-Smokers' Rights Association, paid $15,000 for a full-page newspaper ad which personally attacked a prominent political figure as tobacco lobbyist trying to defeat a tobacco control bill before Parliament. The ad not only effectively removed this person from the debate, but it inspired amendments to the bill that established favorable precedents and, ultimately, may cost the industry millions of dollars.
Some smoking control advocates believe that when adver­tising time for smoking control messages is purchased, the media will be less inclined to accept non-paid PSA's in the future. Others believe that paying for some ads creates good will that can result in a greater receptivity for non-paid PSA's. Where paid media is used, it is advisable to discuss this relationship in ad­vance with station managers in your community.

….Among the most important symbols in the smoking control debate are those that distinguish the two sides of the debate. Tobacco spokespersons portray smoking control advo­cates as:
•unscientific moral zealots and cranks;
•political gadflies, publicity seekers and anti-business radicals;
•chronic busybodies, consumed by a paternalistic crusade to control the behavior of smokers; and
•enemies of civil and human rights, on the slippery slope
toward regulation of all human activity.
At the same time, the tobacco industry presents itself as:
•seekers of truth,
•protectors of freedom, tolerance, public civility, and sweet reason;
•defenders of the civil liberties of smokers and nonsmok­ers alike;
•friends and philanthropists to the most worthy and the most needy: to the arts, to women, to minorities, to the homeless; and
•the fount of essential economic benefits to society.
To the extent that the industry's characterizations of "we" and "they" prevail, the message of the smoking control advocate is discredited, and lost.
Fortunately, the smoking control advocate enjoys natural credibility. He or she is most commonly a scientist, physician, public health official or expert, consumer protector, citizen activ­ist, or volunteer who speaks from conviction, based upon solid scientific evidence. He or she speaks out in the interest of public health, not for profit.

….To the extent that industry spokespersons are forced to endorse unbelievable positions, the credibility of the spokesper­sons can be called into question. This strategy can be especially effective when the industry uses a well-known politician or celebrity to speak for them. Because the public overwhelmingly rejects industry positions, anyone advocating those positions can be "publicly shamed" for abdicating their responsibilities as a citizen. Tobacco control advocates, therefore, should characterize the competing parties in this debate as:
•defenders of health vs. profit seekers;
•community leaders vs. merchants of addictive drugs;
•citizens for clean air vs. environmental polluters;
•children and infants, the family, the poor, women, and minorities vs. big business; and
•health scientists vs. paid propagandists.

….Do not let industry representatives or the media deflect atten­tion from the tobacco industry's role by framing the conflict as "smokers vs. nonsmokers."
Nonsmoking in public is the social norm. Most people don't smoke in public places and most people, smokers and nonsmokers, are bothered by smoke.
If you are accused of being anti-smoker, re-direct
the accusation and say you are anti-smoke and anti-epi­demic and that you have no problem with either of those
•Since 90% of smokers begin smoking and become ad­dicted before the age of responsibility, smokers are the victims of tobacco industry marketing practices which make smoking attractive to young people.
•Most smokers respect the health concerns of nonsmokers. Polls show that the majority of smokers, as well as non­smokers, support restrictions on smoking in public places and workplaces.
So-called "smokers' rights" groups do not speak for the majority of smokers. Rather, they are usually sponsored by the tobacco industry.

….3. The smoking control advocate should be constantly aware that his or her demeanor, tone, rhetoric, good humor under stress, and genuine empathy for addicted smokers is a strong antidote to negative industry characterizations. Be careful to avoid blaming the victim. Many people believe the term "smoking" inherently blames the victim. An alternative is to refer only to "tobacco products." For example, instead of saying "350,000 people die each year because of smok­ing," say "cigarettes kill 350,000 people each year."

….This section will identify some of the positive labels and symbols that fairly and forcefully reflect those facts and argu­ments.
Characterizing the Scientific Case Against Smoking. As its basis for opposing all smoking control policies, the industry uniformly characterizes the scientific case against smoking as:
• an unproven, continuing scientific controversy;
• only a statistical relation; or
• not exceptional (i.e., "Any product consumed in excess,or abused, can be hazardous!")

Smoking control advocates have learned not to fall into the industry's trap of debating the significance of obscure, highly selective data. The Surgeon General, for example, refuses to respond to the pseudoscientific quibbling of any industry spokes­person. Rather, he simply states that there is no scientific contro­versy over the fact that smoking is the greatest preventable cause of disease and death in our society.
To reinforce this conclusion, the smoking control advo­cate must use those symbols and catch phrases that affirm both the certainty and the enormity of smoking's toll
. These include:
America's #1 preventable public health problem;
• a modern pandemic; and
· the twentieth century's brown plague.
Characterizing Smoking Control Policies. The industry also routinely characterizes smoking policy initiatives with predictable labels and symbols. So, in advocating specific smoking control policies, the advocate must advance those symbols that appeal to positive social and political values.

….Science and health and truth are powerful symbols. And they belong, rightly and justly, to the smoking control movement!

D.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE1989 - 232-720 - 814/00128

(emphases added)


The above document is essentially self-explanatory as a resource for media/public manipulation/management in advancing the Godber Blueprint - “[w]e hope that those who read and use it will add to the momentum toward a tobacco-free society by the year 2000.” Most importantly is that it is a US Government publication.

Antismokers were well aware of the manipulation involved, using their apparent credibility to promote inflammatory propaganda - “As a smoking control advocate, you are inherently cred­ible, whether scientist or citizen, because you are seen to be moti­vated by concern for the public health, not by profit seeking”; “Fortunately, the smoking control advocate enjoys natural credibility”; “Science and health and truth are powerful symbols. And they belong, rightly and justly, to the smoking control movement!”

Consider a cited example for use under the banner of ‘creative epidemiology’: “smoking's 350,000 deaths a year are placed in a good perspective by noting that this total is more than cocaine, heroin, AIDS, accidents, fire, alcohol, homicide and suicide combined.” Such a statement is utterly reckless. It violates rules of both statistical and causal inference. Statistically, it is like comparing apples and oranges. They involve very different distributions (and underlying assumptions) and statistically associated factors. In causal terms, mortality from cocaine, heroin, AIDS, etc, is causally definable. ‘Smoking-related’ mortality is a statistical fiction where causal explanation is conspicuous by its complete absence. By improperly comparing a statistical fiction with causally-definable mortality fraudulently elevates the statistical fiction to a causal status it does not have. Antismoking propaganda is replete with such incoherent analogies that are a violation of the rules of statistical and causal inference. Another misleading consequence of ‘creative epidemiology’ is the ‘repackaging’ of old information or new studies confirming old evidence to make them appear as ‘new’ findings.

Blueprint for Success (1990)
Countdown 2000
10 Years to a Tobacco-Free America


“The subcommittee on smoking in public places has developed a strong set of recommendations for consolidating and strengthening state and local smoking-control efforts. To achieve the Countdown 2000 goals, the subcommittee specifies the following minimum standards: smoking should be prohibited in child day care centers, on school property, in all public and private work places, In retail stores, In health care facilities and on any form of public transportation. Most other indoor areas open to the public would be smoke-free under these proposals. Restaurants would provide smoke-free space based on the ratio of nonsmokers to smokers. Any state-level preemption provision must be opposed because it would preclude potentially stronger action in localities. Finally, the subcommittee opposes statutes providing civil rights protection for smokers.” (p.6, 7)

The American Cancer Society, American Heart Association and American Lung Association began working together in the early 1960s to educate Americans about the serious health hazards associated with tobacco use. In 1985, the three agencies created Tobacco-Free America (TFA), and its programs, induding the Smoke-Free Class of 2000, Tobacco-Free Schools and the Legislative Clearinghouse, to meet the following three specific goals:
1) to form strong state and local coalitions of the three agencies to focus the attention of legislators, regulators and other public officials, as well as the general public, on the health hazards of tobacco use and the need for enactment of tobacco-control legislation;
2) to foster public perception that smoking is a socially unacceptable behavior and encourage smokers to quit and young persons not to start; and
3) to attain a smoke-free society by the year 2000, as called for by former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop.” (p.8)

“Currently, one may question whether our grassroots are not merely Astroturf, an artificial roster of volunteers who may or may not respond to a call for action. We are most effective when we have a core group of dedicated advocates who will act on a moment's notice. In the wake of major tobacco- control victories, such as the passage of the New York State Clean Indoor Air Act and the overwhelming approval by
California voters of Proposition 99, the ballot initiative that Increased the state cigarette excise tax by 25 cents, there have also been setbacks. For instance, Colorado, Kentucky, Oregon, Tennessee and Virginia enacted anti-discrimination protections for smokers by prohibiting employers from establishing as a condition of employment that employees and prospective employees must be nonsmokers; thus, putting smokers into a "protected" class. In addition, several states have adopted restrictions on smoking in public places that prevent localities from enacting further restrictions. These regressions, when viewed from a global perspective, signify a negative trend for the tobacco-control movement that began in the late 1980s, in spite of the great progress made during the bulk of that decade. Our ability to organize, energize and mobilize our vast base of dedicated volunteers to affect public policy will determine our degree of success in the 1990s. Our objective in setting into motion this national 'plan of action' is for states and localities to use public policy to the fullest extent over the next ten years, and beyond, to achieve a tobacco-free society.” (p.9)

“GOAL #1: Acceptance and affirmation that public policy advocacy is absolutely essential to fulfill the mission of health promotion and disease prevention through tobacco-control regulation stated by the American Cancer Society, American Heart Association and American Lung Association.
• National, state and local boards should adopt tobacco-control advocacy as a priority. This action requires the education of volunteer boards as to the efficacy of tobacco-control advocacy as a way to achieve the overall mission of our respective organizations.
• Staff and resources of national, state and local agencies must be dedicated to the political education, recruitment, confidence-building and institutional recognition of their volunteer members who advocate tobacco-control policies at each level of government. . Tobacco-control advocacy committees must be organized, or strengthened, at all levels to reflect a clear priority within the organizations.
• Staff positions of experienced government relations/public affairs professionals must be created at the state level.
• State and local coalitions must be organized or strengthened with the following: added human and financial resources; aggressive outreach to new and potential alliances. We must reach out to and enlist in our quest other sectors that have a vested interest In tobacco reguiations,-such as:……” (p.10)

“Restrictions on Smoking in Public Places
GOAL: To protect public health, exposure to environmental tobacco smoke should be eliminated.
RATIONALE: Establishment of public indoor smoking control laws will protect public health by effectively reducing involuntary exposure to environmental tobacco smoke.
According to the U.S. Surgeon General, as many as 5,000 nonsmokers die each year of diseases caused by inhaling smoke released Into the air by tobacco products. Environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) is second only to asbestos in causing more deaths than all other known airborne pollutants combined. While much is known about the adverse health consequences of tobacco use by smokers, recent reports also show a clear health danger to nonsmokers. As a result, public policy debate by local, state and federal lawmakers has focused on protecting nonsmokers from ETS. According to the 1990 Tobacco Free America Legislative Clearinghouse report, State Legislated Actions on Tobacco Issues, '45 states and the
District of Columbia restrict smoking In some manner in public places.' These laws, coupled with those at the local level, range from simple (banning smoking on school buses while they operate) to comprehensive (restricting smoking in most public places, including restaurants and all work places). While there has been a dramatic proliferation of smoking control laws over the past three years, the policy debates that have erupted in local and state legislative chambers have proved that the tobacco industry has raised the stakes by abandoning the political strategy of opposing all smoking control laws to pushing for laws that preempt local action and classify smokers as a protected class. Across the country, the tobacco industry is working to consolidate its power in the statehouse. State legislatures provide a forum more conducive to working through political process, including campaign contributions, well-placed and well-respected highly paid lobbyists and legislative maneuvers controlled by Institutionalized power brokers. The tobacco industry is in a damage control mode on smoking control laws and would prefer to use the state political system where citizens have less access to lawmakers, as opposed to localities where public opinion generates policy change more rapidly. To effectively counter this strategy, public health advocates need to work for public indoor smoking control laws that adhere to the highest public health standards - standards that meet the daunting health risk posed by tobacco use and exposure to others' tobacco use.” (p.27)

“While the political climate in a given legislative body may not be conducive to achieving all of the goals articulated in this Blueprint for Success, it is crucial for smoking-control advocates to secure restrictions on smoking in child care facilities, educational institutions and the work place. These are absolutes. Other provisions in public indoor smoking-control laws may be used as points of negotiation, leverage to ensure inclusion of the priority affecting children and occupational protection.

Countdown 2000 Legislative & Regulatory Objectives
Restrictions on Smoking In Public Places
Restrictions on smoking in public places remain a keystone in the overall challenge to achieve a tobacco-free society. To accomplish the public health goals inherent in this arena, TFA recommends that a series of provisions be adopted to provide uniform protections for the nonsmoker. Priority emphasis should be placed on achieving restrictions that provide protection for children and the adult workforce. Protection of children is not only a public health imperative but is essential to set a healthful example that could prevent children from becoming addicted to tobacco later in life. The latter requires restrictions on the use of tobacco products by teachers and other school personnel while on school property. The work place is targeted for priority action because working adults spend a significant portion of their waking hours-eight or more hours per day, five days per week at work. Daily exposure to tobacco smoke poses an unnecessary health risk and therefore; elimination of tobacco smoke exposure becomes another critical public health goal that should lead to increased productivity, decreased employee health problems and a safer work environment. Countdown 2000 Objective: Enact a comprehensive Clean Indoor Air statute to ensure elimination of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke.” (p.28)

“Note: Regulatory Initiatives may be appropriate to achieve this objective by accessing the jurisdiction of day care licensing agencies.
A prohibition on smoking on school property, including any portion of a facility whose purpose is the education and/or care of students. In facilities of higher education, every effort should be made to prevent tobacco use on school property, except for private residences on such property. Educational facilities are public and private schools, elementary and secondary schools, colleges, universities and other educational and vocational institutions.
Note: Regulatory initiatives may be appropriate to achieve this objective by accessing the jurisdiction of school boards and other licensing agencies. Further, many educators and staff are employed under collective bargaining agreements, therefore, work place restrictions exceeding state or local restrictions should be negotiated through the collective bargaining process.
• A prohibition on smoking in all private and public work places. Work places are any area In a place of employment where one or more employees are assigned and perforrm services for their employer. Work places include offices, factories, warehouses, food service establishments and other places of employment. Specified areas should include meeting and conference rooms, and other areas generally used by employees to carry out their work.
• A prohibition on smoking in all health care facilities. Health care facilities inciude hospitals, health care clinics and laboratories, and community health care centers.
Note: Regulatory initiatives may be appropriate to achieve this objective by accessing the jurisdiction of licensing agencies responsible for accrediting such facilities.
• A prohibition on smoking on all forms.of public transportation including buses, trains, subways and taxis.
• A prohibition on smoking in food service establishments except in designated areas. The food service establishment (restaurant) provision should be prevalence-based. Thus, a restaurant will be smoke-free, except in a designated area whose size is determined by the national percentage of nonsmokers to smokers (i.e., In 1989, approximately 70 percent of the population was comprised of nonsmokers, thus, 70 percent of any food service establishment should be designated smoke-free). A food service establishment is any Indoor area open to the public or portion thereof in which the primary business is the sale of food for on-premises consumption including, but not limited to, restaurants, cafeterias, coffee shops, diners, sandwich shops and short-order cafes. A bar is defined as any indoor area open to the public and devoted to the sale and service of alcohol beverages for on-premises consumption of such beverages. Service of food is considered incidental if the food service generates less than 40 percent of total gross sales. Any bar that generates 40 percent or more of total annual gross sales from the sale of food for on-premises consumption should be considered a food service establishment.
• A prohibition on smoking in indoor areas open to the public Including auditoriums, elevators, gymnasiums, enclosed indoor areas containing a swimming pool, public buildings (any building owned or operated by the state or any county, city, town, village or other political subdivision, public Improvement, or special district, public authority, commission, agency or public benefit corporation; or any other separate corporate Instrumentality or unit of state or local government), theaters, museums, libraries, indoor common areas, waiting rooms, banks, rest rooms and waiting areas in public transportation terminals.
Any comprehensive Clean Indoor Air statute must not contain any preemptive clauses that are intended to remove power and authority to regulate the indoor environment from a unit of local government. Preemption clauses have been attached to laws restricting smoking in public places in six states. A new form of preemption was recently passed in
Virginia (1990) that was disguised as a 'local option.' Local option permits localities to enact ordinances that further restrict smoking in public places; however, the local legislation must conform to a 'model' bill laid out In the state law. Because the state law dictates to localities what language they use, this local option clause serves as a disincentive for localities to take action. Preemption clauses may serve to weaken stronger pre-existing local laws, preclude stronger local laws from being passed in the future and run contrary to the usual legislative procedure of setting minimum standards that local governing bodies may exceed.
Any comprehensive Clean Indoor Air statute must not contain provisions that provide civil rights protection for smokers against employment discrimination.” (p.29, 30)

(emphases added)


The referred-to call by former U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop for a smoke-free society by 2000 was made in 1984 (http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/tylerprize/koop http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/QQ/Views/Exhibit/narrative/tobacco.html) and simply reiterates the Godber Blueprint. The entire document Blueprint for Success is a reiteration of the Godber Blueprint.

A particular concern that is taken up in this document is that smokers should not be accorded civil rights protection from things such as termination of employment because of smoking status - and it is recognized in the report as 'employment discrimination'. This is an obscenity of the tyrannically-minded. Apparently no one is permitted to disagree (i.e., continue smoking) with antismokers without attracting some form of retribution. Antismokers’ thinking is depicted as absolutely right. In fact, antismoking is a persecution of smokers, masquerading as the attempt to ‘protect’ nonsmokers. The antismokers are disturbed when severe penalties (e.g., employment termination, refusal of employment) cannot be inflicted on smokers.

Again, there is the direct claim that children should be protected from smokers because the latter are ‘bad exemplars’.

From Tobacco in Developing Countries
Working Papers in Support of the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health: Building a Tobacco-Free World
March 30 - April 3, 1992

Buenos Aires, Argentina


Use strong direct wording such as
Smoking kills
Smoking is addictive
Smoking causes lung cancer
Smoking causes heart disease
Smoking damages your lungs
Smoking harms the fetus
Smoking hurts your children
Don't use statements that condone any
form of smoking, imply only a chance
of contracting disease, or attribute the
statement to a third party . Don't use :
"Don't smoke too much for health's sake . "
"Smoking may cause
"According to the government .
. . . . "

Consider skull and crossbones or other
strong visual displays

Consideration of new laws to restrict cigarette marketing offers an excellent opportunity to limit cigarette use . Such laws shape social norms about tobacco use and complement policies that limit marketing. New evidence clearly shows that exposure to secondhand smoke can cause cancer among exposed nonsmokers and increases infant risk of respiratory problems. On a preliminary basis, the U.S . Environmental Protection Agency has classified environmental tobacco smoke as a class A carcinogen. (p.16)

Smoke Fighting is a strategic guide useful at the early stages of coalition development and later to update strategies . Coalitions formed to fight TTCs have additional needs and responsibilities .
The coalition must establish a strong public image that portrays it as a defender of the nation's health and sovereignty . In many nations, coalitions are seen as fringe "antismoking" groups out to impose their narrow vision on a society that sees smoking as a sign of status and power . The term "antismoking," a label often applied by the tobacco industry, should be avoided and positive names such as "national health campaign" used. (p.17)

Smoke Signals lists four strategies for gaining access to the media: ~
* health news
* shaming the industry's allies
* public service announcements and counter-advertisements .
The entry of a TTC provides an excellent opportunity to use strategies and maintain a long-term media campaign. Ongoing news stories that "spin" the issue with a new twist are essential to a long-term campaign. The following are examples of how small studies and reports can capture media attention.
* Conduct local surveys on smoking
prevalence, particularly among teens .
and ask how many prefer TTC brands .
Alert the press that children are smoking
foreign brands in record numbers .
(This was done in Taiwan in 1987 . )
* Project future smoking deaths and
estimate future deaths among children
if the market is opened or if women
take up smoking.
* Shame the TTCs by testing tar and
nicotine of locally manufactured international
brands, and attack TTCs if the
levels are lower in the home market .
* Protest violations of advertising laws,
and hold public protests against TTCs .
All you need is a telephone line and personal computer . Most noteworthy is Global Link, a computer-based network that links activists throughout the world . Funded by the American Cancer Society and operated by the Advocacy Institute in
Washington, D .C ., this electronic network is an efficient way of communicating quickly . It reports on events and contains vital information on the tobacco industry . Appendix 2 contains information on joining the network . (p.18)

Truth and the Consequences of Cigarette Advertising
An Advocate’s Guide to Arguments in Support of Banning Cigarette Advertising & Promotions
Developed by the Advocacy Institute for The American Cancer Society and the UICC

Winning the Debate.

ARGUMENT: There's no proof that cigarette advertising increases tobacco use .
'Experts say that many factors contribute to smoking . " 'Smoking is a complex behavior. " 'Our studies find no relationship between advertising and smoking . ' "Children smoke because their parents do . " 'Marijuana isn't advertised, but a lot of people still smoke it. '
There is solid logic and evidence to support the effectiveness of cigarette advertising bans, but absolute scientific proof will never be possible to obtain . Protobacco advocates undermine the evidence of this effectiveness by placing the burden of absolute proof on smoking control advocates before adoption of any smoking control policy is justified . To respond, emphasize the existing evidence that supports advertising bans . point out the dishonest nature of the protobacco claims . and place the burden on the cigarette industry to prove that advertising does not promote smoking . (p40)

Almost all studies and experts cited by the tobacco industry are funded by them . These industry "experts" use the same dishonest and distorted arguments against the effects of advertising as they use to deny the dangers of smoking . (p.41)

Many protobacco spokespeople . using flawed or dishonest "scientific" analysis, claim that advertising bans and other restrictions have no effect on tobacco consumption. They argue that even with advertising, smoking rates are going down in some areas, while countries that have never had tobacco advertising have increasing smoking rates . These arguments are specious and unscientific . In fact, examination of many countries before and after an advertising ban shows that tobacco consumption is much lower than it would have been without the ban .
Despite the claims of the industry, considerable credible scientific evidence suggests that ad bans can work. Don't let the protobacco side claim that science is on their side. Also, ask them why, if advertising bans won't effect their sales, they fight so hard against them !
No civilized society waits for certainty before acting to abate the spread of an addictive killer . You are misrepresenting the evidence . In countries that have adopted advertising bans as an integral part of a comprehensive smoking control program, cigarette smoking has declined . (p.42)

Although it is difficult to show a direct cause-and-effect relationship between an advertising ban and a drop in consumption, there is no proof that advertising bans did not help reduce smoking. Besides, the few cases in which the tobacco industry claims ad bans were followed by increases in consumption are not borne out by the data. (p.44)

REMEMBER: An important part of the protobacco argument here is to portray you, the smoking control advocate, as a naive do-gooder who doesn't understand "business ." Do not let this happen . Both the facts and common sense are on your side, and the industry claim that their advertising is not intended to make more people buy more cigarettes can be easily exposed as either stupid or dishonest . (p.47)

Freedom should be seen not as the freedom of the manufacturer to promote a known health hazard, but rather as the freedom and ability of society to implement public health measures. Cigarette advertising interferes with consumers' freedom of choice by giving them false and misleadingly incomplete information, especially about the health dangers of smoking. (p.47)

As educated . mature men and women shun smoking, the cigarette companies step up their advertising to young people and the poor and disadvantaged . What those ads offer is the message that smoking offers an escape from poverty, prejudice, and powerlessness . That's not free choice, but illusion . (p.49)

Tobacco industry public relations experts, lawyers, and lobbyists seek to portray themselves, not as profit seekers, but as defenders of fundamental freedoms . So they invoke "freedom of speech" in defense of tobacco advertising. In fact, the "free speech" that many countries protect almost always refers to political and artistic speech, whereas nearly all governments retain the power to "regulate commerce ." Most countries that protect such "free" political speech simultaneously regulate commercial speech (e .g ., making it illegal to advertise untruthfully or misleadingly . ) (p.51)

A ban on direct and indirect advertising will not prevent tobacco companies from continuing to give financial and other support to such events . Like any other sponsor, they can give money anonymously-if they are actually motivated by philanthropy, rather than profit . The charity of tobacco companies quickly disappears when its recipients try to speak out about the dangers of smoking. We manage to finance art exhibits without looking to the Mafia for help . Culture can survive without providing a cloak of legitimacy for an industry that kills on a far greater scale. (p.54)

From What Tobacco Really Does to Your Country’s Economic Health

A final word from Simon Chapman: "The perspective worth retaining is quite removed from a balance sheet mentality that simply asks about dollars to be earned . There are occupations that employ many people and make some very rich indeed, but which few would argue ought not to decline. Physicians and nurses earn their living from healing and caring for the sick and injured . Is this an argument against preventing disease and injury? Car smash repair workers hope that there will be motor accidents to fill their workshops with dented panels . Is this an argument against the promotion of traffic safety? The Colombian drug cartels and Golden Triangle drug lords are so wealthy that they retain private armies and mercenaries, many of whom are certainly well paid and so, by the "employment" argument count as a plus for the continuation of the drug trade . But is this an argument against trying to control their activities? The same questions can be asked of those working in the tobacco industry ." (p.71)

From A Clean Indoor Air Guide

"For every 8 smokers the tobacco industry kills, it takes one non-smoker with them . "
-Stanton Glantz, Ph .D.

The Global War, Proceedings of the 7th World Conference
on Tobacco and Health

The scientific evidence linking ETS to death and disease is clear and overwhelming : There is no safe level of exposure for the carcinogens found in tobacco smoke. Victims of ETS are called involuntary smokers or passive smokers . The only way to protect people from the dangers of ETS is to keep tobacco smoke out of our indoor air . The prevention of involuntary exposure to ETS should be a priority for tobacco control advocates worldwide. (p.79)

For most people, tobacco smoke is the most widespread and harmful indoor pollutant that they will encounter. The elimination of tobacco smoke from public places is the only approach that guarantees nonsmokers safety from exposure to ETS . (p.79)

Some of the areas that need to be targeted
for smoke-free policies include :
* worksites
* schools and day care centers
* health care settings
* public transportation
* restaurants
* government buildings
* retail stores
* sports arenas
* theaters
* any place frequented by young children .
The issues surrounding ETS provide activists with new and powerful arguments to combat the tobacco industry. Smoking can no longer be considered simply a matter of an individual choosing to smoke and living or dying with the consequences . It is now recognized that smoking is a danger to others, especially children. (p.80)

As a tobacco control advocate, you must make the fears of the tobacco industry a reality by keeping ETS in the public debate and working toward a smoke-free world .

How to Use This Guide
This advocacy guide has been commissioned by the American Cancer Society to help you to make a forceful and authoritative case for the elimination of smoking in public places . Prepared by the Advocacy Institute . it is designed to provide easy access to answers to industry arguments against such policies . It also provides summary references to key authorities in sufficient depth to provide support for presentations in such forums as legislative or regulatory hearings . (p.80)

How Advocacy Can Help
As an advocate for smoke-free policies, your primary tools are direct advocacy and media advocacy . Direct advocacy refers to the efforts you undertake to directly persuade government leaders or other decision makers to adopt policy changes. Media advocacy includes techniques and tactics that gain access to the mass media in ways that educate the public about the dangers of ETS and frame the issues so as to create an environment where broad support for smoke-free policies exists . Advocacy for smoke-free policies can be approached broadly or narrowly . Often. A single small victory can serve as a model for others to follow . Therefore, targeting one environment, such as a hospital or government building, can be just as important as advocating for broader policies . The following examples are a series of useful activities to promote smoke-free policies . They are divided into activities that promote communitywide smoke-free policies and activities aimed at specific targets . Do not think of this list as complete ; advocacy thrives on creativity .

Communitywide Activities
Below are some direct advocacy activities you can pursue to advocate for smoke-free policies .

* Try to convince public authorities with regulatory powers to ban smoking within their scope of authority .

Use "creative epidemiology" to present old statistics in a new and interesting way . For example, compare the number of deaths caused by ETS to some other cause of death, such as car crashes or homicides .
A study in the
United States found that passive smoking is responsible for 37,000 heart disease deaths per year . Advocates presented this information to the press by pointing out that when deaths due to ET'S are combined, it ranks as the third leading cause of preventable death in the United States (after active smoking and alcohol) . This creative way of showing the relative impact of ETS helped generate more press coverage than would have occurred with
the numbers themselves .
* Use a nontobacco news story to generate news about the relative dangers of ETS . For example, a news story about a government program in one public health area could compare their lack of response to another public health problem ETS .
When two grapes imported from
Chile into the United States were found with traces of cyanide . the U .S . government immediately banned all imports of Chilean fruit . However, when tobacco control advocates realized that the sidestream smoke from a single cigarette contains hundreds of times as much cyanide as was found in the grapes, they brought that information to the attention of the press . Thereafter, the stories about the tainted grapes also contained information about the dangers of ETS. (p.80, 81)

Sample media advocacy activities :
* Alert the media to stories about employees who suffer adverse health effects or who are otherwise aggravated by exposure to ETS.
In Australia, nonsmokers and smokers have successfully sued employers over smoky workplaces that contribute to illness. The widow of a light smoker who died of lung cancer settled a claim against five hotels where her husband worked as a bartender and was paid AS20,000. Medical experts attributed her husband's disease and death to passive smoking. Also in
Australia, a woman who worked as a telephone operator for an airline received A$20,000 in a settlement for harm caused by exposure to office smoke. A huge rise in litigation in Australia is predicted as a result of such cases. (p.83)

"It's a Ventilation Problem "
The tobacco industry loves to find other villains . This argument tries to imply that even if tobacco smoke is annoying, the real culprit is inadequate ventilation. Advocates should not be misled by this diversion; the best solution to the problems of ETS is to remove it at its source .

Argument: If you want to ensure that indoor air is really dean, shouldn't you remove all pollutants from the air? Isn't the real problem a lack of adequate ventilation?
* Ventilation systems are designed to conserve energy, not preserve clean indoor air . Even an expensive ventilation system that provided for six air changes a day would be overwhelmed by the ETS from a typical distribution of smokers. To provide enough ventilation to keep ETS to a safe level would cost US$30,000 per smoker .
* It makes a lot more sense to remove the source of the pollution than to try to clean it up afterward .

"Small Group of Fanatics "
On any tobacco and health issue, the tobacco industry will try to claim that its opposition comes from a very small group of narrow-minded busybodies . They try to get the public to forget that they represent the narrowest group of all : those who profit from tobacco sales. Advocates need to remember that they are representing the public health, not any special interest . In this debate, the tobacco companies are the only ones motivated by self interest.
Argument: Aren't clean indoor air policies really just a means for a small group of militant antismokers to push their political agenda?
The people who are concerned about ETS include anyone who is concerned about the health of citizens; in other words, everybody should be concerned about ETS. The only "small group" on this issue is the small groups of tobacco companies that are trying in every way they can to preserve their profits, even if they have to injure and kill people in the process . (p.88)

(emphases added)


Again, the document is self-explanatory as a media/public manipulation/management resource. It constantly reaffirms that antismokers are inherently good. The tobacco industry and anyone questioning antismokers are inherently evil. The emphasis is on ETS ‘danger’ although the official findings of EPA (1992/3) would not be released until late that year, e.g., “Use "creative epidemiology" to present old statistics in a new and interesting way . For example, compare the number of deaths caused by ETS to some other cause of death, such as car crashes or homicides”, “[a]lert the media to stories about employees who suffer adverse health effects or who are otherwise aggravated by exposure to ETS.”

Consider the statements on cigarette-pack warnings. The document advises against using accurate statistical statements, and to use inaccurate, inflammatory statements, i.e., propaganda.

Also highlighted is that antismokers do not like the word ‘antismokers/ing’ - “The coalition must establish a strong public image that portrays it as a defender of the nation's health and sovereignty. In many nations, coalitions are seen as fringe "antismoking" groups out to impose their narrow vision on a society that sees smoking as a sign of status and power . The term "antismoking," a label often applied by the tobacco industry, should be avoided and positive names such as "national health campaign" used.” The aversion to the term ‘antismoker’ is because it accurately describes the mentality. The goal has been to brainwash nonsmokers into bigotry while maintaining that it only represents nonsmoking, not antismoking. The antismokers had no problem with the term in the early days of the crusade. It became problematic, around the late 1970’s, when they realized there was a great gulf between the mentality of antismokers and that of nonsmokers.

Contrary to all the antismoking rhetoric about youth smoking and tobacco advertising, see

More recent (2003-2006) advocacy/manipulation/deception guides:



It appears that at any given time there are typically a very small number of persons that are peculiarly bothered by tobacco smoke/smokers. Such persons demonstrate an unusual, abnormal hyper-reactivity to smoke/smokers. George Godber, for example, was known to leave the room if someone lit-up a cigarette (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/action/document/page?tid=pzk46e00).
Consider, too, John Banzhaf, a regular attendee/presenter at the World Conferences. A video clip from the 1980’s demonstrates his violent hyper-reactivity to tobacco smoke/smokers (

At a saner time, attempts to justify such hyper-reactivity would have been properly viewed as fanaticism. It would not have been unreasonable to consider that hyper-reactivity to smoke was actually masking more deep-seated psychological disturbance; in such individuals, smoke/smokers has become a psychological projection point for a variety of dysfunction. If the World Conferences on Smoking & Health were just a gathering of fanatics reinforcing their delusions, the circumstance would not have had wider ramifications. However, the Conferences were a gathering of such fanatics fully endorsed/empowered by the WHO, and other medical-establishment organizations, to view the fanaticism as normative and to inflict it upon societies around the world under the guise of science-based ‘health promotion’.

By the early-1980’s, the antismokers had dispensed with the idea of promoting ‘nonsmokers’ rights for their own sake. The only way forward for antismoking was the idea of ETS harm to nonsmokers. Antismokers could then pursue the Godber Blueprint on the pretense of ‘protecting’ nonsmokers from ‘harm’.

Another critical development in the late-1980’s was the redefinition - contrary to the long-standing and reasonable definition of addiction - by the
US Surgeon General of tobacco smoking as an ‘addiction’ (US Surgeon General, 1988). This redefinition trivialized the critical differences between hard drugs (e.g., heroin, cocaine) and tobacco (see RASGD). This highly questionable redefinition allowed such inflammatory propaganda as tobacco being ‘more addictive’ than heroin. Most basically, it allowed the depiction of smokers as just addicts. The idea of addiction was promoted only in its derogatory sense, i.e., to be out of control, and was intended to further dehumanize/denormalize the smoker. This redefinition was important to the antismoking ‘strategy’:

1) Smokers are a danger to themselves;
2) Smokers are a danger to themselves because they are addicts (out of control);
3) Smokers are also a danger to nonsmokers;
4) Smokers are also a danger to nonsmokers because smokers are addicts (out of control).

A few names that were at the fore in propagating ETS harm through the 1980’s, i.e., prior to EPA (1992/3), were Stanton Glantz and James Repace. James Repace was an employee of the EPA and provided the impetus for EPA (1992/3). Also hovering around the EPA were Glantz and Jonathon Samet (Samet was one of the consulting editors for the 1986 Surgeon General’s report [health effects of ETS]). Prior to EPA (1992/3), the World Health Organization was officially committed to a smoke-free world, the
US Surgeon General was officially committed to a tobacco-free USA. Other medical organizations were committed to a smoke-free nation/world. ETS ‘danger’ had been propagated for over a decade. The antismoking crusade relied entirely on the idea of ETS ‘danger’. The EPA was infiltrated with antismokers committed to the Godber Blueprint. It could well be asked that if one was partial to the odd gamble, would placing money on an antismoking-favorable outcome by EPA (1992/3), the first official review of the available literature, have been a safe bet? Indeed, that was the conclusion of EPA (1992/3) - ETS was harmful to nonsmokers and classified as a Group A carcinogen.

Bliley’s (1993) governmental investigation (Statement to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce -
http://www.data-yard.net/science/articles/bliley.pdf) of EPA conduct leading to its 1993 ETS report  revealed that a number of high-profile, militant antismoking activists were appearing in the media in the early eighties with all manner of outlandish and inflammatory claims regarding ETS. More disturbing still is that a number of these antismoking lobbyists were either EPA staff or had contributed to the fashioning of EPA “policy” on smoking and ETS prior to EPA (1993). For example, James Repace, an “environment protection specialist” in EPA’s Indoor Air Division, had done extensive work with political advocacy organizations such as the Group Against Smoke Pollution (GASP) and Action on Smoking and Health (ASH). Repace had also appeared as a paid witness in numerous lawsuits and testifying before various legislative bodies to support governmental restrictions on smoking. Repace stated to the press regarding the failure of antismoking legislation in Maryland, 1980, that “People aren’t going to stand for this. Now that the facts are clear, you’re going to start seeing nonsmokers become a lot more violent. You’re going to see fights breaking out all over.”

According to Bliley (1993),
“during the late-1980’s, Mr. Repace became the driving force behind EPA’s push to classify ETS as a ‘Group A’ carcinogen. He began by outlining plans for two reports designed to promote the elimination of ETS. Although his plans personally to draft a ‘handbook’ on the subject were not realized, Repace assumed primary responsibility for two long-term projects - an ‘ETS literature compendium’ and an ‘ETS workplace smoking guide’, as well as a smaller project, an ‘ETS fact sheet’. These projects were meant to further the agenda first announced in Repace’s 1980 article. Even as Mr. Repace expanded his activities with the Indoor Air Division, he was traveling around the world, at the invitation and expense of smoking organizations, to appear at various conferences and media events to promote antismoking restrictions. For example, Mr. Repace traveled to New Zealand in 1990 to support antismoking legislation in that country. Press coverage there was typical of Mr. Repace’s media appearances, including the identification of Mr. Repace as an EPA employee unaccompanied by the required disclaimer that his views did not reflect an official EPA position. In numerous media interviews, Mr. Repace has made the baseless assertion that 50,000 people in the U.S. die each year from exposure to ETS and has left the clear impression that these views reflect EPA’s official position rather than his personal views.” (see RASGD)

In 1989, three years before EPA (1992/3), a draft of the “compendium” was released by the EPA. Bliley noted:
“The only unifying theme of the compendium is that, in the Agency’s view, smoking and ETS are ‘bad’. Like most of the Agency’s outside contractors on ETS, many chapter authors of the compendium, including Stanton Glantz, Jonathon Samet, and of course, James Repace, had long been active in the antismoking movement…….Although still in draft form and not reviewed by the S[cience] A[dvisory] B[oard], the compendium received widespread media attention. Robert Axelrad, Director of the Indoor Air Division, had asserted unequivocally in a May 8, 1990, letter to The Tobacco Institute’s counsel that EPA was ‘not interested in promoting any media attention to the documents while they are in draft form and will do everything possible to assure that they are not construed as EPA policy’. Notwithstanding Mr. Axelrad’s assurances, the compendium was leaked to the press and its more sensational claims openly publicized prior to any scientific review of the document’s contents. According to a February, 1993 by the General Accounting Office (GAO), EPA staff in April 1991, before EPA had completed its own internal review of the document, improperly sent a draft of the compendium to several external reviewers, including Stanton Glantz. Glantz, an outspoken antismoking activist since the 1960’s, immediately proceeded to provide a copy to an Associated Press reporter. According to the GAO, Glantz claims that his release of the report was simply a ‘mistake’. Most disturbing was the public dissemination of the chapter on cardiovascular disease. Glantz, one of the authors of that chapter, appeared in Boston - again with James Repace - at the World Conference on Lung Health in late May 1990 and gave both a presentation and news interviews on that chapter. Dr. Glantz used the opportunity to repeat and underscore the unsupported claim that more than 30,000 nonsmoking Americans die of heart disease each year as a result of exposure to ETS. This activity made a mockery of EPA’s procedures for ensuring that its policy documents receive a full and fair review before they are finalized. Glantz has a long record of public statements demonstrating his commitment to that political agenda, notwithstanding the lack of scientific support for his claims concerning ETS. While his training is in mechanical engineering rather than medicine or some other relevant discipline, he has pontificated on every conceivable smoking-related topic, such as advertising and economic issues, about which he plainly can make no claim to professional competence. To cite one example, Dr. Glantz’s organization stated in its 1983 annual report that ‘irrefutable medical and scientific evidence has confirmed what millions of nonsmokers have intuitively known for a long time: Tobacco smoke….poses a serious health risk for nonsmokers who breathe secondhand smoke.’” (p. 7-9)

The EPA circumstance prior to 1993 is extraordinary. With antismoking policy formulated long before the first formal risk assessment of ETS in 1993, the EPA was no more than an antismoking organization, dominated by high-profile, antismoking activists. The shamelessness and haughtiness of antismoking conduct is obvious during the 1980’s and early-1990’s concerning ETS. The incitement to fear and hatred through the unquestioned propagation of falsehoods and dogma, masqueraded as scientifically-based, was so “effective,” and over such a short time, that not only did the number of ETS studies increase over this period and industry already taking “preventive” measures, but that, according to even the EPA Administrator Reilly concerning the formation of a panel to critically review the EPA’s risk assessment of ETS, “it is not easy to select a panel of experts on any ‘highly charged emotional and political issue’ such as ETS.” (in Bliley, 1993, p.16) How an initially low-profile phenomenon such as ETS had been elevated to such a “charged” status before the first formal risk assessment of ETS is testimony to the gross misconduct of the antismoking lobby and the EPA itself.

Although the Bliley (1993) enquiry highlighted severe anomalies and violations of due process leading to EPA (1992/3), the conclusions therein were not further investigated or even heard of again. The report was shelved.

Following its report, in mid-1993 the EPA released recommendations for “dealing” with ETS:
“EPA firmly believes that the scientific evidence is sufficient to warrant actions to protect nonsmokers from involuntary exposure to secondhand smoke. Accordingly, we are conducting a public outreach program to communicate the findings of the report to the public.
In July [1993], the Agency published a brochure, What You Can Do About Secondhand Smoke, which specifies actions that parents, decision makers, and building occupants can take to protect nonsmokers, including children, from indoor exposure to secondhand smoke.
The brochure also contains a special message for smokers about how they can help protect people around them.
What kinds of actions are being advised? The following steps can help curb ETS exposure in the home, at childcare centers and schools, in the workplace, and in restaurants and bars:
* Don’t smoke in your home or permit others to do so. If a family member smokes indoors, we recommend increasing ventilation in the area by opening windows or using exhaust fans. We also recommend that smoking should not occur if children are present, particularly if infants and toddlers. Baby-sitters and others who work in the home should not be allowed to smoke indoors or near children.
* Every organization dealing with children - schools, daycare facilities, and other places where children spend time - should have a smoking policy that protects children from exposure to ETS.
* Every company should have a smoking policy that protects nonsmokers from involuntary exposure to tobacco smoke. Many businesses and organizations already have policies in place and more and more are instituting them, but these policies vary in effectiveness. Simply separating smokers and nonsmokers within the same area, such as a cafeteria, will still expose nonsmokers to recirculated smoke and to smoke drifting in from smoking areas. Instead, companies should either prohibit smoking indoors or limit smoking to rooms that have been specially designed to prevent smoke from escaping to other areas of the building.
* If smoking is permitted in a restaurant or a bar, smoking areas should be located in well-ventilated areas so nonsmokers will face less exposure. More and more restaurants and restaurant chains are prohibiting smoking in their facilities, and cities and countries across the
United States are restricting smoking in restaurants within their jurisdictions.
EPA will be publishing guidance to help organizations establish smoking policies in indoor environments.
Providing our children and the public with a smoke-free environment must be a national priority. A 12-minute video entitled ‘Poisoning Your Children: The Perils of Secondhand Smoke’ is available from the……..(at www.epa.gov/docs/epajrnal/fall93/brown1.txt.html)”

These “recommendations” were also to be found in the improperly generated “fact sheet” that the EPA had been circulating long before 1993, and are a reiteration of the Godber Blueprint.

According to Stanton Glantz, founder of Californians for Nonsmokers’ Rights (later christened Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights), one of the key figures in the current antismoking phenomenon, preaching ETS “dangers” in the 1980’s, long before the first official report on “ETS and nonsmokers,” lists his qualification as a PhD. According to his online biography this degree was awarded in 1973 from
Stanford University in Applied Mechanics and Engineering Economic Systems. From this mechanical background, Glantz undertook a postdoctoral year at Stanford University in Cardiology (1975), and another postdoctoral year at the University of California (San Francisco) in cardiovascular research (1977). It appears that the connection to cardiology is in “applied mechanical” terms; he has no formal training in medicine. In 1977, Glantz was given the academic posting of assistant professor in Cardiology at UCSF; this was upgraded to a full professorship in 1987. Glantz is currently a Professor of Medicine and Director of the Center for Tobacco Control Research & Education at the University of California (San Francisco). It appears that the “medical” status serves essentially to “legitimize” the antitobacco status and exploit Glantz’s high profile in this area. Formal qualifications appear to be a non-requirement for Glantz. Even though he has no formal qualifications in economics, he has published studies on the economic impact of smoking bans on the hospitality industry. As expected, his ‘studies’ have typically indicated that there is either no or a positive economic impact - never a negative impact. Although his ‘studies’ have been evaluated as flawed by actual economists, they are cited by others in the antismoking industry as a basis for demanding smoking bans. Glantz has traveled to a variety of countries expounding that smoking bans are good for business.

James Repace, another key antismoking figure, has referred to himself as a ‘health physicist’, whatever this means, and, more recently, as a ‘secondhand smoke consultant’, whatever this means. His qualification is listed as an MSc in Physics (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ytz78c00, http://tobaccosmoke.org/user/james-repace). Repace demonstrates a sub-amateurish ‘expertise’ in mathematical modeling as applied to ETS. Unfortunately, he demonstrates, like others in the antismoker industry and epidemiology, an obliviousness to the actual requirements of coherent causal argument. There is constantly the assumption of cause, but never an explanation of cause. Through the assumption of cause, all manner of statistical claims can be made that only have sensibility in a statistical fantasy world.

Bliley (1993) highlighted that Repace was renown for fostering the misperception that his personal views were actually official EPA policy. In another such instance in the late-1990’s before retiring from EPA,  in providing consultation (personal views) for Kimball Plastics, Repace introduced the idea of smokers’ breath being ‘hazardous’ to nonsmokers. The view has no foundation in fact, and is a variation on the theme of ‘third hand smoke’. However, the Kimball Plastics official was left with the impression that the view was official EPA policy (see RASGD).

Repace has been passed off as a ‘Doctor’, e.g.,
Dr. James Repace, Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D.C. (1986)
James Repace, Ph.D.
At the 9th Annual National Preventive Medicine Meeting (March 1992), Repace is introduced for his speech as Doctor Repace. Repace does not correct the error.

Repace’s latest posting is as a ‘visiting professor’, Tufts University, School of Medicine -
Or, an adjunct professor at Tufts University School of Medicine -
Or, Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor, Tufts Univ. School of Medicine -

In 1998, five years after a law suit was filed by the tobacco industry, US District Court Judge W.L. Osteen invalidated EPA’s (1993) conclusion that secondhand smoke is a human carcinogen and, thus, vacated Chapters 1 through 6 (and related Appendices) of the EPA Report (1993). Amongst other impropriety Judge Osteen found that “EPA publicly committed to a conclusion before research had begun, excluded industry by violating [statutory] procedural requirements; adjusted established procedure and scientific norms to validate the Agency's public conclusion, and aggressively utilized [statutory] authority to disseminate findings to establish a de facto regulatory scheme intended to restrict Plaintiff's products and to influence public opinion”; He also concluded that “in conducting the ETS Risk Assessment, EPA disregarded information and made findings on selective information, did not disseminate significant epidemiologic information; deviated from its Risk Assessment Guidelines; failed to disclose important findings and reasoning; and left significant questions without answers. EPA's conduct left substantial holes in the administrative record. While so doing, EPA produced limited evidence, then claimed the weight of the Agency's research evidence demonstrated ETS causes cancer.”

The Osteen findings were entirely consistent with those of Bliley (1993). Judge Osteen vacated the adulthood section of EPA (1992/93), and, therefore, the classification of ETS as a Group A carcinogen. It is unclear why the tobacco industry only challenged the ‘adulthood’ section of EPA (1992/3); underlying corruption in procedure can also be leveled at the ‘childhood’ section of the report.

The antismoking bandwagon gained considerable momentum in the five years following the EPA report, prior to the Osteen ruling. Also important is that in the early 1990’s the pharmaceutical cartel and pharma-philanthropy (e.g., Robert Woods Johnson Foundation
http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?ia=143&id=14912) weighed into the circumstance. The WHO formally partnered with the pharmaceutical cartel in antismoking (http://www.who.int/inf-pr-1999/en/pr99-04.html) Also, “The American Medical Association, Chicago, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF), Princeton, N.J., planned, organized and conducted the 11th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, which was held in August 2000.” - http://www.rwjf.org/programareas/resources/product.jsp?id=17719&pid=1141 Seizing the opportunity for the sale of essentially useless ‘nicotine replacement therapy’ (NRT) if smokers are progressively pressured to quit, the pharmaceutical interests provided more and more funding and momentum to the antismoking bandwagon. So, despite the Osteen ruling, by the late-1990’s antismoking had become a frenzy. Antismokers, through long-time corrupt conduct, dictated all proceedings and antismoking was awash with funding. The march continued towards fulfilling the Godber Blueprint.

In 2002, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the 1998 Osteen ruling. The appeals court indicated that since EPA’s conclusions did not represent a regulatory finding, then the federal court had no jurisdiction over the matter. One of its major concerns was the possibility of a spate of lawsuits aimed at other governmental agencies providing interim, non-regulatory findings: This does not speak too highly for the judge’s confidence in the quality of information produced by such agencies. Importantly, is that the appeals court did not question the Federal Court’s judgments on the corrupt methodology and questionable conclusions of EPA. Interestingly, even though EPA’s conclusions were non-regulatory, its conclusions were used as the basis for smoking bans in numerous countries, e.g.,
Fourth Circuit ruling 2002

It is notable how, at least, sections of the antismoking lobby interpreted the appeals court decision. It goes a long way in indicating the underlying incompetence/fixation that literally compromises coherent reasoning. Sections of the lobby have interpreted the Appeals Court ruling as validating EPA (1992/3) conclusions, i.e., that the federal court’s ruling on flawed methodology and working to conclusions was incorrect! Some sections are public with their incoherent interpretation, while others are silent about their interpretation but act as if Osteen’s ruling was incorrect. http://www.tobacco.org/articles/org/93/?starting_at=105

On the heels of EPA (1992/3), in 1994 Action on Smoking and Health (John Banzhaf) filed a lawsuit against Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for OSHA to finalize the Indoor Air Quality Rule. The antismoking intent, and to the Godber Blueprint, was for OSHA, the regulatory authority, to determine a specific rule for ETS that would have smoking banned in all indoors.

The tobacco industry was obviously disturbed that on the review panel for OSHA hearings were none other than Stanton Glantz and James Repace - “the inclusion of two well-known anti-tobacco activists who are not OSHA employees but serve in an "official" capacity on the OSHA panel…” and tabled its objection
This hijacking of due process by antismoking activists to push the antismoking agenda follows the template of EPA. Notwithstanding its initial partiality to the antismoking bandwagon by including antismoking activists on its review panel, OSHA did not finalize the proposed rule through the 1990’s. OSHA contended that it needed more time to consider the relevant evidence, and the evidence to date did not warrant an antismoking determination. In 2001, with no finalization, ASH withdrew the lawsuit. It would seem that the possibility of OSHA finalizing the ETS-specific rule allowing for permissible levels of exposure was too unpalatable a prospect for antismoking. So, this pathway was sealed off.

With no specific rule for ETS, OSHA policy regarding ETS is that, in typical encounters with ETS, particular constituents of ETS fall within ‘permissible exposure limits’ (PELs).
“Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS)
Because the organic material in tobacco doesn't burn completely, cigarette smoke contains more than 4,700 chemical compounds. Although OSHA has no regulation that addresses tobacco smoke as a whole, 29 CFR 1910.1000 Air contaminants, limits employee exposure to several of the main chemical components found in tobacco smoke. In normal situations, exposures would not exceed these permissible exposure limits (PELs), and, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, OSHA will not apply the General Duty Clause to ETS.

For further information to offer to employers/employees as guidance, you may wish to review a document published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) about the health effects from environmental tobacco smoke, A Fact Sheet: Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking.”

Disturbing is that while OSHA did not cave-in to antismoking pressure over a considerable time, considering typical ETS exposure to not exceed relevant PELs, it nevertheless directs readers to the EPA ‘Fact Sheet’ compiled by an antismoking activist.

Unperturbed by the OSHA failure, the Godberites had already been working on another route. The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) is the primary technical society in the world in the field of heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) with about 50,000 members from 100 countries. Standards set by ASHRAE are used to set rules that become laws pertaining to indoor air quality.

ASHRAE was not new to the antismoking lobby. For example, James Repace had given a presentation at an ASHRAE event as far back as 1982
In 1999, Richard Daynard, a professor of public health and virulent antismoker, managed to ‘guide’ a new ASHRAE standard pertaining to indoor ETS.
“This culminates a 13-year effort on my part to get the 1989 language (and the earlier, similar, draft language) changed. I was a member of the ASHRAE committee that proposed the change. The tobacco industry, which was responsible for the 1989 language endorsing the lack of deleterious health effects in the presence of "a moderate amount of smoking," fought me (and, eventually, the great majority of the committee) at every turn.” http://no-smoking.org/june99/06-24-99-5.html

It appears most peculiar that an antismoking crusader managed to acquire an ASHRAE membership and considerable influence over this particular decision-making. It does, however, follow the pattern of antismokers infiltrating organizations to push the Godber Blueprint.

In 2004, AHRAE held a technical program to address ventilation of smoking spaces. Two of the four speakers were James Repace and Stanton Glantz.

In 2005, ASHRAE declared the incredulous proposition that no ventilation system can provide a ‘safe level’ of ETS exposure. The position was reiterated in 2008.
http://ca.geocities.com/ stevehar...lationworks.htm

ASHRAE position statement

At the time of this declaration Jonathon Samet was a Committee member of ASHRAE (and was still a member in 2008). The committee also included John Spengler and Thomas Houston, also antismoking activists.

James Repace (an associate member of ASHRAE
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ie/pdf/LBNL-63005.pdf) contributed his inimical ‘mathematical modeling’ to the circumstance: “Reduction of the risk of secondhand smoke exposure for Burswood Casino Staff to acceptable levels would require tornado like air exchange rates greater than 120,000 air changes per hour, or more than 3400 times the highest rates proposed by Lincolne Scott in its ventilation technology scheme for the Burswood Casino.” (p.2, 2005)
According to Repace, the only way to get ETS to an ‘acceptable’ level is to have ventilation power that can also suck the customers, the table cloths, the tables and other furniture, the espresso machine, the floor tiles and maybe a few feet into the bare earth up the ventilator extraction chute.

Interestingly, Repace does seem to believe that there is an ‘acceptable’ level of ETS, just that ventilation, according to his highly questionable ‘modeling’, cannot achieve it. ASHRAE also acknowledges that its position does not supersede that of OSHA, the regulatory authority for indoor air quality in the

To provide a context for the antismoking shenanigans concerning ventilation, consider an excerpt from the 8th World Conference (1992) above:
"It's a Ventilation Problem "
The tobacco industry loves to find other villains . This argument tries to imply that even if tobacco smoke is annoying, the real culprit is inadequate ventilation. Advocates should not be misled by this diversion; the best solution to the problems of ETS is to remove it at its source.

Argument: If you want to ensure that indoor air is really dean, shouldn't you remove all pollutants from the air? Isn't the real problem a lack of adequate ventilation?
* Ventilation systems are designed to conserve energy, not preserve clean indoor air . Even an expensive ventilation system that provided for six air changes a day would be overwhelmed by the ETS from a typical distribution of smokers. To provide enough ventilation to keep ETS to a safe level would cost US$30,000 per smoker .
* It makes a lot more sense to remove the source of the pollution than to try to clean it up afterward."

The antismoking argument in 1992 was that ventilation could keep ETS at a ‘safe level’, but that it was prohibitive cost-wise. The antismoker solution - ban smoking. Indeed, through the 1990’s there may have been those willing to bear the cost of ventilation or that the cost of ventilation was nowhere that indicated by antismokers. The antismoker ‘argument’ then quickly shifted from ventilation being cost-prohibitive to it being technically impossible (Repace). In the antismoker mentality there is no room for accommodation. They do not want even some, let alone many, places that allow smoking. Antismokers, by the Godber Blueprint, want smoking banned in all indoors and then in all outdoors. Through all of the antismoking rhetoric and antics, the manipulation and propaganda, the bottom line is always that the ‘reasonable’ position is to ban smoking. For example, Repace (2005) posits “….establishes air quality goals which produce air pollution levels consistent with massively unacceptable health risks for casino workers, and fails to compare the efficacy of its proposed ventilation technology to actual “best practice”, i.e., smoking bans.”

Despite the ASHRAE position of ‘no safe level’ of ETS through ventilation not overriding the OSHA standard, the ASHRAE position has been useful to the antismoking crusade. The ASHRAE position has been included in advocacy kits. There is no mention at all of the regulatory OSHA standard. Advocates then push the idea that ventilation is no option with the imprimatur of ASHRAE, only complete bans are viable, and that bans are only/always beneficial economically. Any challenging of this position is to be viewed as tobacco industry ‘conspiracy’. Notice too, that an ‘advocate’ need have no knowledge at all of any relevant matters. They simply need to parrot the agenda guidelines. Worse still is that there have been many decision-makers more than eager to embrace the insanity.

Having made inroads into establishing indoor smoking bans, antismoking, following the Godber Blueprint, has extended to the outdoors. Some councils have already banned smoking in parks, on beaches, etc.
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2009/10/29/smoking_ban_in_ayer_covers_the_great_outdoors/). Some universities have banned smoking on the entire campus (e.g., http://www.charlotteobserver.com/local/story/1013210.html). And, providing the ‘evidence’ justifying such bans is none other than James Repace. Repace (2005b) contends, using his ‘mathematical modeling’ technique, that “[s]econdhand smoke causes a number of acute symptoms (eye, nose, and throat irritation, headaches, dizziness, and nausea) and chronic diseases (lung and nasal sinus cancer and heart disease). Students or faculty passing through the cloud of smoke would encounter detectable levels at about 7 meters (23 feet) from a smoker, and irritating levels at 4 meters (13 feet). Moreover, smokers in proximity to a doorway as persons enter or depart, may result in smoke being inducted into the building, posing a chronic threat as well as an acute one, to building occupants.”

According to Repace, and in typical catastrophization style, smokers in proximity to a doorway ultimately pose a ‘chronic’ and an ‘acute’ threat to building occupants. Repace fails to note that “eye, nose, and throat irritation, headaches, dizziness, and nausea” are all typical of anxiety reactions and somatization. This would fully be expected given three-plus decades of fear-mongering, antismoking propaganda.

In another ‘study’, Repace (2008) concludes:
“This new data confirms public intuition, demonstrating that public demand for smoke-free outdoor spaces is not “going too far,” and justifies policies banning smoking in outdoor locations, in vehicles, where people congregate in public, or where workers are placed at risk, such as outdoor cafés.”

Yet, even with Repace’s ‘evidence’, it is difficult to conceive of an ‘ETS threat’ to nonsmokers in large parks. It doesn’t matter: The role of antismoking is to provide whatever manipulation, propaganda and contrivance to advance the Godber Blueprint to its conclusion. Given that a considerable portion of the nonsmoking population has been brainwashed into antismoking bigotry over a protracted period, the argument is that, in accordance with Godber, nonsmokers, particularly children, should not have to put up with the sight of people smoking lest it offend their sensibilities.

Repace has also been instrumental in providing ETS-attributed mortality statistics. Consider a 2004 ‘study’ commissioned by the New South Wales Cancer Council. Page five of the report demonstrates how easy it all is in the antismoking world. One begins with a statistical ‘death toll’ from the
USA. This involves converting attributable risk to attributable numbers, and then simply calling the latter attributable ‘causation’. This is ‘causation’ without any causal explanation, i.e., assumed causation. It is an entirely nonsensical, arithmetic exercise. Then simply scale the USA ‘death toll’ for the Australian and New Zealand populations, another nonsensical, arithmetic exercise, and, presto, more instant ‘death tolls’. With another simple arithmetic step, a country’s ‘death toll’ can be subdivided for States - presto, more instant ‘death tolls’.

Then Repace did a tour of
Australia, sponsored by the Cancer Council.
In this TV appearance, Repace’s study is introduced as “an alarming new study by a
US expert for the NSW Cancer Council…. It estimates that every month in NSW alone five pub or club employees are dying from heart disease or lung cancer as a result of breathing in other people's cigarette smoke.” Other notable quotes: “But the Cancer Council says only a total ban will protect employers from massive compensation payouts in the future”; “What we don't know so well is how many people working next to the smokers are killed”; “We are talking about a very large number of deaths in a very small section of the workforce”; “But it's also one [profession] he never realised could be so dangerous”; “I seriously thought that the results of our study would be that we'd call for better signage of these areas”; “James Repace of Tufts University, in Boston, says it would kill an average of five workers a Month”; “Professor Repace says there'll be more legal claims”; “Balance doesn't come into it for the Cancer Council. It wants a total ban”; “The costs of delay are unacceptable. For every month of delay, there are at least five workers who will lose their lives, and others will experience an avoidable illness”; “We don't want to lose lives to environmental smoke.”

Repace claimed “It's fairly clear they [barworkers] work in a sea of pollution”; “I think the bulk of those deaths are from heart disease, perhaps 10 per cent of them are from lung cancer and there's a good indication that there are many other diseases which are caused by second-hand smoke, things like brain cancer, breast cancer, leukaemia, cervical cancer and the like”; “I've been involved in perhaps 40 legal cases and labour arbitrations going all the way back to the early 1980s and the plaintiffs in the cases I've been involved in have a six-one win-loss record. And so I think if you can establish reasonably well what the exposure was like - and we can do that very well now with mathematical models or with symmetry - it's practically impossible to lose a case”; “I would describe them as among the most polluted that I've ever seen. The levels there were the highest that have been measured anywhere. And I would be very concerned about that.”

The TV report had the standard inflammatory propaganda and threats of legal action.

Repace had been in
Australia five years earlier, sponsored by the National Heart Foundation. In a report summarizing Repace’s visit, it inaccurately refers to Repace as Doctor. It also noted key points made by Repace, i.e., standard antismoking propaganda seeking total indoor smoking bans:
* There is an international scientific consensus that secondhand smoke kills
* Secondhand smoke under typical conditions of smoker density and ventilation poses unacceptable risks to nonsmokers
* Secondhand smoke cannot be controlled to acceptable levels of risk by ventilation or air cleaning
* There is no objective evidence to support the claim that going smoke-free imposes economic penalties on owners.

Remember that an ever-growing band of antismokers, endorsed by the medical establishment and Public Health, has been doing the same all over the globe.

The antismoking crusade of the last three-plus decades has been a manipulation of decision-makers, the media and the public in its attempt to impose its deranged cultic will on societies around the world. It represents a litany of lies. The typical inflammatory propaganda concerning active smoking and ETS is lies. The antismoking claim that it is only interested in ‘protecting’ nonsmokers from ETS is a lie. The claim that it is only following ‘emerging data’ is a lie. The claim that it only wanted some accommodation for nonsmokers indoors is a lie. The claim that only bans indoors have been sought is a lie. The claim that antismokers mean smokers well is a lie. The claim that antismokers are honest is a lie. The claim that antismokers are benevolent is a lie.

The goal from the outset has been to bring the Godber Blueprint - a fixed, rigid position - to fruition: Smoking to be banned in public - indoors and outdoors - leaving a small group of ‘irretrievable addicts’ to practice their ‘filthy’ habit in private and away from ‘superior’ nonsmokers. The antismoking crusade has done whatever necessary to advance the Blueprint in orchestrated steps. ‘Studies’, the choice/exclusion of data, and interpretations have been tailored to fit the Blueprint. Apparently Public Health believes it autocratically rules society. No-one is permitted to disagree with Public Health without attracting retribution. If people choose to continue smoking, even if it reflects disagreement with the claims of Public Health, they will be ostracized and labeled an ‘irretrievable addict’.

Just one of the dysfunctional aspects of the antismoker mentality is pathological lying:
“A pathological liar is usually defined as someone who lies incessantly to get their way and does so with little concern for others. Pathological lying is often viewed as coping mechanism developed in early childhood and it is often associated with some other type of mental health disorder. A pathological liar is often goal-oriented (i.e., lying is focused - it is done to get one's way). Pathological liars have little regard or respect for the rights and feelings of others. A pathological liar often comes across as being manipulative, cunning and self-centered.” (http://www.truthaboutdeception.com/confront_a_liar/public/pathological-compulsive.html) The core group of antismokers that concoct ‘strategies’, ‘tactics’, and propaganda, in their quest to ‘save the world’ - a goal that must be accomplished - are given over to lying on a pathological scale. And within a closed, cultic framework such as antismoking, devotees reinforce each other’s psychopathology: Success is not measured by accuracy of claims and integrity of conduct, but by whether smoking bans and their extent have been instituted. Morality is not defined by honesty and integrity of conduct. These usual moral characteristics have been substituted in antismoking, as an aspect of strong delusion, with the ‘high moral virtue’ of being a nonsmoker.

The antismoking crusade has mangled the edicts of scientific enquiry and coherent statistical and causal inference beyond recognition. It has manipulated the psychology, sociology, morality, and politics of nations around the world. As a scientific undertaking, antismoking is a fake. As a scholarly undertaking, antismoking is a fake. As health promotion, it is a fake, being a comprehensive attack on, at least, psychological, social, moral, and political health. As a moral crusade, it is a fake, relying almost exclusively on chicanery, dishonesty, impropriety, self-interest, haughtiness and greed. Inflammatory antismoking propaganda has produced enmity and social division between family members, between spouses, between parents and children, between colleagues, and between strangers. Remember that antismoking billed itself as the ‘good’ in the mythological battle between good and evil - another lie. The antismoker cult assumed the moral high ground which it neither has nor merits. Yet, in three-decades, it has never been called in official circles on this entirely questionable assumption.

When proposing the first smoking bans in the 1980’s, leading antismokers were questioned about the ‘slippery slope’; whether one ban would lead to another, to another. There was also the problem of the slippery slope regarding attempting to apply the ‘successes’ of antismoking to other issues, e.g., food, alcohol. Snowdon provides an excellent summary of the antismoker lies and the slippery slope:
More references:
The following links demonstrate the duplicity of ASH UK and the slippery slope in pressing for pub smoking bans in that country.

The effect on those that smoke has been devastating, e.g.,
* Smoking has been banished from indoors in workplaces, smokers having to go outdoors in whatever weather to smoke;
* Smoking has been banished from indoors in social places, smokers having to go outdoors in whatever weather to smoke;
* Smoking is being banned in outdoor settings, smokers having no option to smoke - without breaking the law;
* Smokers have been refused the possibility of fostering and adopting children;
* Smoking status has been used to determine child custody in divorce;
* Smokers can be terminated from employment or are ineligible for employment;
* People have lost businesses due to smoking bans;
* Smokers, including the elderly, have been threatened with eviction or refused tenancy;
* Patients that smoke have to endure the barrage of antismoking cultism in hospital settings, and must walk off hospital grounds and onto the street - even in their nightwear - if they want to smoke;
* Mental patients will be physically and/or chemically (sedation) restrained rather than have them smoke a cigarette;
* Smokers have been denied medical treatment;
* Socializing for many smokers, particularly the elderly, has all but been removed.


Smokers have been slandered no end. They have been referred to as ‘just addicts’, filthy, killers, abusers of children, polluters, etc., etc. Just a fraction of such slander directed at any other social group would attract immediate condemnation. Yet, with smokers, it is state-sponsored bigotry under the ‘guidance’ of the antismoking lobby.

These are all intended consequences of the denormalization/abnormalization/dehumanizing strategy of antismoking. It is all considered positive and progressive by antismoking, advancing the Godber Blueprint. In actuality, it is a repugnant, vile, ‘victory’ for the dangerously deluded and bigoted. And, it does not speak too highly for the numerous societies that have empowered antismoking.

Nonsmokers, too, have been brainwashed, mentally assaulted, into false belief, fear and bigotry. There is a considerable segment of the nonsmoker population that are demonstrating anxiety reactions and somatization - e.g,
headache, eye or throat irritation, palpitations, breathlessness, labored breathing, chest tightness, dry mouth, feeling of choking, fear of sudden death, dizziness, hot flushes or cold chills, etc. - due to inflammatory propaganda. The antismoking rhetoric then assigns these psychogenically-produced symptoms to the physiological effects of ETS exposure. Other nonsmokers have been brainwashed into fake superiority (bigotry). Many nonsmokers have become inadvertent devotees of the antismoker cult. It should bother nonsmokers that they have been used as pawns in a deranged ideo-political quest. It should also bother them if they have been easily given over to the brainwashing.

A good example of ‘normalized’ cultic bigotry is New York City Mayor, Michael Bloomberg. He has instituted indoor smoking bans and is contemplating outdoor (parks) bans. He has donated considerable amounts to Tobacco Control. He also encourages the harassment of smokers: “The Mayor of New York, a former smoker himself, has even encouraged the harassment of smokers by saying that giving them "a not particularly nice look" when passing them in the street has shown that "social pressure really does work".”
It is the Mayor that should be apologizing, at the least, for the ease and depth with which he has been brainwashed and his eagerness to promote divisive cultic beliefs.

A long-time Tobacco Control advocate, Michael Siegel, M.D., who has distanced himself from the more extreme element of antismoking, indicates on his blog:

“Of course I was thrown off off the list-serve. Any comments that are not supportive of the established anti-smoking cause and its aggressive agenda - which includes attacking individual citizens with no affiliation with Big Tobacco - are automatically viewed as non-constructive and non-productive and therefore, the dissenter must be immediately silenced. There is truly no room for dissent in the tobacco control movement. Dissent is met swiftly and firmly with censorship. The movement will not allow dissenting views to be heard, lest advocates consider those views and decide to challenge the prevailing wisdom and tactics of the movement.

It is quite clear that the smoke-free list-serve wants to preserve itself as a forum where members can take pot shots at smoking ban opponents and make false insinuations that attack their integrity and character, even without documentation of any inappropriate activity. The list-serve wants to remain free for these inflammatory personal attacks to take place, without being challenged by anyone who might feel that personal smear campaigns like this are inappropriate and potentially defamatory.

While the list-serve is advertised as a forum to exchange information and strategies for achieving smoke-free air, it has recently become more of a forum for advocates to let out their hatred of smoking ban opponents, and smear them with unfounded personal attacks that cannot be challenged because the forum is private and thus their victims are not provided an opportunity to defend themselves. ANR [Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights] is clearly trying to protect the freedom of smoke-free advocates to conduct these smear campaigns in peace, without having to worry about being challenged on their facts, on the truth, and on the ethics of conducting such smear campaigns in the first place.

As far as the accuracy of my comments, ANR did not mention in its note what aspect of my post it is claiming was allegedly inaccurate. I stand by my commentary and so far, no one has pointed out to me any inaccuracies in what I wrote. Moreover, everyone on the list saw the precise communication to which I was responding and so they are all free to judge the accuracy of the posting. In my extensive communications with Tim Filler himself, Tim did not point out any inaccuracies in what I wrote.

…..If you take part in secondhand smoke policy training in the tobacco control movement, chances are that you will be taught that all opposition to smoking bans is orchestrated by the tobacco industry, that anyone who challenges the science connecting secondhand smoke exposure and severe health effects is a paid lackey of Big Tobacco, and that any group which disseminates information challenging these health effects is a tobacco industry front group. Consequently, the a chief strategy of tobacco control is to smear the opposition by accusing them of being tobacco industry moles. And in no situation should one say anything positive about an opponent, even if true.

How do I know this?

Because for many years, I was one of the main trainers of tobacco control advocates in the United States. And this is what I taught, because this was what I was led to believe. I attended many conferences and trainings and this is precisely what I was taught. I accepted it for the truth, and passed it along to others.

These ideas ran counter to my own pre-conceived and firmly held ideas about the nature of opposition to smoking bans and to challenges of the health effects of secondhand smoke. After all, I had many good friends who challenged the connection between secondhand smoke and chronic disease, so I "knew" that not everyone who challenges the science is a Big Tobacco lackey. I also had met many of the opponents of smoking bans and it never occurred to me that they were tobacco moles. Nevertheless, this wisdom was so strongly imparted upon me in the trainings (which were largely delivered by, or influenced by ANR) that I came to believe this information, even though it was at odds with my pre-conceived beliefs.

Importantly, only one perspective on this issue was presented to us in the trainings. There was no room for disagreement or challenge. These ideas were presented as scientific facts, not subject to debate. In fact, if we were to challenge the ideas, the implication was that we - ourselves - might be accused of working for Big Tobacco or receiving secret payoffs.

The most prominent and dogmatic idea presented to us was that "The debate is over." There is no room for questioning of the link between secondhand smoke and chronic disease. Anyone who challenges that link or suggests that it is being exaggerated must therefore be a front for the tobacco industry. No reasonable person - acting of their own accord - would challenge this undebatable science.”
(November 30, 2009)

Siegel is highlighting the modus operandi of the antismoker cult from the outset. In more recent posts, Siegel has highlighted the current antismoking theme of declines in heart attacks following smoking bans. This theme was begun by none other than Stanton Glantz with the
Helena ‘miracle’. In one instance, there is highlighted a compounding of lies, working to a conclusion, by the Institute of Medicine in its proposing that smoking bans produce declines in heart attacks (http://tobaccoanalysis.blogspot.com/ Oct 21, 22, 23). And, “[t]he Committee held a public meeting in which it heard presentations by experts in the field covering various topics. According to the report, the topic of smoking bans was only presented by one expert: Dr. Stan Glantz.”

Even more disturbing is that there has long been a closed propaganda loop between Public Health, the media, and the public. No contrary view can get a look in. Delinquent claims are disseminated to an unquestioning media, and inflicted onto the public - usually with further catastrophization. Antismoking groups then call for bans, or institute bans, based on the publicity. The timing of events is orchestrated.
Siegel provides other useful information on the consequences of antismoking delusion.

ETS ‘danger’ is the ‘sacred’ dictum of the antismoker cult: The entire movement rests on this one idea. It is aggressively protected lest the antismoking ‘house of cards’ come tumbling down. Anyone daring to question this dictum with contrary data or argument attracts immediate personal attack (argument ad hominem) and attempted censorship. Some that have attracted such attack are Enstrom & Kabat and Carl Phillips, e.g.,
http://smokles.wordpress.com/ (December 6, 2009)

Godber’s 1975 call to “[s]et up committees of sophisticated politicians and economists in every country to help pursue stated goals” has long been realized. There is now a very large global network of persons, cutting across a variety of professions, partial to antismoking. Antismoking has aligned a large number of organizations and created many more of its own.

Antismoking is generally serviced by GLOBAlink. “GLOBALink has been a membership program of the International Union Against Cancer (UICC) since 1993, devoted to serving the global tobacco control community in the fight against the use and promotion of tobacco products. It provides a user-friendly mean of information exchange through the Internet and email, exclusively for people working in tobacco control. GLOBALink is a vital tool for policy makers and campaigners and is particularly useful in that it provides a forum for discussion free from tobacco industry scrutiny.
GLOBALink's community-reviewed membership has grown from less than 50 at the start to an over 6,200-strong group of tobacco control professionals from 155 countries.”

Not indicated on its website is that GLOBlink provides a forum for discussion free from tobacco industry scrutiny, but also free from public scrutiny. It is essentially a clandestine organization.

Antismoking has grown exponentially, specifically on the back of ETS ‘harm’. GLOBAlink membership has gone from 50 to 6,200 in just over a decade. The World Conferences on Tobacco Or Health have gone from 500 attendees in 1975 to 5,000 at the 11th World Conference in 2000 and with a budget of $10,000,000.

“The American Medical Association,
Chicago, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF), Princeton, N.J., planned, organized and conducted the 11th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, which was held in August 2000.
The 11th World Conference on Tobacco OR Health, "Promoting A Future Without Tobacco," the largest tobacco-control conference in history, took place in
Chicago on August 6-11, 2000. The conference was the venue for release of "Reducing Tobacco Use: A Report of the Surgeon General."

More than 5,000 people representing more than 173 countries attended the conference.

Holding the conference in the
United States, something that had not occurred since 1975, would mean that many more American tobacco-control researchers and activists, including RWJF grantees, could attend and learn from the experiences of other countries. Furthermore, the year 2000, the year scheduled for the 11th WCTOH, was a particularly significant one for the U.S. tobacco-control movement because it was the target date former Surgeon General Everett Koop had set in the late 1980s for a smoke-free society.

….. A wide spectrum of other funders, including ACS, the American Legacy Foundation, Pharmacia and the United Nations Foundation/WHO, supplied major grant and in-kind support totaling nearly $8 million of the WCTOH's $10 million budget. (See Appendix 4 for a list of core supporters.) To identify needs and more funding sources, ACS created the resource acquisition committee that worked with two fund-raising firms.”

Antismoking now attracts obscene levels of funding: There are billions of dollars annually in Tobacco Control. Given that Tobacco Control is essentially propagandistic advocacy, it attracts a variety of persons, e.g., the obsessed with control, the ideologically misguided, the moralistic, the narcissistic, the greedy, the terrified, bigots, careerists, etc, etc. There are workshops and conferences year round; there are world conferences every three years. Antismokers have many functions and dinners where they bestow awards and accolades on one another for their great ‘service’. It is an autocratic, incestuous network. It is always right; dissent towards the ‘orthodoxy’ is always wrong. There is now a substantial, unelected, bureaucracy that did not exist 25 years ago. This bureaucracy has direct, unquestioned access to the media and policy makers.

Governments are given over to antismoking. Governmental funding of research is directed to antismoking interests. Researchers quickly get the gist of what attracts funding if they want their careers to advance. There have been thousands upon thousands of funded studies into smoking and ETS that ‘magically’ happen to support an antismoking conclusion or indicate an antismoking conclusion with further research. Yet, one would be hard-pressed to find one, repeat - one, officially funded piece of research scrutinizing the antismoking mentality. Antismoking lends itself well to research. It has a long (500 year), sordid history (see RASGD, Velvet Glove Iron Fist). Yet, there is no research.

For the last nearly three decades, antismoking has dominated all proceedings. It has defined all terms of reference, research themes and all policy agenda. And, as has been indicated, it has acquired its social status and wealth through chicanery. The antismoking lobby has been well aware of its acceptance as credible by politicians, the media and the public. It has fully exploited this perceived credibility to spread inflammatory propaganda to advance the Godber Blueprint. Where an entity spreads lies while at the same time promoting itself as scientifically credible and scholarly would be defined as fraud. In many other areas this would rightly be considered criminal conduct. Antismoking fraud has allowed it to improperly gain social status, manipulation of public policy, and attract very, very large amounts of funding. It is sad testimony to the state of academia, the media, the medical establishment, and governments the world over that the conduct of antismoking is not only not seen as criminal - a white-collar, multi-billion dollar racket - but is being fed to flourish.

Governments have given themselves over to globalist policy (i.e., the UN/WHO):

History of the WHO FCTC process

“Later that year, the Forty-ninth Session of the WHA adopted Resolution WHA49.17, "International framework convention for tobacco control", requesting the Director-General to initiate the development of a Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. As a result of this resolution, WHO's first treaty-making enterprise was formally launched.

In 1998 newly-elected WHO Director-General, Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland made global tobacco control a priority through the establishment of a Cabinet Project, the Tobacco Free Initiative, to focus international attention, resources and action upon the global tobacco epidemic. New multisectoral partnerships reflecting the nature of the action were developed. More importantly, Dr Brundtland worked with Member States to secure a negotiating mandate for the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and set about the task of mobilizing public and political opinion in favour of global rules for tobacco control.

On 21 May 2003, the 56th World Health Assembly, unanimously adopted the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control[8]. The Convention was opened for signature, for a period of one year, from 16 June 2003 to 22 June 2003 at WHO headquarters in Geneva and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York, from 30 June 2003 to 29 June 2004. The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control is a landmark for the future of global public health and has major implications for WHO’s health goals. The conclusion of the negotiating process and the unanimous adoption of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, in full accordance with Health Assembly resolutions, represents a milestone for the promotion of public health and provides new legal dimensions for international health cooperation.”

WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

"The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) is the first treaty negotiated under the auspices of the World Health Organization. It was adopted by the World Health Assembly on 21 May 2003 and entered into force on 27 February 2005. It has since become one of the most widely embraced treaties in UN history and, as of today, has already 167 Parties.

The WHO FCTC was developed in response to the globalization of the tobacco epidemic and is an evidence-based treaty that reaffirms the right of all people to the highest standard of health. The Convention represents a milestone for the promotion of public health and provides new legal dimensions for international health cooperation."

(Note: all emphases added)

“The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (FCTC) places governments under international obligation to implement tobacco control policies. As part of the world alliance against smoking, Singapore ratified the WHO FCTC on 14 May 2004, signifying its commitment in the global fight against tobacco abuse.
WHO released MPOWER in 2008, a policy package that builds on the measures of the FCTC that have been proven to reduce smoking prevalence. To implement the package, countries need to:
Monitor tobacco use and prevention policies
Protect people from tobacco smoke
Offer help to quit tobacco use
Warn about the dangers of tobacco
Enforce bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship
Raise taxes on tobacco


The suggestion that WHO made global tobacco control a priority in 1998 is just another blatant lie in a litany of lies in this antismoking saga. Anti-tobacco was a priority of WHO - self-authorized - since the late-1960’s. The Godber Blueprint (under the auspices of WHO) was established, more than 20 years earlier, in 1975.

Contemporary antismoking is a study in how a very small group of persons given over to considerable mental impairment and deranged ideology, representing a globalist organization, duped the world into cultic submission. And, it was important to WHO that this small group comprised fixated, rigid, ideologically-deluded persons. For this type of person, legitimate criticism ‘rolls off the back’: They simply continue with their fixation. Nations have relinquished their independence, handing over policy-control to an answer-to-no-one global organization. WHO is not a ‘health’ organization: It is a medical organization. A medico-materialist, perverse, idea of ‘health’ (healthism) has been inflicted upon, and accepted, by the world. This is a [temporary] win for Global Statism. Public Health has been used by the UN as a mode of infiltrating countries around the world, stripping them of their cultural, social and political heritage, and aligning them with Global Statism: Nations are being undermined by globalist and medical-establishment concerns. Numerous nations are being ‘homogenized’, ‘uniformized’, into the cult of the body and healthism. It highlights, firstly, that the medical establishment is dangerously venturing - again - to social domination, this time on a global scale; and, secondly, how poverty-stricken of depth of thought that many nations are. Even with the advantage of hindsight, of only recent history (i.e., the Nazi medical establishment), the same errors are being revisited. This time on a far grander scale.

Attention needs to be given to the role of ‘charitable’ organizations (e.g., Cancer Societies) and ‘philanthropy’ (e.g., Rockefeller, Robert Woods Johnson Foundation) in manipulating public policy. Their stance on particular issues places them on a par with political parties. Yet, they by-pass due political process (i.e., scrutiny and election) and wield very large sums of funding to manipulate policy formulation through ‘advocacy’ groups.

Followers of the recent Climategate scandal will see many parallels between the conduct of Tobacco Control and Climate Control. At the root of the idea of anthropogenic climate change is, again, the UN. Through emissions trading, the UN would be able to further loot countries around the world and further dictate the day-to-day lives of citizens.

What Can Be Done To Stem The ‘Hemorrhaging’.

The antismoking cult demonstrates the typical symptoms of tyranny. It claims that its move to its current conquest is its last, even while it is plotting its next conquests. It has demonstrated by its aggressive exclusion of all but its own perspective, that the mental impairments involved preclude it from coherent reasoning. It must simply be exposed for the corruption that it represents.

Firstly, disseminate this information.
Secondly, antismoking needs to be recognized as a cult. When you now hear a devotee push the superiorist orthodox line, indicate that you are aware of how the cult operates and that you don’t want to hear any more of the fear and hate-mongering.
Thirdly, pass on the information to anyone in academia, the media, government, and the legal establishment that indicates even the slightest interest.
Fourthly, litigation directed at antismoking groups and government health departments (for having embraced antismoking delusion) for deceptive and fraudulent practices. There is a strong history of peddling self-serving, inflammatory propaganda under the guise of scientific credibility, scholarship, and health promotion. Inflammatory propaganda is incitement to irrational belief, fear and hatred. An entire bureaucracy and funding network has been built on fraud and an assault on multi-dimensional health.

Useful Links


Klaus K blog, Denmark - 
(Thanks to Klaus K. for reference to 3rd World Conference on Smoking and Health)


Christopher Snowdon - Velvet Glove, Iron Fist

Michael McFadden - Dissecting Antismokers’ Brains

Tobacco Plant Science

bkrampt01 at optusnet.com.au                                               V-R Di Pierri © 2009